



**German Delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly  
&  
Gert Weisskirchen  
Personal Representative of the  
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism**

**Expert Forum on**

# **Combating Antisemitism – Challenges and Successful Strategies**

**German Bundestag, Berlin  
Marie-Elisabeth Lüders Building, Conference Room**

**25 January 2008**

**Contributions from the Experts**

## Program of the Conference

09:00 – 10:00 Service of remembrance in the German Bundestag on the occasion of Victims of National Socialism Day (video transmission to conference room)

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11:00 – 11:30 Opening and greetings

**Dr. Norbert Lammert**

President of the German Bundestag

**Dr. Angela Merkel**

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Ambassador René Nyberg**

Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Finland

11:30 – 13:00 Panel: **Education on the Holocaust and Antisemitism**

Speakers:

**Aycan Demirel**, Kreuzberg Initiative against Antisemitism (KiGA e.V.), Germany

**Michał Bilewicz**, Forum for dialogue Among Nations, Poland

**Alla Gerber**, Holocaust Foundation, Russia

**Wolf Kaiser**, Memorial and Education Center Haus der Wannseekonferenz

Chair:

**Ingolf Seidel**, Task Force: Education on Antisemitism, Germany

13:00 – 13:30 Buffet in break-out area

13:30 – 15:15 Panel: **Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat Them**

Speakers:

**Carine Bloch**, Vice-President, Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (LICRA), France

**Rafal Pankowski**, Never Again Association, Poland

**Martin Endemann**, Alliance of Active Football Fans (BAFF e.V.), Germany

**Dr. Gregor Rosenthal**, Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance (BfDT)

Chair:

**Michael Whine**, President, Government and International Affairs, Community Security Trust, United Kingdom

- 15:15 – 16:45 Panel: **Antisemitic Tendencies in the Academic Context and Successful Strategies to Combat Them**
- Speakers:  
**David Hirsh**, University of London, founder of "Engage", United Kingdom  
**Prof. Dr. Lars Rensmann**, MMZ Fellow, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA  
**Dr. Yves Pallade**, B’Nai Brith Europe, Germany  
**Irina Scherbakova**, Memorial, Russia
- Chair:  
**Prof. Gert Weisskirchen**, Member of the German Bundestag, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism, Germany
- 16:45 – 17:00 Coffee break
- 17:00 – 18:45 Panel discussion: **The Role of Europe's Parliaments in Combating Antisemitism**
- Speakers:  
**Prof. Dr. Cornelius Weiss**, Member of the State Parliament of Saxony, Germany  
**Gitta Connemann**, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany  
**Petra Pau**, MdB, Vice-President of the German Bundestag, Germany  
**Hellmut Königshaus**, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany
- Chair:  
**John Mann**, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, United Kingdom
- 18:45 – 19:15 Conclusions  
**Rabbi Andrew Baker**, American Jewish Committee (AJC), USA  
**Prof. Gert Weisskirchen**, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany

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# 1. Panel: Education on the Holocaust and Antisemitism

## 1.1. *Einführung zum Panel Bildungsarbeit zum Thema Holocaust und Antisemitismus*

Ingolf Seidel

Die Beschäftigung mit Bildungsarbeit zu den Themen Holocaust und Antisemitismus in einem gemeinsamen Panel birgt verschiedene Problematiken in sich und wirft Fragestellungen auf, von denen ich einige in der gebotenen Kürze skizzieren möchte.

An zentraler Stelle steht für mich die Präzisierung der Thematik, die mit Fragen von Erwartungen an die Bildungsarbeit verknüpft ist. Kann historisch-politische Bildungsarbeit zum Holocaust gegen aktuelle Äußerungsformen von Antisemitismus angehen und ihre – wie auch immer geartete Zielgruppe – zugleich aufklären und immunisieren? Darin enthalten sind auch Fragen zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen pädagogischer Interventionen überhaupt sowie danach, ob die Beschäftigung mit Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust als eine Grundlage für eine Ethikerziehung dienen kann und soll.

Historisch-politische Bildungsarbeit kann die verschiedenen geschichtlichen Entwicklungslinien des Antisemitismus in Europa darstellen, nachvollziehbar machen und aufzeigen wie jüdische und nicht-jüdische Erfahrungen durch christlichen Antijudaismus und Antisemitismus geprägt sind. Dabei sollte die jüdische Geschichte weder nur auf die Shoah reduziert werden, noch ausschließlich als Verfolgungs- oder Opfergeschichte dargestellt werden, um nicht stereotype Wahrnehmung vom Jüdinnen und Juden zu reproduzieren.

Historische Bildung zum Nationalsozialismus, zur Shoah und zu anderen NS-Massenverbrechen sollte ein selbstverständlicher Teil von Bildung und Erziehung sein und dementsprechender Bestandteil der Curricula. Wie sinnvoll es allerdings ist dieses Wissen, das zwangsläufig mit Fragen von Werten und Moral gekoppelt ist, in Form von Schulnotenvergabe zu beurteilen sei dahingestellt.

Grundsätzlich wäre dazu zu raten, die, zum Teil sehr hohen, gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen an die historisch-politische Bildung und die Pädagogik überhaupt zu dämpfen. Die Problematik, die sich hieraus für manche Pädagoginnen und Pädagogen ergibt brachte Robert Sigel von der Bayerischen Landeszentrale für politische Bildung jüngst in einem Interview mit dem Magazin Focus auf den Punkt:

„Pädagogen, vor allem die besonders engagierten, überfordern sich oft bei dem Thema. Sie haben einen ungeheuren Anspruch an sich selbst: Sie wollen die Fakten vermitteln, gleichzeitig haben sie einen moralischen Anspruch, wollen zur Toleranz erziehen, rechtsradikalem Denken und Antisemitismus vorbeugen. Sie packen alles in dieses eine Thema – das ist zuviel.“<sup>1</sup>

Weder eine Schockpädagogik, die durch Grauen überzeugen will, noch Frontalunterricht oder eine moralisch aufgeladene Erwartungshaltung an Jugendliche wird die Fähigkeiten zur Empathie und zum Perspektivwechsel, beides Eckpfeiler zeitgemäßer pädagogischer Konzepte, befördern.

Vielmehr wäre eine zentrale Erwartung an diejenigen, die auf dem Feld bildnerisch und pädagogisch arbeiten, dass sie sich mit ihren eigenen Verstrickungen in Geschichte und Erinnerung sowie in familiäre und gesellschaftliche Tradierungen auseinandersetzen. Für die

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.focus.de/schule/schule/unterricht/interview\\_aid\\_229997.html](http://www.focus.de/schule/schule/unterricht/interview_aid_229997.html) (eingesehen am 14.01.08)

Mehrzahl der heute in der Bildungsarbeit tätigen gilt, dass ihr eigenes Wissen über den Nationalsozialismus und die Shoa, bedingt durch den generationellen Abstand, ein vermitteltes Wissen ist. Für Pädagoginnen und Pädagogen stellt sich dabei die Frage wie bewusst sie mit ihrer eigenen Verstrickung in die Geschichte, in nationale Narrative und in Familiengeschichten, umgehen und wie stark ein solches Geschichtsbewusstsein in ihre Bildungsarbeit einfließt.

An zeitgemäße Konzepte der historischen Bildung und an solche zu aktuellem Antisemitismus stellt sich weiterhin die Frage wie sie sich zu der zunehmend multiethnischen Zusammensetzung ihrer jugendlichen Klientel zu stellen. Gerade die unterschiedlichen familiengeschichtlichen Narrative bieten eine Möglichkeit zur Bereicherung des pädagogischen Prozesses und sollten zu mindest primär als Chance gesehen werden und nicht in erster Linie als Problem. Beispielhaft nennen möchte ich den Ansatz der Bildungsstätte im ehemaligen ‚Haus der Wannseekonferenz‘, die mit Biographien türkischer Verfolgter arbeitet und Besucherfaltblätter auch in türkischer und arabischer Sprache anbietet. Problematische Äußerungen im ‚globalisierten Klassenzimmer‘ oder durch ein Nebeneinander zum Teil konkurrierender Erinnerungsgemeinschaften hervorgerufene Idiosynkrasien können im pädagogischen Rahmen selbstverständlich nicht ignoriert werden. Pädagoginnen und Pädagogen stehen dabei vor der Herausforderung, dass sie Instrumentalisierungen und Falschinformationen entgegentreten und sich zugleich der Herkunft von Erinnerungs- und Opferkonkurrenzen bewusst sind und diese einordnen können. Historisch-politische Bildung hat die Aufgabe über die jeweilige Nationalgeschichte herauszugehen und ihren Adressaten ein Bewusstsein komplexer geschichtlicher Vorgänge aus verschiedenen Perspektiven zu vermitteln.

Methoden des ‚Forschenden Lernens‘, der Biografiearbeit, Annäherungen über Kunst und das Herstellen zu lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen der Lernenden bieten Möglichkeiten das durchaus vorhandene Interesse an der Geschichte des Holocaust zu vermitteln.

Neben der historisch-politischen Bildung wäre eine Bildungsarbeit, die den durchaus eigenständigen Problematiken von aktuellem Antisemitismus gerecht wird zu platzieren. Ebenso wenig wie Antisemitismus als Begriff im Rassismus aufgeht und auch nicht auf die rassistische und historische Dimension zu beschränken ist, kann Bildungsarbeit gegen Antisemitismus ausschließlich als Unterpunkt von antirassistischer Bildung abgehandelt werden.

Lehrerinnen und Lehrer berichten in den letzten Jahren über Schwierigkeiten Zeitzeugengespräche mit Holocaust-Überlebenden durchzuführen, wenn diese Juden sind, da Schüler sich vermehrt solchen Gesprächen verweigern. Die Äußerung ‚Du Jude‘ scheint, durchaus in herabsetzender Absicht geäußert, zum gängigen Vokabular, an den Schulen zu gehören. Gerade nicht-antisemitische Schüler bestätigen diese Alltagswahrnehmung von Pädagoginnen und Pädagogen.

Die zunehmende Wahrnehmbarkeit antisemitischer Äußerungen und Gewalttaten reduziert sich nicht auf rechts orientierte Jugendliche oder auf entsprechende Vorkommnisse in der Mehrheitsgesellschaft. Stereotype und pathische Wahrnehmungen finden sich in den verschiedensten Bevölkerungsgruppen und Antisemitismus variiert abhängig von nationalen Narrativen und konkreten gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen. Auch bei Jugendlichen aus Familien mit Migrationshintergrund aus muslimisch geprägten Ländern finden sich antisemitische Einstellungen, die zwischen Latenz und offener Aggression variieren. Das Ticket für solche Einstellungen ist in erster Linie der israelisch-palästinensische Konflikt und dessen Wahrnehmung, bei gleichzeitiger Unkenntnis der komplexen Situation und Geschichte in der Region. Ob es sich bei dieser Perzeption des Konflikts um ein Zeichen misslungener oder vielmehr gelungener Integration in die deutsche Mehrheitsgesellschaft handelt sei dahingestellt. Nicht selten gesellt sich zu der problematischen Wahrnehmung des ‚Nahostkonflikts‘ ein Denken in

Verschwörungskategorien und Personalisierungen abstrakter politischer Vorgänge bei den Jugendlichen.

Die real existierende Diskriminierungserfahrung von jungen Migranten kann für die pädagogische Arbeit nicht als Alibi dienen antisemitische Äußerungen zu verharmlosen. Autoritären Ideologien, ob sie sich bei autochthonen Deutschen rechtsextrem oder Migranten islamistisch und nationalistisch äußern ist, wie jeder Form von Antisemitismus, im pädagogischen Prozess entschieden entgegenzutreten. Das schließt nicht aus ein vorhandenes Bedürfnis nach Anerkennung von Diskriminierungserfahrungen zu erkennen und ihm Raum zu geben.

Unabhängig von Befunden über die Zunahme von antisemitischen Weltansichten bedarf es einer politischen Bildung, welche die verschiedenen Formen von Antisemitismus in ihrer Praxis aufgreift und bearbeitet. Für die verschiedenen Kontexte und Zielgruppen sind dabei jeweils abgestimmte methodische Herangehensweisen und Konzepte notwendig.

Die Bildungsarbeit zu aktuellem Antisemitismus ist, obwohl noch ein relativ junges Feld, dennoch geprägt durch verschiedene, zum Teil sehr ambitionierte Projekte. Konzepte wie Antisemitismus im Schulunterricht oder in der außerschulischen Bildungsarbeit thematisiert werden kann, existieren und haben auf europäischer Ebene wie die entstehenden Unterrichtsmaterialien von ODIHR/OSZE, die durch das Anne Frank Haus, dem Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung und dem Fritz Bauer Institut erarbeitet wurden, Modellcharakter.

Unabhängig davon sind die Erwartungen an pädagogische Interventionen im Allgemeinen hoch. Wenn von pädagogischen Projekten allerdings erwartet wird, sie könnten gegen manifeste Vorurteilsstrukturen angehen und die Funktion einer gesellschaftspolitischen Feuerwehr übernehmen, so müssen diese Erwartung zwangsläufig enttäuscht werden.

Das Ziel einer solchen Bildungsarbeit geht über die reine Wissensvermittlung hinaus und in den Bereich der Vermittlung ethischer Grundlagen hinein. Von grundlegender Notwendigkeit ist ein pädagogischer Prozess von dialogischer Natur zwischen Lernenden und Lehrenden. Methoden einer Instruktionspädagogik sind geeignet Widerstände zu wecken oder gar zu produzieren. Über eine Mischung aus Wissensvermittlung, der Stärkung von Empathie, Methoden zum Perspektivenwechsel und der Förderung eines Verständnisses von pluralen Identitäten bei ihrer Zielgruppe kann Bildungsarbeit präventiv wirken.

Ein Netzwerk wie die Task Force Education on Antisemitism, das durch das American Jewish Committee betreut und koordiniert wird, und in dem unterschiedliche Träger der politischen Bildungsarbeit die Ergebnisse ihrer Arbeit im Rahmen kollegialer Beratung evaluieren sowie sich selber über aktuelle Entwicklungen im Bereich Antisemitismus und Bildung informieren, gibt es bisher meiner Kenntnis nach im nationalen Rahmen nur in Deutschland. International arbeiten in der Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research Expertinnen und Experten von staatlichen Trägern, Forschungseinrichtungen und privaten Stellen aus 24 Ländern zusammen. Es ist selbstverständlich wünschenswert solche Kooperationen weiter zu entwickeln. Ebenso wünschenswert ist es die bestehenden Bildungsangebote im Bereich historischer Bildung und der zu aktuellem Antisemitismus auszubauen. Unabdingbar hierzu ist eine verstärkte unbürokratische finanzielle Absicherung und Förderung dieser Arbeit in Gedenkstätten, Forschungseinrichtungen und in Initiativen aus der Zivilgesellschaft.



## **1.2. *History as a problem in anti-Semitism-reducing educational projects: Experience of Forum for Dialogue among Nations***

Dr Michał Bilewicz<sup>2</sup>

The problem of anti-Semitism in Poland was well discussed in many publications and reports. Some of the most important insights in the nature of Polish anti-Semitism stress the role of the wide-spread belief in Jewish conspiracy, that becomes most salient before the parliamentary elections – as it is being used as a mean of political propaganda (Kofta, 2005). Other researchers stress the role of other important phenomena, as the feelings of guilt and repressed memory of a bystander (Steinlauf, 1997) or victimhood competition between Poles and Jews (Krzeminski, 1993). Such biased memories, deeply rooted in the national representations of the Holocaust and the Polish-Jewish history in general, are probably shaping attitudes of the older generations of Poles towards Jews.

However, until recently there were no attempts to face the problem of anti-Semitism among Polish youth. Young people do not seem to be influenced by the representations of the past, historical memories or direct experience of contact with Jews. On the other side – among young generations of football fans, subculture members etc., the most extreme forms of anti-Semitism could be observed (Kornak, 2007). At the same time – numerous Polish youngsters try to combat anti-Semitism in their everyday life activities (Radzik, 2007; Kornak, 2007).

Since its beginning Forum for Dialogue among Nations organized educational activities, aiming in combating anti-Semitism among Polish youth. Its actions were concentrated on increasing the opportunities of contact between young Poles and Jews (by organizing exchanges and student meetings), as well as on direct anti-Semitism-reducing workshops in Polish high-schools. This paper focuses on the effectiveness of student meetings and anti-Semitism reducing workshops performed in Polish schools.

### **Polish-Jewish youth meetings**

During the last decade, increasing Polish-Jewish contacts have been established. With the opening of Polish borders, Jewish youth from Israel, USA, Canada and other countries have begun visiting places related to the Holocaust— such as ghettos, and concentration and death camps. During these visits, some of the Jewish groups have met with young Poles. For most young Poles and Jews, such encounters are a unique opportunity to interact with members of a group about which they feel they know well from historical narratives (Steinlauf, 1997) but with whom they have little personal experience.

Since 1998 every year Forum for Dialogue among Nations organizes Polish-Jewish meetings during March of the Living. The March of the Living is an international educational program that brings Jewish teenagers from all over the world to Poland on Holocaust Memorial Day to march from Auschwitz to Birkenau, the largest concentration camp complex built during World War II, and then continue to Israel to observe Israel Memorial Day and Israel Independence Day. While in Poland, Jewish teens also visit Warsaw, Krakow and Lublin. More than few groups of Jewish students (American, Canadian and Australian) during their stay in Warsaw and Krakow take part in encounter program with Polish students (from high schools in these cities).

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<sup>2</sup> Vice-President, Forum for Dialogue among Nations, Faculty of Psychology, Warsaw University

The encounter program consisted of a 2-hour meeting in schools (around 100-200 students participated in each meeting). However, the encounters were organized in small 10-people groups (5 Polish students, 5 Jewish students), as only such groups are proved to be effective in psychological process (Bradford, Gibb & Benne, 1964).

In 2004-2006 we decided to evaluate this meeting program in order to study its educational effectiveness in combating anti-Semitism and indicate problems that may occur during such actions. The overall effectiveness of these programs proved to be significant: Polish students after participation in the encounter program had much more positive attitudes towards Jews, and they felt that Jews are more similar to them (Bilewicz, 2006; Bilewicz, 2007). At the same time there was no direct effect of contact in reduction of belief in Jewish conspiracy – for those students who believe in such anti-Semitic conspiracy theories such contact had no effect. It seems that they sub-typed Jews whom they met as an exception from the ‘overall Jewish conspiracy’.

However, when we compared students who talked with their Jewish friends about present-day issues and historical issues, we found out that only meetings about present-day issues were successful in anti-Semitism reduction. When Polish students talked with young Jews about the history, they didn’t change attitudes towards Jews and they didn’t perceive Jews as more similar to them. On the contrary, they perceived Jews as being anti-Polish, and this elevated anxiety during the encounter.

Thus, the history of Polish-Jewish relations may constrain opportunities of anti-Semitism reducing contacts in today’s Poland.

### **Anti-Semitism reducing workshops**

Since 1998 Forum for Dialogue among Nations has been organizing 1-day workshops for high-school students in several Polish cities and towns. Numerous scenarios and curricula were created during these years, and all of them were performed and tested in class-room setting by prepared young trainers. The scenarios were prepared under supervision of our experts, a group of scholars from Warsaw University (sociologists, historians, pedagogues and psychologists). The main aim of these workshops was the reduction of anti-Semitism among Polish high school students.

In 2007 Forum decided to evaluate the workshops in Polish high-schools. The main aim of this was to study the effectiveness of certain interventions in (1.) increasing positive attitudes towards Jews, (2.) eliciting responsibility for past negative actions of Poles towards Jews, (3.) increasing involvement in Polish-Jewish dialogue.

All 4 workshops were based on social-psychological theories of prejudice reduction: *Anti-Semitic graffiti* workshop was based on perspective-taking theory (students took perspective of American Jewish senior coming back to his Polish hometown and facing anti-Semitic signs on the walls), *What is and what should never be* workshop was based on counterfactual thinking theory (students were constructing alternative versions of history and explaining behaviour that could lead to rescue of Jews in Poland), *The Poles and the Jews during the Holocaust* workshop was based on collective guilt theory (students were faced with informations about Polish misbehaviour towards Jews during WWII), and *Israel’s critique* workshop was based on new anti-Semitism theory (students were pointing similarities between Nazi caricatures and modern anti-Israel propaganda, and they tried distinguish anti-Semitic speeches among other critical voices about Israel).

The quantitative evaluation of these interventions showed that the workshop about anti-Semitic graffiti in Poland led to more positive perception of Jews; workshop about counter-

factual thinking about Polish-Jewish history led to increased responsibility for Polish crimes towards Jews, and to greater involvement in Polish-Jewish dialogue, but at the same time it worsened attitudes towards Jews; workshop about Polish-Jewish relations during the Holocaust did not change attitudes at all; and workshop about new anti-Semitism led paradoxically to greater perceived responsibility for Polish history (Bilewicz & Wójcik, 2008).

It should be stressed that – like in the case of encounter program (Bilewicz, 2007) – workshops reflecting on historical issues built psychological walls between young Poles and Jews. Confronting the negative Polish-Jewish history led students to the perception of Jews as less similar to themselves and to more negative attitudes towards them. Also the issues related to Israel led to controversies, resulting with more negative attitude towards Jews. In comparison to these ‘historical’ and ‘political’ issues, a workshop about everyday anti-Semitism observable on the walls of Polish cities (*Anti-Semitic graffiti*) led to more positive perceptions of Jews, but it didn’t lead to any collective guilt or responsibility for historical misdeeds. When all workshops are taken as a whole – they had significantly positive impact on involvement in Polish-Jewish dialogue. This seems as good prognosis for future anti-Semitism reduction.

## Conclusion

In all educational efforts organized by Forum for Dialogue among Nations, the history becomes an important obstacle. The workshops in Polish schools are most effective in anti-Semitism reduction only if they do not touch historical issues (esp. World War II and the Holocaust). The same could be applied to Polish-Jewish youth meetings – they tend to fail when students step into the fertile ground of Polish-Jewish history. The main reason for that is lack of proper historical education in Polish high-schools. Students are taught idealised narrative of their own history, and this makes them closed for any attempts of presenting them different perspectives of their nations history (in our case – the Jewish perspective). Such idealised version of Polish history becomes an obstacle in future Polish-Jewish contacts, and inhibits positive consequences of such contact. That is why enormous efforts have to be made in order to prepare Polish students to any activities related to Holocaust or Polish-Jewish history. Without proper historical education and proper historical curricula, any efforts to face anti-Semitism could have only limited effectiveness.

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### **1.3. Bildungsarbeit zum Thema Holocaust und Antisemitismus**

Wolf Kaiser<sup>3</sup>

Die häufig geäußerte Erwartung, Geschichtsunterricht zum Holocaust immunisiere gegen Antisemitismus oder könne gar bestehende antisemitische Vorurteile abbauen, hat sich nicht erfüllt. Dennoch nennt der Titel dieses Panels nicht zufällig Antisemitismus und Holocaust zusammen als Gegenstände von Bildungsarbeit. Ohne die lange Tradition der Judenfeindschaft und deren Radikalisierung zum rassistischen Antisemitismus wäre es nicht zum Holocaust gekommen. Zwar gäbe es auch ohne die beispiellose Katastrophe des Völkermords an den europäischen Juden, gute Gründe, dem Antisemitismus entgegenzutreten, dessen Diskreditierung ist aber zweifellos auf die Shoah zurückzuführen. (Ich bevorzuge im Folgenden wegen der problematischen Konnotationen von „Holocaust“ den Begriff Shoah.) Für viele derjenigen, die sich gegen den Antisemitismus engagieren, war und ist das Entsetzen über dieses Massenverbrechen der Ausgangspunkt. Und selbst diejenigen, die antijüdische Vorurteile oder gar eine jüdenfeindliche Einstellung haben, können die Shoah nicht ignorieren. Wer heute öffentlich eine antisemitische Bemerkung macht, ist oft bemüht, sich zumindest vom Rassenantisemitismus der Nationalsozialisten zu distanzieren. Zugleich gibt es heute paradoxerweise Formen des Antisemitismus, die als Reaktion auf die Shoah und deren Wahrnehmung entstanden sind. Dazu zählt der sekundäre Antisemitismus derjenigen, die „den Juden“ vorwerfen, sie beuteten die Schuldgefühle der Deutschen systematisch aus. Erst recht muss die Leugnung oder Relativierung des Mords an den europäischen Juden - die schwerste Kränkung der Überlebenden und eine Verunglimpfung des Andenkens des Ermordeten - als Antisemitismus bezeichnet werden. Diese neuen Formen müssen mit berücksichtigt werden, wenn man diskutiert, wie Antisemitismus bekämpft werden kann.

Es liegt auf der Hand, dass solides Wissen über den nationalsozialistischen Mord an den Juden notwendig, wenn auch nicht ausreichend ist, um die Bereitschaft, dem Antisemitismus entgegenzutreten, zu stärken, dem Geschichtsrevisionismus den Boden zu entziehen und Verständnis dafür zu wecken, warum die Erinnerung an die Opfer, die Strafverfolgung der Täter, die Entschädigung der Überlebenden und die weitere Erforschung des historischen Geschehens wichtige Aufgaben insbesondere der europäischen Länder waren und sind. Es ist auch nicht belanglos, wie Wissen über die Shoah vermittelt und erworben wird. Ein pädagogisch fragwürdiger Umgang mit der Shoah – wenn etwa von den jüdischen Opfer nur in der entmenslichenden Sprache der Täter die Rede ist - kann entgegen der Intention des Pädagogen antijüdische Vorurteile und Einstellungen fördern anstatt sie abzubauen.

Durch diese Vorbemerkungen soll nicht bestritten werden, dass es in der Auseinandersetzung mit dem Antisemitismus Aufgaben gibt, für die Kenntnisse über die Shoah keine oder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Wenn beispielsweise der Unterschied zwischen legitimer Kritik an israelischer Politik und antisemitischen Äußerungen zum Nahostkonflikt verdeutlicht werden soll, sind andere Kenntnisse gefragt, obwohl die Shoah auch hier ins Spiel kommen kann: Wer sich mit ihr eingehend beschäftigt hat, wird der nicht selten zu hörenden Behauptung, die Israelis täten den Palästinensern jetzt an, was die Nazis den Juden angetan haben, wohl kaum Beifall zollen.

Da ich in einer Einrichtung arbeite, die sich nicht vorrangig mit dem aktuellen Antisemitismus befasst, sondern sich vor allem der Bildungsarbeit zur Shoah widmet, werde ich mich im Folgenden zu den Herausforderungen äußern, mit denen wir bei dieser Arbeit konfrontiert sind, ohne jeweils explizit auf den Antisemitismus Bezug zu nehmen.

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<sup>3</sup> Gedenk- und Bildungsstätte Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz

## Vom Beschweigen zum Histotainment

Jahrzehntelang richtete sich Kritik am Umgang mit der Shoah gegen das Beschweigen der Verbrechen, das als die zweite Schuld der Deutschen angeprangert wurde. In der Tat ist die schon 1947 erhobene Forderung nach einem „Schlussstrich“ bis heute nicht verstummt, und der Wunsch, durch Vergessen zu einer vermeintlichen Normalität übergehen zu können, ist weit verbreitet. Daher bleibt es eine pädagogische Aufgabe, immer wieder zu verdeutlichen, warum es wichtig ist, sich mit der Geschichte der Shoah eingehend auseinanderzusetzen. Heute kann man allerdings nicht mehr behaupten, dass das Thema in der Öffentlichkeit totgeschwiegen würde. Es ist vielmehr besonders in den Medien so präsent, dass Martin Walser meinte, sich gegen die „Dauerrepräsentation unserer Schande“ zur Wehr setzen zu müssen. Anders als Walser erscheint mir diese Medienpräsenz aber nicht deswegen als problematisch, weil hier „die Instrumentalisierung unserer Schande zu gegenwärtigen Zwecken“ betrieben würde, sondern weil die Medien - neben wertvollen journalistischen Arbeiten und Filmen – nicht selten Beiträge bringen, in denen die Shoah trivialisiert wird. Im Histotainment werden historische Filmaufnahmen und Zeitzeugenberichte (nicht selten vermischt mit gestellten Szenen, die vorführen, wie der Regisseur sich das Verhalten historischer Personen vorstellt) zur Erzeugung emotionaler Effekte verwendet. In sentimental Spielfilmen wird die Shoah benutzt, um einem trivialen Plot scheinbar historisches Gewicht zu verleihen.

Die trivialisierende Verwendung der Shoah erzeugt nicht nur ungenaue und verzerrte Bilder der historischen Vorgänge, sie vermittelt den Rezipienten auch das Gefühl, sie wüssten über die Shoah schon alles, was es darüber Wichtiges zu wissen gebe. Die Behauptung: „Wir haben das schon so oft gehört. Wir wissen das doch“ ist sicherlich die häufigste Äußerung von Widerstand, die man von deutschen Jugendlichen zu hören bekommt, wenn man das Thema Shoah ankündigt. Pädagogisch kann man auf diese Erscheinungen nicht mit allgemeiner Medienschelte oder der Aufforderung reagieren, lieber ein gutes Buch zu lesen als fernzusehen. Überdross bei der Konfrontation mit der Shoah (für den sicherlich nicht die Medien allein verantwortlich sind) sollte im Hinblick auf den Umgang der Gesellschaft insgesamt mit diesem Thema diskutiert werden. Das kann man auf unterschiedliche Weise tun: historisch, indem man die Veränderungen des Umgang mit der Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus und der Shoah in den Besatzungszonen, in beiden deutschen Staaten und nach der Vereinigung untersucht, medienkritisch, indem man so genannte Dokumentarfilme und Spielfilme auf die intendierten Effekte, die Darstellungsmuster, Leerstellen und Akzentuierungen hin analysiert, politologisch, indem man nach den politischen Intentionen, Funktionen und Folgen von Thematisierungen der Shoah fragt.

## Bildungsarbeit als Erziehung?

Bildungsarbeit zu Antisemitismus und Shoah zielt nicht nur auf Wissensvermittlung. Sie hat auch den Anspruch, Werte zu vermitteln, humane Einstellungen zu entwickeln oder zu festigen und die Urteilsfähigkeit zu fördern. Nun vollzieht sich die Entwicklung des moralischen Urteilsvermögens aber – wie Lawrence Kohlberg gezeigt hat<sup>4</sup> - durch Moralkonflikte und Meinungsverschiedenheiten über Problemkonstellationen. Kann und sollte man solche Konflikte pädagogisch inszenieren, um moralische Bildung zu ermöglichen? Es gibt in unserer Gesellschaft heute einen erheblichen Konformitätsdruck, wenn es um den Nationalsozialismus und seine Verbrechen geht. Politisch ist der öffentlich demonstrierte Konsens, dass der Nationalsozialismus eindeutig und entschieden abzulehnen ist, unbedingt notwendig und die

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<sup>4</sup> Vgl. Lawrence Kohlberg / Elliot Turiel: Moralische Entwicklung und Moralerziehung. In: Sozialisation und Moral. Neuere Ansätze zur moralischen Entwicklung und Erziehung. Hrsg. v. Gerhard Portele. Weinheim 1979, S. 13 - 80; Lawrence Kohlberg: Die Psychologie der Moralentwicklung. Hrsg. v. Wolfgang Althof, Frankfurt a. M. 1996.

Aufrechterhaltung des Konformitätsdrucks wünschenswert. Es wäre illusionär zu glauben, die gesamte Bevölkerung werde in dieser Frage ein postkonventionelles, durch die Orientierung an allgemeinen Werten gekennzeichnetes Stadium des moralischen Urteils erreichen. Pädagogisch ist Konformitätsdruck aber ein äußerst problematischer Einflussfaktor, der in einer Institution wie der Schule mit ihrem Gratifikations- und Sanktionssystem auch dann wirksam ist, wenn der einzelne Pädagoge sich nach Kräften um Offenheit bemüht. Anpassungsdruck fördert – wo er erfolgreich ist – nicht moralische Entwicklung, sondern vorübergehendes Wohlverhalten durch Konditionierung. Sobald sich die Machtverhältnisse auch nur im unmittelbaren Umfeld ändern, kommt die Anpassungsfähigkeit denjenigen zugute, die dann das Sagen haben.

Die von Wissenschaftlern der Universität Frankfurt durchgeführte Studie zu den „Paradoxien pädagogisch-moralischer Kommunikation im Unterricht“ hat gezeigt, dass „pädagogische Kommunikation Einstellungsänderungen nicht kausal erwirken kann“<sup>5</sup>. Die Autoren haben daraus den Schluss gezogen, dass es geboten sei, überhöhte Erziehungsansprüche zurückzunehmen. Zugleich aber haben sie hervorgehoben, dass im Geschichtsunterricht gerade beim Thema Shoah die ethischen Prinzipien reflektiert werden können, die die normative Grundlage allen sozialen Zusammenlebens bilden (sollten). Folgt man dieser Argumentation, so ist die Aufgabe von Lehrkräften weder auf die reine Wissensvermittlung zu reduzieren (wie es, verbunden mit kaum diskutierten Wertsetzungen, laut einer bisher nicht publizierten Anschlussstudie häufig in der Schule geschieht), noch sollten sie alle Meinungen, auch die auf Unwissen oder moralisch unakzeptablen Einstellungen basierenden, unkommentiert im Raum stehen lassen (dazu neigen der Anschlussstudie zufolge Pädagogen in außerschulischen Bildungseinrichtungen). Sie sollten vielmehr die Reflexion und Kommunikation über die Bewertung der historischen Vorgänge und die Verhaltensweisen der Akteure fördern und dabei in Kauf nehmen, dass es keine Garantie gibt, zu den erwünschten Ergebnissen zu kommen.

Nach Auffassung der Autoren der Frankfurter Studie besteht die Aufgabe und Leistung des Geschichtsunterrichts darin, „in den bereits institutionalisierten Umgang mit Geschichte durch Habitualisierung, sprachliche Kategorisierung, Internalisierung von Erwartungen, aber auch durch Reflexion und Kritik einzuüben und den Konsens öffentlichen Redens damit zu erhärten, sozial zu verankern und fortzuschreiben“. Schule und Unterricht reproduzierten „nur – im Guten wie im Schlechten –, was in der Gesellschaft der Erwachsenen bereits erreicht worden ist“<sup>6</sup>. Dem ist von Geschichtsdidaktikern entgegengehalten worden, dass ein Geschichtsunterricht seinen Zweck verfehle, der nicht die Fähigkeit der Lernenden zum eigenen historischen Urteil fördere, sondern nur die Übernahme konventioneller Deutungen, zumal nicht deren aufgeklärteste Variante, sondern die medial herrschende übernommen werde.<sup>7</sup> Während Bodo von Borries behauptet, die Themen Vernichtungskrieg und Völkermord seien für die Einübung historischer Urteilsfähigkeit ungeeignet<sup>8</sup>, vertritt Gerhard Henke-Bockschatz die Auffassung, die Vermeidung vorschnellen Moralisiereins und eine gesteigerte Methodenkompetenz der Lehrenden und Lernenden könne auch bei diesen Themen zu einem reflektierten und selbstreflexiven Umgang mit Geschichte führen<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> [Meseth, Wolfgang](#) ; [Proske, Matthias](#) ; [Radtke, Frank-Olaf](#): Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Geschichtsunterricht. Erste empirische Befunde und theoretische Schlussfolgerungen. In: [Meseth, Wolfgang](#) ; [Proske, Matthias](#) ; [Radtke, Frank-Olaf](#) (Hrsg.) : Schule und Nationalsozialismus. Anspruch und Grenzen des Geschichtsunterrichts. Frankfurt am Main/New York 2004, S. 142.

<sup>6</sup> A.a.O., S. 143.

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. Bodo von Borries: Moralische Aneignung und emotionale Identifikation im Geschichtsunterricht . Empirische Befunde und theoretische Erwägungen. In: Schule und Nationalsozialismus, a. a. O., S. 292.

<sup>8</sup> Vgl. a. a. O., S. 294.

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. Gerhard Henke-Bockschatz: Der „Holocaust“ als Thema im Geschichtsunterricht. Kritische Anmerkungen. In: : Schule und Nationalsozialismus, a. a. O., S. 298-322, hier bes. S. 299 u. 320.

Wie immer man die (übrigens im schulischen und im außerschulischen Rahmen unterschiedlichen) Möglichkeiten einschätzen mag, dass Jugendliche in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Shoah zu Urteilen kommen, die auf eigenen Einsichten beruhen - richtig ist sicherlich, dass der Einfluss von Erwachsenen außerhalb der Bildungseinrichtungen auf die Meinungsbildung der Jugendlichen kaum zu überschätzen ist, sei es in der Familie und dem Bekanntenkreis, sei es durch Medien von der Tagespresse über das Fernsehen bis zum Spielfilm.

## **Erwachsenenbildung**

Damit ist allerdings für diejenigen, die Bildungsarbeit nicht nur mit Jugendlichen, sondern auch mit Erwachsenen betreiben, eine weitere Herausforderung formuliert: Wie kann die Geschichte der Shoah Erwachsenen so vermittelt werden, dass deren Selbstreflexion dadurch gefördert wird – mit möglichen positiven Folgen für ihre Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen? Direkt erzieherisch Einfluss nehmen zu wollen, wäre hier sicherlich noch weniger realistisch als bei Jugendlichen und würde zu Recht als anmaßend empfunden. Das Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz verfolgt seit seiner Gründung einen anderen Weg.

Ausgehend von dem zentralen Ereignis in der Geschichte des Hauses, der „Staatssekretärsbesprechung am Großen Wannsee“ wird die Beteiligung von Angehörigen verschiedenster Berufsgruppen an der Planung, Organisation und Durchführung der Deportation und Ermordung der Juden zum zentralen Thema gemacht. In Seminaren für Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in diversen Bereichen des öffentlichen Dienstes (im weitesten Sinn des Wortes) werden historische Dokumente studiert, an denen sich das Handeln und die Einstellungen von Beteiligten ablesen lassen. Das sind u. a. Auszüge aus Berufsfachzeitschriften, aber auch Ausführungsverordnungen, Dienstanweisungen, Formulare usw. Darüber hinaus werden auch Berichte, Briefe und persönliche Erinnerungen verwendet. Oft haben die Seminarteilnehmer schneller Zugang zu den in der Verwaltung verwendeten Materialien als ein berufsfremder Historiker, weil ihnen die Struktur administrativer Vorgänge und die dabei verwendeten Instrumente aus ihrem Berufsalltag vertraut sind. Das damit verbundene Erfolgserlebnis ist motivierend, auch wenn es manchmal mit einem Erschrecken darüber verbunden ist, wie sehr die eigenen Verfahrensweisen formal denjenigen gleicht, die bei der Organisation der Judenverfolgung zur Anwendung kamen.

Das gilt insbesondere für Berufsfelder, in denen sich eine ganz spezifische Sprache und Denkweise ausgebildet hat. Juristen beispielsweise verfügen ja nicht nur, wie andere Berufe auch, über eine Fachterminologie; ihre Vorgehens- und Argumentationsweise hat sich über einen langen Zeitraum sehr spezifisch entwickelt und ist auch in den Pervertierungen des Justizwesens der NS-Zeit durchaus erkennbar. Die Justizreferendarinnen und –referendare, die regelmäßig zu Seminartagen ins Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz kommen, stellen fest, dass ihr professionelles Instrumentarium zur Legitimierung schreienden Unrechts eingesetzt worden ist, und es entwickeln sich immer wieder Diskussionen darüber, worin eigentlich der Halt zu gewinnen ist, der es ermöglicht, sich der Pervertierung des Rechts zu einem Instrument staatlich organisierter Unmenschlichkeit zu widersetzen.

Generell geht es in den berufsgruppenspezifischen Seminaren darum, historisches Lernen über die Shoah mit Diskussionen und Reflexionen über Ideologien und Mechanismen zu verbinden, die zu organisierter Verantwortungs- und Gewissenlosigkeit führen können, und über Möglichkeiten, dem ein an Menschen- und Bürgerrechten orientiertes Handeln entgegenzusetzen. Es gibt keine Garantie, dass das Handeln des Einzelnen, der an einer Seminarwoche teilgenommen hat, im Konfliktfall durch solche Überlegungen zu historischen Erfahrungen tatsächlich beeinflusst wird. Doch sollte es nicht gering geschätzt werden, wenn historisch-



politische Bildung die Reflexion über solche Fragen in vielen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen anzuregen vermag.

## Tätergeschichte und Opferperspektive

Berufsgruppenspezifische Bildungsveranstaltungen zu den nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen, die inzwischen auch in etlichen anderen Gedenkstätten angeboten werden, richten die Aufmerksamkeit in erster Linie auf die Täter, wie man sich überhaupt in Deutschland aus nahe liegenden Gründen viel mehr mit den Tätern befasst als in anderen Ländern, wenn es um die Shoah geht. Das kann zu Einsichten führen, die durchaus von allgemeinem Interesse sind. Wenn man verstehen will, wie es zum Völkermord an den Juden kam, ist es durchaus angebracht, ja notwendig, die Ideologien und Motivationen der Täter, die Strukturen ihrer Organisationen und ihre Vorgehensweise zu untersuchen. Das Geschehen war von den Entscheidungen der Täter bestimmt und ist daher als Gesamtprozess auch nur auf der Grundlage der Dokumente zu rekonstruieren, die die Täter produziert haben. Auch schulischer Unterricht, der nicht nur Fakten vermitteln will, sondern auf historisches Verstehen zielt, muss sich mit solchen Dokumenten befassen. Geeignetes Material ist nicht schwer zu finden. Zum Beispiel enthält ein Lehrbuch für die Sekundarstufe II fünf historische Quellen zur Shoah: Anordnungen von NSDAP-Führern zum Verhalten gegenüber Juden von 1933 und 1938, Auszüge aus den Nürnberger Gesetzen und aus dem Wannsee-Protokoll und eine Passage aus den autobiographischen Aufzeichnungen des Auschwitz-Kommandanten Rudolf Höss<sup>10</sup>. Auf dieser Grundlage können die Schüler sich mit wichtigen Dokumenten und Vorgängen vertraut machen. Und doch fehlt in diesem Lehrbuch etwas Entscheidendes: die Stimme der Opfer, die allein uns eine annähernde Vorstellung vermitteln kann, was die Diffamierung, Ausgrenzung, Entrechtung und die schließlich zum Völkermord radikalisierte Verfolgung für die Opfer bedeutete. Nur wenn wir versuchen die Perspektive der Opfer einzunehmen, können wir erahnen, welche menschlichen Katastrophen die nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen verursachten, aber auch, welche Kraft viele Opfer aufbrachten, um standzuhalten und ihre menschliche Würde zu verteidigen, so lange es möglich war.

Da die direkte Begegnung mit Überlebenden, die schon bisher für deutsche Schüler eher die Ausnahme als die Regel war, in Zukunft kaum mehr möglich sein wird, muss man auf medial vermittelte Zeugnisse zurückgreifen, auch wenn sie nicht dasselbe leisten können, wie ein persönliches Gespräch. Neben Tagebüchern und schriftlich vorliegenden Erinnerungen sollten die auf Ton- und Bildträger aufgezeichneten Berichte und Interviews verstärkt pädagogisch eingesetzt werden. Die pädagogische Nutzung steht bisher in gar keinem Verhältnis zu der Menge des vorhandenen Materials. Damit es sinnvoll eingesetzt werden kann, müssen zunächst schlüssige und praktikable Konzepte erarbeitet und in Fortbildungsveranstaltungen den Lehrkräften nahe gebracht werden. Sonst besteht die Gefahr, dass die Videokassette oder DVD mit dem Zeitzeugeninterview als Ersatz für Unterricht verwendet wird, anstatt dass der Überlebendenbericht als ein wichtiges Element in die Auseinandersetzung mit der Shoah integriert wird.

Zweifellos wird der Eindruck, den die Rezeption eines aufgezeichneten Überlebendenberichts hinterlässt, in der Regel schwächer sein als der eines persönlichen Gesprächs. Andererseits ermöglicht die Verwendung einer Aufzeichnung eher eine auch analytische und kritische Annäherung. So kann dem Eindruck einer moralischen Überwältigung vorgebeugt werden, ohne dass damit Empathie ausgeschlossen wäre. Eine empathische Haltung gegenüber den Opfern ist nicht mit Identifikation gleichzusetzen. Jeder Versuch, die Distanz zu ignorieren,

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<sup>10</sup> Klaus Dieter Hein-Mooren u.a.: Buchners Kolleg Geschichte. Von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Nationalsozialismus. 2. Aufl. Bamberg: C.C. Buchners Verlag, 1992, S. 423 – 428.

die uns von ihnen trennt, wäre ebenso anmaßend wie illusorisch. Aber wenn Schüler den Bericht eines Überlebenden hören, können sie versuchen, die Geschehnisse mit dessen Augen zu sehen und sich zugleich bewusst sein, dass sie unter gänzlich anderen Umständen leben. Die Forderung nach Multiperspektivität im Geschichtsunterricht, die übrigens – wenn man sich mit der Shoah befasst – auch bedeutet, den Tatbeitrag der Zuschauer und die Motive und Verhaltensweisen der Helfer und Retter zu beleuchten, meint ja nicht, dass man eine bestimmte Sichtweise unkritisch übernimmt, sondern dass man die Perspektiven der historisch Handelnden rekonstruiert, erläutert und kommentiert.

## Die europäische Dimension der Shoah

Das kann nur gelingen, wenn man mit dem historischen Kontext vertraut ist, in dem die Shoah stattfand. Darin liegt eine größere didaktische Herausforderung, als es auf den ersten Blick scheint. Wenn man sich, wie in deutschen Schulen vielfach üblich, auf die nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Deutschland beschränkt und dann allenfalls noch einen Blick auf Auschwitz als Inbegriff der Menschenvernichtung wirft, mag man mit dem vorhandenen historischen und geographischen Allgemeinwissen vielleicht noch einigermaßen auskommen, um das Geschehen verorten und in einem größeren Zusammenhang sehen zu können. Die Nationalsozialisten haben aber die Juden fast ganz Europas entrechtet, enteignet, deportiert und ermordet. Es ist nicht zuletzt diese europäische Dimension des Verbrechens, die die Shoah von den meisten anderen Völkermorden unterscheidet. In den besetzten und in den verbündeten Ländern wurden die deutschen Täter von Erpressern und Denunzianten, von kollaborierenden Verwaltungen und Polizeibeamten, in unterschiedlichem Maße auch von einheimischen Mittätern unterstützt. Diese Tatsachen zur Sprache zu bringen, ohne die deutsche Verantwortung im Geringsten zu relativieren, setzt genaue Kenntnisse voraus. Das kann in der Bildungsarbeit nur exemplarisch gelingen. Denn der Versuch, den deutschen Horizont zu überschreiten, darf nicht dazu führen, dass nur noch Daten und Zahlen vermittelt werden. So wie zahllose Kinder und Jugendliche am Beispiel der Inge Deutschkron die Not und den Mut der in Deutschland im Untergrund ums Überleben kämpfenden Juden kennen gelernt haben, so sollten sie auch vom Schicksal der polnischen, der litauischen Juden, der tschechischen oder der ungarischen Juden nicht nur in allgemeinen Zügen, sondern anhand einzelner Biographien erfahren, an der des Dawid Rubinowicz zum Beispiel, oder der von Solly Ganor, von Petr Ginz oder Tivadar Soros<sup>11</sup>, um nur einige wenige zu nennen, von denen beeindruckende Tagebücher oder Erinnerungen vorliegen.

## Internationale Zusammenarbeit

Für eine solche Erweiterung des Blickfelds wäre eine Verstärkung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit auch von Lehrerinnen und Lehrern von größtem Wert. Dazu gibt es Ansätze, die u. a. vom Europarat und von der Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) gefördert werden, und es wäre wünschenswert, dass solche Bemühungen auch von Seiten der Schulverwaltungen deutscher Bundesländer dadurch Unterstützung fänden, dass es Lehrkräften ermöglicht und nahe gelegt wird, an internationalen Lehrerseminaren teilzunehmen. Es geht dabei nicht darum, didaktische und methodische Konzepte einfach von einem Land ins andere zu exportieren. Das wäre nicht nur wegen ver-

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<sup>11</sup> Vgl. Inge Deutschkron: Ich trug den gelben Stern 4. Aufl. Köln 1983. Das Tagebuch des Dawid Rubinowicz. Hrsg. von Walther Petri. Aus dem Polnischen von Stanislaw Zylinski. Weinheim und Basel 1988. Solly Ganor: Das andere Leben. Kindheit im Holocaust. Frankfurt a. M. 1997. Petr Ginz: Prager Tagebuch. 1941-1942. Hrsg. von Chava Pressburger. Aus dem Tschechischen von Eva Profousová. Berlin 2006. Tivadar Soros: Maskerade. Die Memoiren eines Überlebenskünstlers. Aus dem Englischen von Holger Fließbach. Stuttgart 2003.

schiedener Lehr- und Lernstile wenig Erfolg versprechend, sondern angesichts der äußerst unterschiedlichen Rolle und Geschichte der europäischen und außereuropäischen Länder im Zweiten Weltkrieg sogar moralisch fragwürdig. Nicht zufällig stehen in den verschiedenen Ländern jeweils unterschiedliche Fragen im Zentrum, wenn es um die Shoah geht. Dafür gibt es historische Gründe, es kann aber auch von aktuellen Entwicklungen bestimmt sein. So bildeten Probleme, die im östlichen Europa kaum eine Rolle spielen, in einigen west- und mitteleuropäischen Ländern den Anlass, neu über den Umgang mit der Geschichte des nationalsozialistischen Rassismus und Antisemitismus nachzudenken. Auf rassistisches Verhalten gegenüber Migranten, aber auch auf judenfeindliche Äußerungen von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund reagierten Pädagogen mit der Entwicklung neuer Konzepte, die für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Antisemitismus und der Shoah in multiethnischen und multikulturellen Gesellschaften angemessen sind.<sup>12</sup> Adressaten dieser Konzepte sind also nicht nur Angehörige der Mehrheitsgesellschaft, sondern auch die Einwanderer. Dabei wurde deutlich, dass es zwar verallgemeinerbare Erfahrungen gibt, die Herausforderungen aber nicht in allen durch Migration geprägten Gesellschaften dieselben sind. Von Bedeutung ist u. a., aus welchen Ländern die größten Gruppen von Migranten kommen, da es große Unterschiede hinsichtlich der mitgebrachten Geschichtsbilder und Einstellungen gibt. Auch hier zeigte sich, dass es nicht um die Übernahme fertiger Konzepte geht, sondern um den Austausch von Erfahrungen, die Erprobung von Vorschlägen und die Kooperation bei der Bewältigung komplexer Aufgaben.

Ob eine solche Kooperation letzten Endes zur Entstehung eines europäischen Geschichtsbildes beiträgt, als dessen Nukleus einige die Geschichte des Holocaust ausgemacht haben, kann einstweilen offen bleiben. Wir sind von einem gemeinsamen Geschichtsbild ohnehin so weit entfernt, dass ein Streit darüber, ob es wünschenswert wäre, müßig scheint. Wenn die nationalen Geschichtsbilder nicht dem Entwurf von Feindbildern dienen, ist schon viel erreicht.

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<sup>12</sup> Vgl. z.B. "Erziehung nach Auschwitz" in der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Pädagogische und soziologische Annäherungen. Hrsg. von B. Fechner, G. Kößler und T. Liebertz-Gross. Weinheim 2000. Elke Gryglewski: "Ich bin jetzt ein Teil von Deutschland..." - Jugendliche nichtdeutscher Herkunft und ihr Umgang mit der Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Gedenkstätten. In: NS-Gewaltherrschaft. Beiträge zur historischen Forschung und juristischen Aufarbeitung. Berlin 2005, S. 498-508. Gordon Mitchell u. a.: "Wenn wir die ganze Sache nicht machen würden, dann würde Gras darüber wachsen ...". Deutsch-jüdische Vergangenheit in interkulturellen Schulklassen. Frankfurt a. M. 2007

## 2. Panel: Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat Them

### 2.1. *Grußwort*

Theo Zwanziger<sup>13</sup>



Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,

der Kampf gegen Rassismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus ist eine gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe. Deshalb muss auch der Fußball in der Lage sein, über das Sportliche hinaus unserer sich ständig verändernden Gesellschaft ein menschliches Gesicht zu geben. Wir treten gemeinsam mit unseren Landesverbänden seit langem mit vielen Aktionen gegen jede Art von Diskriminierung ein und wollen hier auch weiterhin klar Position beziehen.

Der Deutsche Fußball-Bund unterstützt seit vielen Jahren die Arbeit von Fanprojekten, zu deren Kern-Aufgaben die Gewaltprävention, der Abbau extremistischer Orientierungen und die sozialpädagogische Betreuung von Fangruppen-Mitgliedern gehören.

Im Rahmen des Lizenzierungsverfahrens verpflichten wir die Vereine, Fanarbeit zu leisten und begleiten sie dabei mit Schulungs- und Weiterbildungsangeboten.

Mit der jährlichen Verleihung des Integrations- und des Julius-Hirsch-Preises zeichnen wir Vereine und Institutionen aus, die sich mit beispielhaften Maßnahmen gegen die Ausgrenzung von Menschen auf dem Fußballplatz, im Stadion und in der Gesellschaft stellen und setzen dabei gleichzeitig auf deren Vorbildcharakter für andere Initiativen.

Zusammen mit dem Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend unterstützen wir das Projekt der Deutschen Sportjugend „Am Ball bleiben - Fußball gegen Rassismus und Diskriminierung“, in dessen Rahmen die positiven Kräfte des Fußballs, insbesondere der Fan-Szene gefördert werden.

Außer über diese konkreten Projekte erreicht der Fußball im Alltag viele Menschen und kann daher einen großen Einfluss auf gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen ausüben. Auf spielerischem Weg bietet er die Chance zu Selbstverwirklichung und Anerkennung, stärkt das Selbstbewusstsein und sorgt für wichtige Gruppenerlebnisse im Umgang mit Sieg und Niederlage. Ein wesentlicher Aspekt sportlicher Aktivitäten in den Vereinen ist der gegenseitige Respekt und Toleranz.

Der Deutsche Fußball-Bund möchte seine gesellschaftliche Position nutzen, sich einzusetzen für Freiheit, Toleranz und Menschlichkeit. Wir wenden uns entschieden gegen das Vergessen der Nazidiktatur und stellen uns darauf ein, dass der Kampf gegen rassistische, fremdenfeindliche und antisemitische Einstellungen ein langwieriger Prozess ist.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to read "Theo Zwanziger".

Dr. Theo Zwanziger

<sup>13</sup> Präsident des Deutschen Fußball Bundes (DFB)

## **2.2. *Racism, Xenophobia and Right-Wing Extremism in Spectator Behaviour and the Development of Counter Strategies***<sup>14</sup>

Gunter A. Pilz

### **Initial Situation and Aim**

Xenophobia, racism and right-wing extremism in the context of football matches have been observed and debated for many years. As a result, there has been reaction on several levels. Fan projects, clubs, associations and police, but also fans themselves, have developed different strategies to take action against racist and right-wing extremist incidents or to prevent them in advance wherever possible.

The aim of the study is to analyse the most recent developments relating to xenophobia, racism and right-wing extremism in spectator behaviour and identify provisions, possibilities, and limitations of counter strategies, and then to create action recommendations on this basis. It is thus important to formulate conditions which are necessary for successful work, or, aspects which can limit the effectiveness of antiracist work. In doing this, the different action fields and perspectives of the involved parties are considered.

### **Results: Description of the Situation**

In almost all national league clubs which were studied during the research period 2004 to the first half year 2005, visible and audible xenophobic and right-wing extreme behaviour in the tiers of the stadium has reduced in recent years but has not disappeared. In the individual stadium location, there has been a decline both on different levels and also in different problem situations. While it is mostly individuals or small groups in most places who involve themselves in these kinds of expressions, a whole block of several hundred to one thousand fans in some locations has involved itself in xenophobic discrimination independent of the events in the match.

Furthermore, it can be seen that problematic behaviour is not restricted to only the ultra scene or the standing area, but rather can be found in the seated area, too.

A shift in racism and right-wing extremist behaviour away from the stadium and toward the journey to and from the match was identified – this creates a public beyond the stadium, for example in public transport. Bus and train journeys during away games are also used as a place for staging racist and right-wing extremist songs.

Furthermore, a shift in racism and right-wing extremist behaviour away from the premier league and toward the lower leagues was identified. Here we can see problem situations which in some cases require urgent attention. As a cause of such a shift, the following could be named: missing fan projects and other offers which look after fans who are susceptible to problematic behaviour and attitudes; the lower public and media pressure leads to the fact that such incidents often do not become known to public; less police and club control as well as lacking club commitment and financial resources.

With regard to the national team, a decline in the visibility of right-wing extremist expressions or xenophobic presence has been seen in recent years.

however, severe racist and/or right-wing extremist behaviour is very much in trend, particularly at away games. For example, this could be seen at the games in Celje in March 2005 and in Bratislava in September 2005. These incidents are not seen by the questioned experts as a

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<sup>14</sup> Zusammenfassung aus der Studie: PILZ, G.A. u.a. Wandlungen des Zuschauerverhaltes im Profifußball. Schorndorf 2006

new phenomenon, but rather that they show a “wave pattern”: right-wing extremist and racist expressions come again and again – often also together with violence – at national team matches, especially in Eastern Europe.

The described decline in problematic behaviour in the analysed premier league clubs does not necessarily mean a decline in problematic attitude patterns. There could be a discrepancy between attitude and behaviour. Problematic attitude patterns could have become less visible – this is indicated by interviews with fans and experts. This is the case to a considerable extent for the area of right-wing extremism. The right-wing extremist scene has changed its strategy and communicates using hidden codes of ringwing extreme attitudes and a corresponding symbol system which often is only recognisable to insiders. This puts high demands on fan project workers, stewards, and fan supporters because they first have to learn this expert knowledge which is normally not available to them.

Racism is also still just as present in the premier league stadiums. It has however also taken on other, less obvious forms, besides the direct insulting of spectators which still exists (as we saw in the recent events of the 2005/2006 season). Subtle racism can be recognised in that black and also East European players are more readily criticised by fans and have to perform better than German or West European players. If black players are criticised, they are likely to be de-personalised and thus change from an individual to a black man.

Racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism are certainly perceived in the stadium and partly critically discussed. Homophobia and sexism however are much less perceptible and also less often questioned. Thus, a hierarchy of discrimination has developed – although homophobia and sexism are more prevalent in stadiums than xenophobia and right-wing extremism. Homophobic fan songs belong particularly to the standard repertoire in many football stadiums and are not questioned. At the same time, football belongs to one of the last social bastions in which homosexuality is generally a taboo. Sexist merchandising articles are very common and are considered as a “normal” part of football culture.

## **Results: Counter Strategies**

As reasons for the decline in racist and ring-wing extremist spectator behaviour, changes in football culture are also named in interviews besides the explicit counter strategies and the self regulation mechanisms in the fan scene. These are things such as the stronger presence and normality of black players in the teams and the “civilisation” of football through the “eventisation” which increasingly attracts the middle class into the stadiums to whom the “culture of insults” is alien.

Counter strategies can be differentiated by agent and type of strategy. Important agents are fan projects, police, clubs, associations, fan initiatives and fans. Counter strategies are available in the area of pedagogical work, campaign work, self regulation mechanisms, rules, sanctions as well as networking. There are no panaceas for work against right-wing extremism, racism and xenophobia. Continuous work with different approaches and a constructive, networking cooperation between the agents is necessary.

Since the beginning of the eighties, the associations – DFB, but also some federal state associations, too – have highlighted the problem with right-wing extremism and racism in the stadiums and tried to work against these problems on various levels. Since the end of the nineties, the DFB has gone from more singular campaigns over to the development of a comprehensive concept against racist tendencies in football stadiums and to consistent involvement of the premier league clubs. It has agreed on a 10 point plan against racism which, among other things, advises implementing an antiracism paragraph in the stadium rules and requires a clear positioning of the club against racism. The DFB participates in the FIFA and UEFA

conferences against racism and thus can promote the implementation of international resolutions against racism in the premier league.

Self regulation mechanisms in the fan scene are a considerably important aspect in the development of counter strategies. They must be sustainably supported. “Politics doesn’t belong in the stadium” is an argument of many fans to prevent racist and rightwing extremist statements. However, this argument is also often used to stop antiracist activities. Fans realise at the same time that racist and right-wing extremist behaviour brings negative headlines for the club. With fans or spectators who identify with the club, they are careful not to damage the club’s image and behave appropriately without necessarily identifying with the content of an anti-racist attitude.

It is clear that some of the fans intervene in racist and right-wing extremism with courage because they do not want to tolerate such discrimination and statements. These fans must be supported by the club and the fan project. This is also true for fan initiatives which act explicitly against racism and right-wing extremism in football.

Framework conditions and guidelines can be formulated for work against racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism so that this work is sustainably effective. With regard to the club, it is important that it positions itself clearly and early against racism and right-wing extremism in order to avoid an undertow effect in the fan scene. A club is only then credible in its commitment against xenophobia and right-wing extremism when it also deals with its own fans respectfully and democratically and continually works on the racism theme instead of only reacting whenever there is a problem which is publicised by the media.

Building blocks for the work against racism have been developed through the study based on interview analysis. They should be implemented in the daily work. Fan projects are confronted with numerous tasks with the result that anti-racist work is often pushed aside and violence prevention is favoured. The complexity of the subject and the necessary expertise regarding right-wing extremism, which is often not available in sufficient quantity, add to the difficulties.

The functioning communication between the different agents connected with the stadium is of high importance. Practical examples show how breakdowns in communication, e.g. between the club and the fan project, reduce the effectiveness of the work or even inhibit activities. The determination of responsibilities and the networking of the agents are very important in this context. It must be clear to all the agents that anti-racism has to be understood as a cross-section task and not as a compulsory programme. Especially campaign work may not be a one-off occurrence. It must be accompanied by additional measures. Campaigns are only then credible when they are part of a continuous concept. The general rule is that the social anchoring of measures increases their effectiveness. That means that measures are particularly effective when they are developed together with the fans, or at least are supported by the fans.

Furthermore, anti-racist work means opening your own institution – for example with regard to the participation of migrants.

## Action Recommendations

The following action recommendations are suggested for the work against racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism

- Development of an education programme „Work for Respect and Tolerance“ for the fan
- project and regularly carrying out training and workshops for fan project workers
- Training with multipliers or key figures from the fan scene through the fan project
- Regular training of stewards, security personnel, and fan supporters especially on the subject of recent developments in right-wing extremism and training on intervention action in the stadium
- Carrying out an event day for respect and tolerance against xenophobia, sexism and
- homophobia in the premier league
- Development of a travelling exhibition on the subject of “Women, Football and Sexism”
- Establishment of a share fund to support specific activities for respect and tolerance in the fan scene
- Organising an instructor on the subject of “Xenophobia and Right-Wing Extremism“ at the fan project coordination point (KOS)
- Organising a voluntary instructor/contact person for the work for respect and tolerance in the club
- Implementation of an interdisciplinary work group for respect and tolerance on the national level.



## 2.3. ***Sport, Racism and Citizenship***

Carine Bloch<sup>15</sup>

Founded in 1927, LICRA (the International League Against Racism and Anti-Semitism) fights all forms of racism, anti-Semitism and discrimination throughout the world. Since 1998 LICRA's Sports Commission has had two main objectives: to use sport as a tool to teach young people about citizenship, respect for others and responsibility and to combat undesirable developments in professional, amateur and non-organised sport.

Respecting one's opponents, the referee and team-mates, taking responsibility on a playing field, learning to live and develop one's potential within a group (...); there is no doubting the social and pedagogical role of sport. Sport in France, moreover, does not suffer, or at least not unduly, from discrimination: whether in amateur or professional clubs or in training centres, participating in sport and/or access to sport at high level is open to all. Today it is one of the very rare fields which continues to offer young people from the most diverse geographical, social and religious backgrounds the hope that anybody can still achieve success.

But if sport can still point the way in terms of equality of opportunity, it can likewise be a place which gives expression to undesirable racist tendencies and violence.

Since it was established, LICRA's Sports Commission has denounced the racist tendencies which are corrupting sport, football in particular, at all levels. LICRA is shattering a disturbing silence and confronting a taboo subject; LICRA, some say, is talking up epiphenomena". Since research work is confined principally to the subject of violence and does not really tackle the questions at the heart of LICRA's purpose, LICRA understood that in order to mobilise people and take effective action, its first task was to demonstrate and to convince. To do so it had to be able to quantify, qualify and analyse racist phenomena and/or the use of sport as a recruitment ground. It therefore decided to keep a record of all the information it could collect on racist incidents occurring at sporting venues. In order to classify this information, it developed a special observation tool.

### **I. Review of racist tendencies**

#### **1. Tools for observation and analysis**

##### ***A. LICRA observation tool***

LICRA has designed this observation tool to record racist incidents on and around sports grounds in all sports and at all levels of practice (professional, amateur and non-organised). The information tool was tested out in 2006 and 2007 and LICRA sections trained in its use.

The purpose of the tool is to observe :

- racist incidents and the risks of infiltration (by extremists) in professional sports;
- racist abuse/violence and incitement of racial hatred, as well as the danger of those involved in amateur sport retreating into their own communities;
- the risk of young people involved in non-organised or relatively unstructured sport being recruited (by fundamentalists, sects, the extreme right...).

The tool is a platform for collecting information obtained from a variety of sources:

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<sup>15</sup> President of LICRA, head of the Sport Committee, Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme

- Internal sources

Information is collected at departmental and regional level by LICRA sections (60 sections spread throughout France). The recorded incidents are validated at national level by the platform administrator, who is also responsible for archiving, consolidating and processing the data recorded.

- External sources

In addition to information collected by LICRA's sections, LICRA also relies on other sources, including :

- sports clubs and supporters' associations which contact LICRA headquarters. Since the information campaign « Racisme, se taire c'est accepter » (Racism, keeping quiet is the same as accepting) in June 2006, targeted at 22,000 football clubs in the FFF (French Football Federation), these contacts have intensified as players and spectators have become more aware of LICRA's work in this field
- the media reporting on racist acts (press, radio, television, internet) : articles are rare even if the acts are increasingly well reported
- internet forums which are monitored by LICRA
- LICRA partners (FFF, Ministry of the Interior, etc.) who have their own observation tools and exchange information with LICRA

### B. Survey of communes

In 2005 LICRA decided to conduct a survey among the communes with a view to establishing another source of information. The communes can be viewed as external stakeholders which cannot be accused of partiality. Moreover, elected representatives and officials in the communes are seen to be less judges in their own case in the world of sport; because they are local, they have detailed knowledge of the ground in question.

The survey of a representative panel of 589 communes was carried out over three years, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 344 communes, that is to say 58%, responded to the survey, a high response rate compared with normal replies to surveys on subjects such as racism and anti-Semitism. The panel is representative of the French communes as a whole, covering the country's entire territory and involving communes of all sizes in both urban and rural settings.

The information passed on by the communes to LICRA is treated strictly confidentially. The survey consists of a five-page questionnaire covering questions on three main themes: professional football/sport, amateur football/sport and non-organised football/sport.

## 2. Types of incident observed

The survey of the communes reveals different types of incident according to the sport and level of play. Over the 344 communes who replied, 44% have observed problems in all sports and at all levels. The communes report that 90% of the problems observed relate to football, the most played and most popular sport.

### A. In professional football and sport

#### a. Review

Over the three years 19 of the 48 communes which have a professional football club within their territory have responded to the survey (a response rate of 40%). Only eight of the 19 communes report racist incidents within their professional football club. This figure seems low especially since LICRA itself has been contacted by victims reporting racist incidents on the part of pseudo-supporters and/or the politicisation of some stands in relation to 20 professional clubs. Between January 2005 and June 2007, for example, LICRA recorded more than 165 examples of racism in professional football in France.

Nevertheless, as the survey has gone on mindsets have changed and tongues have loosened. In 2005 one single town had the courage to tackle the question of racism in professional football. Today there are ten or so. The systematic denunciation of these incidents has paid off; the beefing up of legislation is now showing results in and around stadia. Racism in professional football is becoming less of a taboo subject, even if the commonly expressed view that “it’s a problem for others, not for us” still persists.

Over the three years of the survey ten communes, moreover, have reported observing racism in other high-level sports, all of them collective : handball, rugby, volleyball and basketball.

#### b. Authors and victims

Few racist incidents take place between players on the professional football pitch. In football stadia the vast majority of incidents are observed in the stands (monkey cries, Nazi salutes, racist insults, slogans, banners...), where small organised groups mainly attack rival players and fans, notably those of colour. These organisations use football as a means to spread their hateful propaganda in an attempt to recruit new members. They also think nothing of transforming a match into a political arena, as happened in the tragic match between Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) and Tel Aviv in November 2006.

### **DRAMA AT PSG IN A CLIMATE OF RACISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM**

Press release 24/11/06

LICRA strongly condemns the multiple incidents of violence, racism and anti-Semitism which occurred yesterday during the UEFA Cup match between PSG and the Israeli club Hapoël Tel Aviv.

LICRA denounces, as it has done for a number of years, the climate of insecurity and terror (racist and anti-Semitic violence, attacks on immigrants, lynchings...) which prevails at every match at the Parc des Princes. Since the beginning of the season LICRA has noted a real hardening of racist aggression at PSG and escalating violence.

During and after the match yesterday evening hundreds of Parisian supporters shouted anti-Semitic insults such as “dirty Jew!”, “death to Jews” and “Heil Hitler”, accompanied by multiple Nazi salutes, according to several witnesses who contacted LICRA this morning. “Gangs of 10 to 15 youths, some armed with knives, gave chase to Jewish supporters once the match had ended”, they added.

LICRA calls on the authorities without delay to launch a thorough investigation into the circumstances which led to the death of a supporter after the match and saw another seriously injured. For LICRA this tragedy is further evidence of the failure of the Local Security Contract (CLS) applying to the Parc des Princes which was put in place in June 2004 and the limits of an ambiguous policy pursued by the Parisian club for almost 20 years in the face of these intolerable developments.

Fortunately the drama of this match and the events surrounding it has also had a galvanising effect. Stricter legislation in relation to sports facilities has led to two phenomena: a reduction in the number of offences committed inside stadia and the displacement of racist phenomena from inside to the outside of stadia. Now violent and racist incidents take place on the fringes of the match: rival supporters (the famous fights), spectators and passers-by are now attacked or subjected to abuse, generally because of the colour of their skin or their religion.

### *B. In amateur football and sport (federal and non-organised)*

148 communes (43% of the communes who took part in the survey) report that they are aware of racist acts at amateur level. The problems are different from those in professional football where racism mainly emanates from particular supporters in the stands. In amateur sport there are many more racist acts committed on the field (almost one in two). For the most part these are similar to those observed in civil society, exacerbated by the tensions of the game and/or local and parochial rivalries. The data collected from the communes in relation to amateur and non-organised sport highlight three main phenomena :

- Racism, anti-Semitism and homophobia

Racism and anti-Semitism are widespread: over the three years of the inquiry the municipalities informed LICRA of nearly 1300 racist and anti-Semitic acts. Insults are commonplace and unfortunately too rarely recorded by referees in their match reports. Acts of aggressions are becoming more and more numerous and, above all, violent.

As far as homophobia is concerned, it is becoming increasingly recognised as a major (and worrying) phenomenon in the world of football. 10% of communes admit to being aware of problems linked to a refusal of some to accept the sexual orientation of others (a significant increase over the 2% revealed in the 2005-2006 inquiry). Measures still need to be put in place.

A number of communes have also reported cases of discrimination against women. Young women, notably Muslim women, are sometimes refused access to sport as a result of cultural and family traditions. Sexism accounts for 10% of the acts committed in amateur sport.

- Retreating back into the community

The existence of community clubs is not a new phenomenon. In France, a country which attaches greater importance to integration than to assimilation, these have up to now been clubs open to all communities. Since 2000, however, LICRA has observed a trend for these clubs to refocus on their original community. This trend is a response to fear on the part of the victims of racist acts, who prefer to belong to a community club. 30% of the communes who replied

to the survey confirm that they have observed such a trend. It is also clear, nevertheless, that towns and cities in general oppose the establishment of such teams which are contrary to the values of the Republic.

There is also another phenomenon: 20% of the municipalities have observed a rise in tension between urban and rural teams which reveals a fracture between the two environments. The fact that one side includes very mixed populations while on the other side minorities are underrepresented is frequently a source of conflict.

- Recruitment by fundamentalist groups

A further type of problem affects amateur and non-organised sport: the recruitment of young people by fundamentalist groups.

15% of the communes who took part in the survey report attempts by fundamentalist groups (90% of cases) or sects (10% of cases) to recruit young people. The communes report difficulties in gathering information on this phenomenon because it is hard to identify and to observe. As a result, the figures communicated in the survey seem significantly below the real situation. The enrolment process is often the same. The fundamentalists practise a form of infiltration within a group (community or other), propagating their malevolent ideas. They use sport, sometimes relying on a sporting structure, as a vehicle to transmit their message and introduce religious practices into sport.

Street football or indoor football (futsal) is the sport which is most affected by this mechanism. It also affects other sports such as body building and combat sports which are very popular in deprived areas and which provide fertile ground for this type of activism.

## II. LICRA activities in France

### 1. Speaking out and mobilising people

#### A. Warning about racist tendencies amongst young people

LICRA gets involved with young people on a daily basis in order to raise their awareness about problems of racism, anti-Semitism and discrimination early on. This involvement takes place in primary and secondary schools, six-form colleges, and training centres run by professional clubs. In total, awareness-raising work has been carried out amongst 280,000 young people since 1999 through sport or in a sporting context.

LICRA develops instruments and organises specific events in order to work in depth with young people on issues like those of respect, citizenship and individual responsibility. It has organised, for example:

- Prevention workshops in connection with films like *Le foot pour la tolérance* ("football for tolerance"), which was produced by LICRA in 2002
- Speeches and discussions with testimony from well-known sporting figures
- Educational tournaments on the subject of citizenship with debates and activities (charters) in the context of matches

Another instrument used is a partnership agreement between LICRA and the UCPF (Union of Professional Football Clubs), which was signed in 2007. This agreement provides in particular for prevention work using an educational guide, but also the exchange of information concerning racist acts, along with an annual assessment of application of the Charter against Racism signed in 2005. The guide, published in the framework of this cooperation, allows events to be organised in the 40 training centres run by the clubs in the first and second divisions. The idea of these is to raise the awareness of young people concerning the problems of racism in general and within their own sporting field in particular.

### *B. Raising awareness amongst the general public*

#### a. Organising conferences

Throughout the year, LICRA organises conferences to inform the general public about the dangers of racism and anti-Semitism, in order to raise awareness and mobilise people. These conferences highlight the different forms of these phenomena observed by LICRA and provide a framework for action in combating this scourge. In 2007, 55 events of this type were organised at local level by LICRA's branches in the context of sporting events.

#### b. Running communication campaigns

LICRA runs communication campaigns in order to mobilise the silent majority and combat the tendency to play down racist phenomena in sport.

The first information campaign was run in 2002. The slogan of the campaign was *Mettons le racisme hors-jeu! Mettons la violence hors-jeu!* ("Let's put racism out of the game! Let's put violence out of the game!").

In 2006, a large-scale operation was launched in partnership with the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Voluntary Sector and the French Football Federation. The slogan *"racisme, se taire c'est accepter"* ("racism: keeping quiet is accepting it") was displayed on tens of thousands of posters (accompanied by an information leaflet), encouraging witnesses or victims of racism to speak out. In the framework of this campaign, the 22,000 French football clubs were called on to take action.

In the field of professional football, LICRA initiated a campaign in 2006-2007 entitled *pseudo supporter rest chez toi* ("pseudo supporter: stay at home!"). This campaign centres on two film clips intended to be broadcast via the media or directly in sporting venues. It is also possible to view these films via [www.licrafoot.com](http://www.licrafoot.com) (making them accessible to as many people as possible). The Paris Saint-Germain Football Club (PSG) got involved with this campaign by showing the clips and distributing leaflets at a match in February 2007. This campaign is rounded off by an educational interview with one of the two actors, which can be used by LICRA activists in their prevention work in schools and sporting clubs. Cinemas in twenty cities in France also showed these films during the educational weeks against racism in March 2007.

## **2. Mobilising different stakeholders and managing partnerships**

Since 2005, LICRA has observed a tangible increase in awareness amongst those active in the sporting world of the existence of racist tendencies and their consequences. Thus, LICRA is regularly consulted and organises events in partnership with these stakeholders.

### A. Public Institutions

LICRA organises events in partnership with public institutions to fight against racism.

The association organises training seminars aimed at elected representatives and those working in the fields of sport and security for local and regional authorities. The aim of these training seminars is to provide instruments or advice to the participants on identifying and combating racism. In 2006 and 2007, for example, 900 elected and non-elected representatives of regional authorities took part in such seminars.

LICRA and the local authorities also organise awareness-raising projects (debates, sporting tournaments...).

And some local authorities get more deeply involved and sign agreements. The goal of these agreements is to mobilise stakeholders over the long term. These partnership agreements signed by LICRA and the various stakeholders usually provide for monitoring, awareness-raising and sanctions in response to racism. LICRA has worked, for example, with the Midi-Pyrénées public service training and career development agency, the regional and departmental authority for youth and sports in Charente-Maritime, the French forum for urban security, sports and regional development and numerous regional authorities (city of Nantes, Rhône-Alpes regional council, etc.)

### B. Campaigns in cooperation with football organisations

LICRA establishes partnerships in order to organise awareness-raising and communication campaigns, as well as campaigns to promote vigilance with regard to racism and ensure sanctions for those involved.

In the field of professional football, LICRA has partnerships with:

- The UCPF (Union of Professional Football Clubs)
- Professional football clubs (HAC, Lens, PSG, Tours, Stade de Reims...)

In the field of amateur football, LICRA cooperates with:

- the FFF (French Football Federation)
- the football leagues (Rhône-Alpes, Nord Pas de Calais, etc.)
- the districts (Dordogne, ...)
- numerous amateur clubs
- fan associations ( "les Doggies" in Lille, "les West Dragons" in Toulouse...)

LICRA also has links with the DTNA (the central referees' organisation), the UNFP (professional footballers' union) and UNECATEF (the national union of professional coaches and technical employees in football).

### 3. Legal and legislative campaigns

#### A. Legislative activities

##### a. Ministry of Sport

Since 1998, LICRA has had regular meetings with the Ministry of Sport. During the amendments to the Sports Law in 2000, LICRA's proposals were taken up, allowing anti-racist associations to act as a joint plaintiff in court cases on behalf of victims.

##### b. Ministry of the Interior

Since its creation in 1998, LICRA's sports committee has had regular meetings with the Ministry of the Interior, giving it an opportunity to feed in its perspectives on issues of stadium safety and the battle against racism and violence. The association had expressed its desire to see the toughening of sanctions for those responsible for racist chants or violence in stadiums. In the framework of the fight against terrorism, a law was brought into force in July 2006: this law allows associations or groups of violent and/or racist fans to be dissolved. A LICRA proposal was fed into the law: LICRA had pointed out the fact that most problematic fans were not part of associations as defined by the 1901 law.

#### B. Work on sporting disciplinary codes

LICRA has questioned the FFF on a number of occasions concerning its disciplinary code for racist behaviour during a match. LICRA has called on the FFF to ensure that acts of a racist nature are labelled as such and treated separately from other forms of violence, as it the case in criminal cases (where they are treated as aggravating circumstances). The provisions were amended to this end in 2006: they now provide for a 6-match suspension for players and a 5-month suspension for managers, trainers or other officials involved in using racist language.

#### **THE KEBE AFFAIR: A IMPORTANT PRECEDENT**

Press Release, 15/10/07

LICRA welcomes the decision taken today by the disciplinary committee of the LFP (Professional Football League) to subtract one point from SC Bastia's points in League 2 due to racist behaviour demonstrated by certain fans in the context of the away-match in Libourne Saint-Seurin on 14 September last year.

This sanction, for an offence which, it should be stressed, is illegal under French law, represents a cultural revolution in French professional football, due to its unique and novel nature. LICRA would like to point out, however, that strict application of FIFA's disciplinary code would require the subtraction of three points for the first racist offence, or six points or relegation for re-offenders. Nevertheless, this decision was able to achieve a small degree of clarity, following the grotesque way in which the Baros affair was dealt with, which was incomprehensible to everyone.

Finally, LICRA believes, as stated recently by Michel Platini, President of UEFA and the DNA (national association of referees), that temporary or permanent interruption of a match in cases where racism has been observed will remain a further instrument in the battle against racism in football.



### C. Protection of victims

#### a. In the legal sphere

LICRA is regularly contacted by victims of or witnesses to racist actions in sport. The association assists them free of charge in their proceedings. It advises them in taking legal action. LICRA can also join victims as a co-plaintiff if they so desire. For example, in 2006, it joined Paris Saint-Germain football club as a co-plaintiff at the trial of supporters who had unfurled a racist banner.

#### b. In the field of sport

Alongside these legal proceedings, LICRA also offers its expertise to victims and sporting authorities within the framework of disciplinary commissions.

In addition, LICRA has the power to refer any racist action in and around football stadiums to the national council for ethics in football. LICRA's regional branches are also heard by the football ethics commissions at département and regional level.

## **III. LICRA's activities at international level**

### **1. Rule changes and a resolution**

#### A. Football's international governing bodies

In 2006, football's international governing bodies, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), took action against racism by introducing measures to increase the penalties for racist behaviour on the pitch and around football stadiums. The FARE Network, of which LICRA is a member, was consulted concerning the introduction of more severe penalties in cases of racism. FIFA intends in future to impose stadium bans and deduct points in the case of racist behaviour by a player, manager, official or supporter. UEFA is planning to impose suspensions of up to five matches for players who make racist remarks.

#### B. The European Parliament

LICRA regularly lobbies the European Parliament on issues relating to racism in sport. For example, in 2000, the association participated in working groups of the European Commission which led to the resolution on preventing racism, xenophobia and intolerance in sport.

In March 2006, a resolution on tackling racism in European football was signed by Members of the European Parliament. This resolution was the fruit of exchanges and consultations with the FARE Network. LICRA collected more than 50 signatures from French MEPs in support of the adoption of this resolution.

## **2. Activities within the FARE Network**

For over five years, LICRA has been working with FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe), the European network of associations against racism in football, which has a special partnership with FIFA, UEFA and the European Parliament on issues of racism. As a result, the network can make proposals at legislative and regulatory level. FARE is also involved in international competitions (World and European Cups). The Swiss branch of LICRA has created a Sports Commission; it will be involved in the FARE Network's activities during Euro 2008, which is being jointly organised by Switzerland and Austria.

### A. FARE Action Week

LICRA is charged, on behalf of the FARE Network, with running the European Action Week against racism in football held in October each year, during which hundreds of projects are organised across the continent. The 8th Action Week took place in 2007 and was the framework for around fifteen projects in France and Switzerland.

### B. FARE conference

Each year, the FARE Network organises an international conference which brings together the delegates of the network and experts in tackling racism in football. Following conferences in Sheffield, Vienna and Bratislava, Paris was chosen by FARE as the venue for the conference on 19 and 20 May 2007. LICRA was responsible for organising this event, of which Michel Platini, the President of UEFA, was the patron.

130 guests thus met at the headquarters of the French Football Federation (FFF) to hold discussions about this year's theme: "Football, Diversity and Equality". The conference was attended by 80 representatives of the FARE Network, as well as representatives of French and European public authorities (the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the City of Paris), representatives of football institutions (UEFA, the FFF, the UNFP and the UNECATEF), referees' representatives, journalists, sociologists, former professional players... with the conspicuous exception of the French Football League, a notable absentee at this conference.

This European conference involved two days of reflection and exchange on how to tackle racism in football more effectively. The central issues raised included: those at the top setting an example, the lack of diversity in football's decision-making bodies in Europe, the scandal of the trafficking and exploitation of young African footballers, a real awareness of the problem of homophobia, and the harmonisation at European level of antiracism legislation and sporting rules.

Finally, in September 2007 in Vienna, FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe) made LICRA a member of its administration group, thus making the antiracism association one of the most important organisations within the network.

### **3. Trafficking in young African footballers**

#### **A. Current situation**

More and more young African players are drawn to the major European championships, against the background of poor prospects of a future in sport in their country of origin. These young people – sometimes pushed into this by their families, who see in them hope for social and economic advancement – are often manipulated by unscrupulous local or European agents. They leave for Europe whilst still minors to take part in trials, on simple tourist visas. If they do not pass the trials, they usually find themselves abandoned in the country illegally, without papers, without money, and without access to social security benefits. Today, thousands of such young people, forgotten by all, wander across Europe, travelling from country to country. They are often unable to return to Africa with dignity, and/or they prefer to remain illegally in Europe rather than returning home and having to bear the “dishonour” of their family.

This situation was described as “alarming” by UEFA at the “Play Fair With Sport” conference in 2006. It is to be feared that the situation may deteriorate if nothing is done. Furthermore, the successful examples of a few African players such as Samuel Eto’o and Didier Drogba encourage young Africans to take this route, without having been warned about the risks.

#### **B. Actions taken to date**

In November 2006, the first International Conference on Young African Footballers was held in Enghien-les-Bains, organised by Culture Foot Solidaire in partnership with LICRA. It brought together numerous stakeholders in the world of football: institutions such as UEFA, the UCPF (Union of Professional Football Clubs), associated networks such as FARE, as well as former sports players such as Salif Keita, the first winner of the African Player of the Year award, and Aimé Jacquet, manager of the 1998 World Cup winners. This conference allowed a light to be shone on this serious problem, linked globally to North/South immigration. The FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe) conference organised by LICRA in May 2007 (see above) also offered a forum for tackling this problem.

Furthermore, LICRA’s legal service, in partnership with Culture Foot Solidaire, works throughout the year to help young victims in their administrative and legal proceedings, offering them assistance and advice.

Finally, the MEPs Ivo Belet, Jean-Luc Bennahmias, Adeline Hazan, Guy Bono and Patrick Gaubert, president of LICRA, submitted a written declaration concerning the fight against the trafficking and exploitation of children in football to the European Parliament on 28 March, with the aim of drawing the attention of sporting and political authorities to this catastrophic situation.

### **4. Individual activities**

Examples:

LICRA worked with the FES (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) on preparations for the 2006 World Cup (work with French supporters).

It coordinated the “social cohesion” group of the Agenda 21 for Paris’ 2012 Olympic bid.

## **2.4. Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat Them**

Rafal Pankowski<sup>16</sup>

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to share with you some reflections on certain aspects of football culture in Poland and in East-Central Europe at large. It seems that football is in fact a good exemplification of both the dangers and the positive potential that can be identified in contemporary popular culture. It is popular culture that constructs and moulds identities today and any serious initiative aiming at social change needs to take this factor into account.

In this context I would like to tell you about something positive that has happened in football culture in Poland in the recent years. Antisemitism is, unfortunately, still very much present in Polish football. Nevertheless, the number of antisemitic manifestations has decreased significantly, not least thanks to joint efforts of the "NEVER AGAIN" Association and the Polish Football Association. We are currently trying to replicate our example of good practice across the region of Central and Eastern Europe, working hand in hand with bodies such as Football Against Racism in Europe and UEFA.

Problems of racism, and antisemitism in particular, are part of every day life in Eastern Europe to an extent no longer encountered in many Western states. Until recently no other arena in Poland seemed to have been affected so deeply by racism and antisemitism as football grounds. An antisemitic subculture dominated the stadiums almost completely, with rival gangs routinely calling each other's clubs "Jewish." (NB. "Jewish" here is a term of abuse. It happens despite the fact that the real number of Jews in Poland today is of course very small.) Anti-racist efforts to counteract this trend were initially met with indifference or even hostility by football officials.

The media covered the issue of football hooliganism. What they rarely mentioned, however, was the successful penetration of hooligan circles by racist ideology as well as by organized neo-fascist groups. The display of Celtic crosses and other nazi-skinhead symbols at football games had become commonplace in the 1990s.

The issue was vividly illustrated in March 2000 in Lodz, an industrial city with two big football clubs, LKS and Widzew. Antisemitic and nazi graffiti, often combined with the clubs' symbols, was present almost everywhere on the city's walls and little action was taken until a shocked visitor, the chairman of an Israeli organisation of former Lodz inhabitants (most of them survivors of the Lodz Ghetto), wrote an open letter to the local authorities.

Alerted to the fact that the city's international reputation was at stake, the authorities, together with the local media organized a much publicized action day, to clean the offensive slogans off the walls. However, in an act of extreme defiance the same evening, neo-nazis showed their contempt for such initiatives. They daubed "Judens raus" and symbols of the neo-fascist party, National Revival of Poland (NOP) on the home of Marek Edelman, the last surviving commander of the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising and a leader of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s.

After outrage in the national media, Poland's president wrote a letter to Edelman offering him personal security guards. Edelman publicly rejected the offer, saying the government should rather look at its own policy of tolerating neo-fascist groups. He also pointed to the daily discrimination suffered by Roma people and refugees.

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<sup>16</sup> "Never Again" Association, Collegium Civitas, Poland

The NOP, involved in the attack, is the main extreme-right organization that has tried to organize football hooligans into "national-revolutionary" cadres, through leafleting and displaying its symbols at stadiums.

In this context one has to add the entire football hooligan subculture is very strongly violence-oriented. The numbers attending league games are rather small. Because of that, it became much easier for an extremist minority to win cultural (and physical) hegemony on the terraces.

The lust for violence and the frustration of young, predominantly working class, youths involved in football hooliganism, is easily channelled by extreme-right activists who provide them with a sense of purpose.

Hooligan gang leaders seem sympathetic to the cause, too. One editor of a prominent hooligan publication stated in an interview: "Fascism is not a horrible idea. I think that national socialism is a necessary and only means of purifying the ranks of some groups from gypsies, punks and negroes. From everywhere I hear, it is more and more welcome at stadiums." Such ideas are translated into popular chants heard on the terraces, such as "We will do to you what Hitler did to the Jews."

Antisemitism is not the only form of prejudice widely expressed at football grounds. The problem of racism in Polish football is increasingly affecting the black players who have joined Polish clubs since the mid-1990s.

In reaction to this, the 'Let's Kick Racism Out Of The Stadiums' campaign of the 'NEVER AGAIN' Association aims to challenge racist attitudes amongst fans and promotes anti-racism at football grounds. 'NEVER AGAIN' is a broadly-based anti-racist organization that acts in other fields, too (e.g. Music Against Racism), but it has appreciated the importance of football in contemporary culture and society.

The campaign activities include regular monitoring and reporting of incidences, production of two anti-racist magazines ('Stadion' and 'Never Again' magazine) and the organizing of an annual anti-racist football tournament.

Through cooperation with the national and international media, 'NEVER AGAIN' has raised awareness of the existence of the problem of racism and antisemitism in football. Importantly, the 'NEVER AGAIN' Association has succeeded at raising awareness of the Polish FA and club officials on the issue of symbols displayed in stadiums. An anti-racist manual has been produced jointly by 'NEVER AGAIN' and the Polish FA which provides guidance for club officials and FA game observers. Since 2003 'NEVER AGAIN' has trained officials, among others through presentations at the annual conference on stadium security organized by the Polish FA.

As a result, a large number of racist and antisemitic symbols and slogans was removed from stadiums. In some cases matches were stopped and clubs were fined for racist and antisemitic behaviour of the fans.

Those measures were welcomed by public opinion and the previously silent majority of the fans. They also met with considerable resistance from the extreme right, which involved pickets of stadiums, smear publications in the radical nationalist press and other forms of pressure. Photos and personal details of activists connected with the campaign appeared on the infamous nazi hit list Redwatch which is still available on the Internet. When the far-right gained access to the Polish government in 2006, the pressure intensified. As late as July 2007, Sylwester Chruszcz, a Member of the European Parliament from the far-right League of Polish Families, demanded the ban on extreme-right symbols in stadiums be lifted. Similar demands were voiced by other radical nationalist groups, such as the All-Polish Youth, the National

Rebirth of Poland and the Polish National Party. In this context the intervention by UEFA President Michel Platini who personally supported “NEVER AGAIN” and the FA in their firm stand on the issue of racist symbols was important and valuable.

The activity of 'NEVER AGAIN' has been endorsed by, among others, Emanuel Olisadebe, Poland's first black international and many other prominent role models: players and public figures. Educational activities were organized at grass-roots level, including numerous local tournaments and the distribution of thousands of posters with football stars expressing their opposition to racism and antisemitism. They were received enthusiastically by the young football fans and a growing network of anti-racist football fans has appeared.

It is hoped that such anti-racist work in Polish football can be sustained and new successful projects can be inspired and supported in other Central and Eastern European countries, too.

Anti-racist initiatives in Eastern Europe are very much needed but there is often little chance for them to obtain local funding. In October 2003 it was decided that the funds received by the FARE network from the MTV Free Your Mind Award would be used to aid anti-racist football projects in this region. Subsequently, 'NEVER AGAIN' received support from the Stand Up Speak Up campaign fund, initiated by the famous player Thierry Henry.

This support has been used both for the enhancement of the above mentioned activities in Poland and for the promotion of anti-racism in and through football in the region. 'NEVER AGAIN' is well qualified for the task: it has highly competent activists and it has accumulated years of experience working at both the national and the international level. It has also experienced being active in a hostile environment, coming a long way from the initial refusal to acknowledge the problem of racism and antisemitism by authorities and media alike, to the gradual acceptance of the need for anti-racist measures. 'NEVER AGAIN' has established numerous contacts with anti-racist initiatives in the region, including fan groups and ethnic minorities. It serves as a contact point for the development of anti-racist football projects in Eastern Europe with a special emphasis on the former Soviet Union. In each of these countries the experiences of 'NEVER AGAIN' and FARE are shared in the field of combating racism in and through football to encourage local football-related anti-racist initiatives. The 'NEVER AGAIN' Association provides assistance to the other organizations in the region in terms of guidance, advice, inspiration, and material to be used in their activities. We act as consultants and experts for the national and local initiatives.

The growing number of events taking place in the region during the Football Against Racism in Europe Week of Action in October each year is an optimistic sign.

There is still much to be done, but important progress has been made and one has to state the unchallenged cultural hegemony of racism and antisemitism in many stadiums is a thing of the past. As a growing number of examples show, football can be used as a positive means to construct inclusive identity instead of being a tool of violent exclusion and hatred.

## 2.5. Antisemitische Tendenzen im Fußball und erfolgreiche Strategien zu ihrer Bekämpfung

Gregor Rosenthal<sup>17</sup>

### 1. Einleitung und Problemstellung

Antisemitismus gehört im Umfeld des Fußballs zu einer der ältesten Formen von Diskriminierung (Endemann 2002, S. 80). Seinen katastrophalen Höhepunkt erreichte er in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts mit der Verfolgung jüdischer Fußballspieler und dem Verbot von Traditionsclubs in Deutschland und Österreich.<sup>18</sup> Mit der Befreiung vom Nationalsozialismus 1945 endete jedoch nicht die Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Stereotype Vorurteile und die oftmals latente, aber auch offene Feindschaft gegenüber Juden sind bis heute Teil der gesellschaftlichen Realität der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.

Auch im Fußball rücken antisemitische Tendenzen in jüngster Vergangenheit wieder vermehrt in den Mittelpunkt der öffentlichen Aufmerksamkeit und diese existieren trotz der nur zahlenmäßig geringen Präsenz und aktiven Teilnahme jüdischer Spieler oder Vereine in der deutschen Fußball-Landschaft.<sup>19</sup>

Aktuelle Erscheinungsformen des Antisemitismus im deutschen Fußball sind vor allem verbale Beleidigungen der gegnerischen (nicht-jüdischen) Mannschaft und deren Anhänger als auch der unparteiischen Schiedsrichter. So ist das „U-Bahn-Lied“ („Wir bauen eine U-Bahn nach Auschwitz“) häufiger Bestandteil der Gesänge verschiedener Fan-Gruppen und die Titulierung der Schiedsrichter als „Jude“ gilt in einigen Stadien als selbstverständlich. Aber auch beispielsweise die Schändung eines jüdischen Friedhofs durch Fußballfans (Endemann 2002, S. 81), sowie die öffentliche Defamierung und Schmähung vermeintlicher „Judenclubs“<sup>20</sup> oder aktiver jüdischer Fußballer und Vereine sind Ausdruck von vorhandenen Vorurteilen und negativen Einstellungen gegenüber dem Judentum.

Während öffentlicher Druck, hohe Medienpräsenz und präventive sowie repressive Maßnahmen seitens der Fußball-Verbände das Problem in den höheren Ligen eindämmen und unter Kontrolle bringen konnte, sehen sich die unteren Ligen im Amateurbereich oft durch geringere Sicherheitsmaßnahmen und häufig fehlender Erfahrung der Beteiligten im Umgang mit antisemitischen oder rassistischen Vorfällen eher hilflos den Problemen in diesem Bereich ausgesetzt.

Der jüdische Verein TuS Makkabi Deutschland e.V. ist mit seinen Ortsverbänden in den regionalen Ligen regelmäßig antisemitischen Vorfällen ausgesetzt. So werden beispielsweise Spiele von Makkabi-Vereinen regelmäßig durch antisemitische Beschimpfungen seitens des gegnerischen Anhangs begleitet oder Tore von Makkabi-Spielern werden mit „fahr doch nach Auschwitz“, „Deine Oma ist in Auschwitz gestorben“ von Gegenspielern kommentiert. Ein Eintrag im Gästebuch von TuS Makkabi Düsseldorf dokumentiert z.B.: „Haben die jüdischen Geldsäcke...nicht schon genug Deutsche Helden im 1. und 2. Weltkrieg verheizt?“<sup>21</sup> Interna-

<sup>17</sup> Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – Gegen Extremismus und Gewalt (BfDT)

<sup>18</sup> So wurde der deutsche Nationalmannschaftsspieler und deutsche Meister mit dem Karlsruher FV (1910) und der Spielervereinigung Fürth (1914), Julius Hirsch, 1943 nach Auschwitz-Birkenau deportiert und ermordet.

In Österreich wurde 1938 die legendäre Fußballmannschaft SC Hakoah Wien aufgelöst und u.a. der Kapitän der Meistermannschaft von 1925, Max Scheuer, von den Nationalsozialisten umgebracht.

<sup>19</sup> Bei den jüdischen Vereinen handelt es sich um die 24 Fußballabteilungen mit ca. 3.000 Mitgliedern von Makkabi Deutschland – Jüdischer Turn- und Sportverband in Deutschland e.V., die alle ausschließlich in Amateurfußballligen spielen. Im Deutschen Fußball-Bund sind insgesamt 25.869 Vereine und eine Gesamtmitgliederzahl von 6.490.008 registriert ([www.dfb.de](http://www.dfb.de)).

<sup>20</sup> Vereine wie z.B. Eintracht Frankfurt, Bayern München, Stuttgarter Kickers, die in der Vergangenheit ein jüdisches Umfeld besaßen, sind oft antisemitischen Schmähungen ausgesetzt.

<sup>21</sup> Eintrag im Online-Gästebuch von TuS Makkabi Düsseldorf, 25.11.2007

tionale Konflikte stellen zunehmend auch ein Problem gerade bei Fußballspielen zwischen jüdischen Vereinen und Vereinen mit Spielern, die einen Migrantenhintergrund in der islamischen Welt besitzen, dar. So äußerte der Präsident von Makkabi Frankfurt, Alon Meyer, gegenüber der FAZ, dass die Jugendmannschaften des Klubs „leider allzu oft“ antisemitischen Beschimpfungen weniger aus der rechten Ecke, sondern meistens von muslimischen Jugendlichen ausgesetzt seien.<sup>22</sup>

Antisemitismus ist sicherlich nicht nur im Fußball anzutreffen, er ist vielmehr ein gesamtgesellschaftlich auftretendes Phänomen. Doch gerade dem Fußball, als Schmelztiegel verschiedenster gesellschaftlicher Gruppen und Massenbewegung mit starker sozialer Integrationsfunktion, fällt eine enorme Bedeutung und Verantwortung im gesellschaftlichen und politischen Sozialisationsprozess, insbesondere bei Jugendlichen, zu. Viele gesellschaftliche Probleme und Fehlentwicklungen, dies gilt auch für rassistische und antisemitische Tendenzen, werden im Fußball wie unter einem Brennglas deutlicher und exponierter dargestellt. Darauf hat der Fußball in den vergangenen Jahren verstärkt mit einer Anzahl von Maßnahmen für Toleranz und einem friedlichen Miteinander und gegen Rassismus, Diskriminierung und Antisemitismus reagiert.

Der Kampf gegen den Antisemitismus ist gerade wegen der im Namen des deutschen Volkes begangenen Verbrechen eine gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe von höchster Priorität. Zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure aus verschiedenen Bereichen, die sich intensiv diesem Problem widmen, konnten eine Reihe von erfolgreichen Strategien und praxisorientierte Handlungsansätze zur Bekämpfung antisemitischer Tendenzen etablieren. Die Kompetenz des BfDT als zentraler Ansprechpartner und Impulsgeber der Zivilgesellschaft liegt darin, dieses Erfahrungspotenzial auch dem Fußball zu öffnen. Es geht ganz konkret um die Fragestellung: Wie können bewährte Strategien und Konzepte zur Bekämpfung des Antisemitismus aus anderen zivilgesellschaftlichen Bereichen auf den Fußball und seine Strukturen übertragen werden? An welche zentralen Ansprechpartner, ob aus dem zivilgesellschaftlichen oder staatlichen Spektrum, kann sich der Fußball wenden, um Strategien, praxisorientiertes Know-How und vorbildliche Projekte kennen zu lernen?

## 2. Themenschwerpunkt Antisemitismus

Der Auftrag des BfDT ist es, gesellschaftliches Engagement für Demokratie und Toleranz - gegen Extremismus und Gewalt zu bündeln, zu vernetzen und öffentlich zu machen. Seit seiner Gründung am 23. Mai 2000 durch die Bundesministerien des Innern und der Justiz fördert das BfDT vorbildliche Modellprojekte von zivilgesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen und Initiativen, die sich für Toleranz und Weltoffenheit als Markenzeichen einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft einsetzen.

Die Bekämpfung von Extremismus und Antisemitismus bilden zentrale Arbeitsschwerpunkte des BfDT. Das Engagement der Zivilgesellschaft in diesen Bereichen wird durch das BfDT unterstützt, indem wir zum einen vorbildliche Projekte gegen Antisemitismus – beispielsweise in unserem Best-Practice-Wettbewerb „Aktiv für Demokratie und Toleranz“ – sammeln, weiterempfehlen, öffentlich machen und mit Geldpreisen auszeichnen. Zum anderen fördern wir konkretes zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement von Gruppen und Einzelpersonen gegen antisemitische Tendenzen vor Ort. Denjenigen, die bisher nicht aktiv sind, zeigen wir Wege auf, wie sie sich durch erfolgreiche, nachahmbare und praxisorientierte Handlungsansätze einsetzen können.

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<sup>22</sup> „Wir dürfen uns nicht einschüchtern lassen“, FAZ.net, 10.09.2007



Auf Grund seines wichtigen Beitrages zur praktischen Demokratieförderung hat sich das BfDT im vergangenen Jahr verstärkt dem Thema „Toleranz im Sport“ zugewendet. Im Mittelpunkt dieser inhaltlichen Weiterentwicklung steht vor allem die Bekämpfung von Rassismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus im Fußball. Unser Ansatz ist es, den Betroffenen im Fußball Impulse und Anstöße zu geben, die ihnen ganz konkret bei der Arbeit vor Ort in den Vereinen weiter helfen. Dazu organisieren wir Veranstaltungen und Foren, bei denen sich Praktiker und ehrenamtlich Engagierte austauschen und gemeinsam mit erfahrenen Akteuren der Zivilgesellschaft Lösungsansätze für die Probleme im Fußball entwickeln können. Des Weiteren zeigen wir erfolgreiche Handlungsmodelle anderer zivilgesellschaftlicher Bereiche auf, die auch im Fußball angewendet werden können. Dass der Fußball ein Klima der Toleranz, der Offenheit und der Zusammengehörigkeit herstellen kann, hat nicht nur die Weltmeisterschaft im Jahr 2006 in unserem Land deutlich gezeigt.

### **3. Projekte und Kooperationen im Bereich „Toleranz im Sport“**

Als eine unserer wichtigsten Veranstaltungen im Themenbereich „Toleranz im Sport“ veranstaltete das BfDT im November 2007 gemeinsam mit der Koordinierungsstelle Fanprojekte (KOS) und dem Projekt „am Ball bleiben“ der Deutschen Sportjugend einen bundesweiten Kongress „Vereine stark machen - Was tun gegen Diskriminierung und Rassismus im Fußballverein? in Halle (Saale). Die Tagung umfasste rund 150 Teilnehmer aus dem gesamten Bundesgebiet. Erstmals kamen Vertreter des Amateurfußballs vom Präsidenten, Jugendtrainer bis zum engagierten Fan und zivilgesellschaftlichen Initiativen zusammen, um gemeinsam Handlungsstrategien zu erarbeiten. Mit der Vorstellung verschiedener Konzepte zur Konfliktbewältigung wurde den Amateurvereinen eine Hilfestellung gegeben und neue Netzwerke geschaffen. Die breite Mischung des Teilnehmerfeldes und die aktive Beteiligung der

Kongressteilnehmer unterstrichen beeindruckend die gesamtgesellschaftliche Bedeutung des Themas. In fünf Foren wurden von den Teilnehmern beispielsweise der Umgang mit Beleidigungen und den unterschiedlichen Formen von Diskriminierung auf dem Fußballplatz oder die Erscheinungsformen von Rechtsextremismus und seiner Codes thematisiert. Noch in diesem Frühjahr wird ein Handbuch für sich neu gründende Faninitiativen erarbeitet werden, in dem diese praktische Tipps, insbesondere für die oft schwierige Startphase, erhalten.

Im Februar 2008 veranstaltet das BfDT in Hannover mit weiteren Kooperationspartnern eine bundesweite Veranstaltung zum Thema „Integration- die Herausforderung im Fußball?!“. Die Teilnehmer werden sich unter anderem mit Fragen zu kultureller Vielfalt und interkultureller Kompetenz oder interethnischen Konflikten im Fußballverein befassen. Ein besonderer Schwerpunkt wird sein, inwieweit zivilgesellschaftliche Konzepte zu interkulturellem Lernen auf den Fußball übertragbar sind und wie sich der Fußball anderen Akteuren im Bereich Integration öffnen kann.

Ein weiteres Beispiel praktischer Demokratieförderung im Sport ist unser Projekt „Team Time“, eine Kooperation des BfDT mit dem Deutschen Basketball Bund, das im Rahmen der Streetbasketball-Tour Mecklenburg-Vorpommern erstmalig im Sommer 2007 mit zahlreichen regionalen zivilgesellschaftlichen Partnern durchgeführt wurde. Ziel des Projektes war es, Jugendlichen in einem sportlichen Umfeld den Gedanken eines toleranten und gewaltfreien Umgangs miteinander näher zu bringen. Hierzu wurden an ausgewählten Turnierstandorten neben sportlichen und musikalischen Aktivitäten Informations- und Beratungsmöglichkeiten sowie Wege zum ehrenamtlichen Engagement im Rahmen so genannter „Märkte der Möglichkeiten“ angeboten und aufgezeigt. Die Kombination aus Sport und politischer Bildung wird voraussichtlich auch in diesem Jahr in einem anderen Bundesland fortgesetzt.

Für ein gemeinsames, effektives und abgestimmtes Vorgehen für Toleranz und Fair Play im Fußball, sind funktionierende Netzwerke eine entscheidende Grundlage. Die Netzwerkbildung unterstützt den Dialog zwischen allen Beteiligten und Partnern des Fußballs. Aber auch eine zusätzliche Öffnung gegenüber anderen zivilgesellschaftlichen Einrichtungen, die oftmals mit denselben Problemen konfrontiert sind, ist notwendig und bietet die Möglichkeit, voneinander zu lernen sowie nachhaltig gegen Gewalt, Rassismus und Antisemitismus vorzugehen. Um dieses Ziel zu unterstützen, ist das BfDT von Beginn an in der Expertengruppe „Für Toleranz gegen Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit“ der DFB Task Force vertreten gewesen. Seit September 2007 ist diese Expertengruppe als ständige Einrichtung in die DFB-Strukturen eingegangen und das BfDT ist der zentrale staatliche sowie zivilgesellschaftliche Vertreter in der DFB-Arbeitsgruppe „Für Toleranz gegen Rassismus“.

#### 4. Dialog und Vernetzung gegen Antisemitismus

Durch diese Form seiner Aufgabenwahrnehmung und die Arbeit als zentraler Ansprechpartner und Impulsgeber der Zivilgesellschaft kann das BfDT als Schnittstelle zwischen Sport, staatlichen Aktivitäten und bürgerschaftlichem Engagement für Toleranz und gegen Extremismus im Fußball fungieren. Das BfDT bemüht sich insofern, bewährte zivilgesellschaftliche Handlungsmodelle zur Bekämpfung von Diskriminierung, Extremismus und Antisemitismus und deren Träger mit den Akteuren und Einrichtungen des Fußballs so praxisorientiert wie möglich zusammenbringen. Dieser Erfahrungsaustausch und die dadurch geschaffenen Synergien besitzen nach unserer Einschätzung und bisherigen Erfahrung die große Chance, erfolgreiche Strategien gegen Antisemitismus im Fußball zu entwickeln bzw. bereits etablierte Lösungsansätze weiterzuentwickeln.

Welche zivilgesellschaftlichen Handlungsmodelle könnten auch im Fußball eingesetzt werden?

- Ein Beispiel könnten gemeinsam von zivilgesellschaftlichen Gruppen und Fußballverbänden erarbeitete Materialien für SchiedsrichterInnen, TrainerInnen sowie weitere Vereinsverantwortliche sein, die Antisemitismus und Rassismus im Fußball identifizieren sowie Maßnahmen zu deren Bekämpfung beinhalten. Ein diesbezüglich hervorzuhebendes Projekt ist die vom American Jewish Committee (AJC) koordinierte „Task Force: Education on Antisemitism“. Diese Task Force dient dem Austausch über aktuelle Erscheinungsformen von Antisemitismus und der Entwicklung entsprechender pädagogischer Methoden für den schulischen und außerschulischen Bildungssektor. Sie reflektiert die Erfahrung aus der Praxis sowie die konzeptionellen Ansätze der einzelnen Netzwerkmitglieder, darunter Gruppen wie die Amadeu Antonio Stiftung oder das Projekt „BildungsBausteine gegen Antisemitismus“ des Bildungsteams Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. und Tacheles reden! e.V.. In diesem Kontext haben die beiden zuletzt genannten Vereine ein gemeinsames Bildungsprogramm zum Thema „Woher kommt der Judenhass? Was kann man dagegen tun?“ entwickelt und dafür Materialien, Methoden und Konzepte in einem Lernbuch aufbereitet.
- Gegen Antisemitismus von Jugendlichen mit Migrant\*innen-Hintergrund wendet sich die im Best-Practice-Wettbewerb 2006 vom BfDT ausgezeichnete „Kreuzberger Initiative gegen Antisemitismus e.V.“. Sie beschäftigt sich mit den zunehmenden antisemitischen Tendenzen, besonders in muslimisch geprägten Migrantengruppen in Berlin. Durch die interkulturelle Zusammensetzung des Teams aus Pädagog\*innen mit und ohne Migrant\*innen-Hintergrund werden türkische, arabische und muslimische Jugendliche erreicht und pädagogische Module gegen Antisemitismus entwickelt und erprobt, die den spezifischen Anforderungen dieser Zielgruppen besonders Rechnung tragen

(„Pädagogische Konzepte gegen Antisemitismus in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft“). Der Verein setzte sich insbesondere auch für den türkisch-jüdischen Dialog ein und leistet einen wichtigen Beitrag gegen Gewalt und Fundamentalismus. Das vom BfDT unterstützte interkonfessionelle Fußballturnier „Avitallscup“ in Berlin nimmt sich ebenfalls dem Ziel an, den Fußballplatz als Ort des fairen Spiels zwischen Christen, Muslimen, Juden und Atheisten zu etablieren.

- Weitere bewährte Ansätze antisemitischen Tendenzen durch Aufklärung entgegenzuwirken, sind zum einen die Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus und den Auswirkungen des mörderischen Antisemitismus während der NS-Zeit. Zum anderen ist für eine vorurteilsfreie Einstellung oftmals die Begegnung mit dem heutigen jüdischen Leben und den Gemeinden in Deutschland prägend. Zwei im Best-Practice-Wettbewerb 2007 ausgezeichnete Projekte widmen sich diesen Aspekten im besonderen Maße. Das Christliche Jugenddorfwerk Chemnitz (CJD) engagiert sich seit Jahren gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus bei Jugendlichen. Mit dem Projekt Geschichtswerkstatt „DenkZeichen Erzgebirge“ möchte die CJD eine Sensibilisierung bei Jugendlichen für das Thema Antisemitismus erreichen. Die Geschichtswerkstatt konnte eine umfangreiche regionalgeschichtliche Bibliothek aufbauen, die als Grundlage für Recherchearbeiten der Jugendlichen diene und in der Verlegung von acht „Stolpersteinen“ für jüdische Opfer des NS-Regimes vor deren einstigen Wohnhäusern in der Stadt Freiberg mündete. Die Jüdische Kultusgemeinde im Landkreis Hameln-Pyrmont e.V. hat das Projekt „Zusammen gegen Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus“ initiiert, das Kindern und Jugendlichen in der Stadt Hameln dabei helfen soll, die jüdische Kultur besser kennen zu lernen. Die Umsetzung erfolgte in Form von Synagogen-Besuchen von Schulklassen. In einer anschließenden Diskussion zum Thema „Judentum und Leben der Jüdischen Gemeinde heute“ hatten die Schüler die Möglichkeit, einem Rabbiner detaillierte Fragen über das Judentum zu stellen. Dass dieser Ansatz auf den Fußball übertragen werden kann, zeigt der sauerländische Fußballverein TuS Plettenburg, der für sein Engagement den Julius-Hirsch-Preis 2007 des DFB erhalten hat. Der Verein hat sich mit dem Schicksal des deutsch-jüdischen Nationalspielers Julius Hirsch auseinandergesetzt und mehrere Texte über ihn zur Ausstellung „Kicker, Kämpfer, Legenden“ beigetragen. Nach einem Freundschaftsspiel der Jugendmannschaften in Berlin, nahm der TuS Makkabi Berlin im Juni am vom TuS Plettenburg ausgerichteten „Julius-Hirsch-Cup 2007“ teil.

## 5. Fazit

Bei der Bekämpfung antisemitischer Tendenzen profitieren der Fußball aber auch die übrigen gesamtgesellschaftlichen Bereiche von einer jeweiligen Öffnung. So können erfolgreiche Strategien gemeinsam weiterentwickelt werden und der Fußball kann neben eigenen Maßnahmen auch davon Nutzen ziehen, praxisorientierte Handlungsansätze durch die Vernetzung mit anderen zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren auf seine eigenen Strukturen zu übertragen.

Die Kompetenz „Vernetzung und Dialog“ des BfDT können und möchten wir als Ansprechpartner für z.B. Fußballverbände, Vereine, Faninitiativen aktiv in diesen Prozess einbringen. Dazu werden wir weiterhin im Rahmen eigener Projekte und Veranstaltungen Vertreter des Fußballs und erfahrene zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure aus anderen Bereichen zur Entwicklung gemeinsamer Lösungsansätze zusammenbringen. Neben der Veranstaltung „Integration- die Herausforderung im Fußball?!“ in Hannover, planen wir in diesem Kontext eine weitere Kooperationsveranstaltung zum Thema „Für Toleranz - gegen Rechtsextremismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus im Fußball“ im 2. Halbjahr 2008.

Darüber hinaus bieten wir an, geeignete „Best-Practice-Modelle“ aus unterschiedlichen zivilgesellschaftlichen Initiativen und Aktivitäten für Demokratie und Toleranz den Einrichtungen und Vertretern des Fußballs vorzustellen und damit einen zusätzlichen Impuls für konkrete Kooperationen und nachahmenswertes Handeln, für die Zielsetzung von mehr Toleranz im Sport zu geben.

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### **3. Panel: Antisemitic Tendencies in the Academic Context and Successful Strategies to Combat Them**

#### **3.1. *Hostility to Israel and anti-Semitism***

David Hirsh<sup>23</sup>

The type of antisemitism I am addressing here is that which is expressed in the language of hostility to Israel and which is not explicitly antisemitic. It is therefore necessary to make difficult judgments about what is antisemitic and what is not. Such judgments require knowledge.

Some of this antisemitism could be caused by antisemites who have discovered an apparently legitimate way of articulating their hatred of Jews. I would expect more and more such antisemites to adopt an antiracist vocabulary, as people like David Irving and David Duke are doing.

Or it could be that the strength and the particular form of hostility to Israel are partly motivated by an unconscious hatred of Jews.

But in my view the hostility to Israel is not usually a result of an underlying antisemitism. Antisemitism often begins with a healthy sense of outrage towards Israeli human rights abuses – a hostility which I share. But it often becomes a hostility to Israel, rather than its actions or policies, and it can then become a hostility to the Jews who live there, and to the Jews around the world, who seem to support it uncritically. In any case, it is not necessary to show that somebody is a Jew-hater in order to show that what they say or do is antisemitic or has antisemitic potential.

I propose to discuss a number of ways in which hostility to Israel is often expressed either with an antisemitic intensity or in antisemitic ways. I am focusing on what people do and what they say. I do not think it is necessary to speculate about their secret or unconscious motivations. Contemporary antisemites do not feel that they are antisemitic; they deny that they are antisemitic; they say that they hate antisemitism as they hate all racism. These disavowals do not diminish the antisemitic threat, they exacerbate it. Contemporary antisemitism is spread by people who think that they are doing good, exposing lies, standing up against hypocrisy and institutionalized, murderous cruelty. Today's spreaders of antisemitism have the energy and the confidence of people who think that they are doing good.

We would not go far wrong if we assumed that most contemporary antisemitism starts as hostility to Israel and that antisemitism is an effect of that hostility rather than a cause. Disproportionate hostility to Israel risks licensing and legitimizing antisemitic movements. It normalizes antisemitic ways of thinking about Jews and their place in the world.

#### **1. Singling out Israel for unique hostility.**

Israel has been responsible for a large number of human rights abuses particularly associated with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Such an occupation can only be sustained by a regime of fear and violence. Yet Israeli human rights abuses are far from unique. Many states occupy contested territory; many states are responsible for much greater human rights

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abuses than Israel. So the sharp focus on Israeli human rights abuses, so often combined with a silence about the abundance of much greater human rights abuses around the world, is a matter of concern.

## **2. Defining Israel as essentially and incurably evil**

Israel commits human rights abuses but it does not commit genocide. It is often, however, portrayed as being equivalent or similar to Nazi Germany. Yet there are no concentration camps, there are no gas chambers, there are no Einsatzgruppen, there is no analogy. To compare Israel to Nazi Germany is simply to say that it is uniquely evil, and more evil than other state. It is also particularly offensive since the Jews were the victims of Nazi genocide.

Israel is often portrayed, without serious analysis, as being equivalent or similar to apartheid South Africa. When this is not an honest attempt to shed light, but it becomes instead a way of designating Israel as being uniquely worthy of boycott, then this is a cause for concern.

Israel is often portrayed as being essentially racist. For example in UN fora, campaigners have insisted on defining Zionism as a form of racism. This is a way of pathologizing Zionism, of turning the word into an epithet or evil, and of claiming that it is incurably more threatening than 'normal' nationalism or other movements for national self-determination.

Israel is often portrayed as being a keystone in a global system of imperialism. All of these ways of singling Israel out have the effect of putting Israel at the centre of what is wrong with the world. Antisemites have always thought of Jews as being central to the world's ills and they have often portrayed Jews as playing a crucial part in the system of capitalist exploitation. Now, Israel is thought of as being central, and as a crucial part of imperialist exploitation. In truth, Jews and Israel are not central to anything and a worldview which finds that they are, is a cause for concern.

Campaigns to boycott Israeli academics, sportspeople, artists and musicians, to exclude Israelis from the cultural and economic life of humanity, necessarily rely on some way or other of understanding Israel to be a unique evil on the planet. Such campaigns also progress from spreading the idea that Israel is uniquely threatening to attempting to set up concrete exclusions of Israelis.

## **3. Mirroring elements of old antisemitic rhetoric – blood libel**

It used to be said that Jews used their cunning to hunt and to murder innocent children in order to use their blood for religious ritual, often in order to consume it. This was sometimes thought of as a re-enactment of the crucifixion, of the most evil act imaginable, the killing of God. Elements of these old blood libels appear in contemporary stories about the evils of Israel more frequently than could be understood to be coincidental. Israel is often portrayed as wishing to murder Palestinians; often there is no instrumental motive but it is accused of doing so out of pure malice. It is often claimed that Israel has a policy of murdering innocent children. The death of Palestinians under the age of 18 slips, in the analysis of some anti-Zionists, into a gratuitous policy of child-murder. Images are often produced which illustrate Israelis or Jews killing and / or eating children; images are often produced which combine the elements of Palestinian blood and food; stories are often circulated about Israel spreading viruses or stealing the body parts of Palestinians or having blood on its hands. Israel is often portrayed as a state which kills simply for the sake of killing.

#### 4. Mirroring elements of old antisemitic rhetoric - conspiracy

If Jews murder children, you can be sure that they conspire to hide the fact. Conspiracy theory is the other central libel of antisemitism. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a forged book which claims to be a report produced by the world Jewish conspiracy, has never been out of print and is still sold world-wide as a true exposé. Jews are accused of fomenting wars and revolutions in which they themselves are not prepared to kill or to die. They are presented as owing allegiance only to each other and therefore not to the communities in which they live; not to their neighbours or their class or their nation. Contemporary versions of antisemitic conspiracy myths are produced by respectable professors, are published by respectable publishers, and are considered seriously by the respectable media. Using the apparently legitimate vocabulary of the 'Israel lobby' it is possible to articulate antisemitic conspiracy theory in such a way which is not likely to be immediately recognized as antisemitic.

Those who campaign against contemporary antisemitism are accused of 'playing the antisemitism card' or 'crying antisemitism' in order to de-legitimize criticism of Israeli human rights abuses

I have called this response *The Livingstone Formulation* after the Mayor of London, who said: 'for far too long the accusation of antisemitism has been used against anyone who is critical of the policies of the Israeli government'. The *Livingstone Formulation* has become a standard response to an accusation of antisemitism and it does two things.

Firstly, it denies that there is a distinction between the criticism and the demonization of Israel. Demonization, for example, which singles out Israel for unique loathing, or which claims that Israel is apartheid or Nazi or essentially racist, or which characterizes Israel as a child-killing state, or a state which is responsible for wars around the world, or a state which is central to global imperialism, is not the same thing as criticism of Israeli government policies.

Secondly, the *Livingstone Formulation* does not simply accuse anyone who raises the issue of contemporary antisemitism of being wrong, but it also accuses them of bad faith: 'the accusation of antisemitism *has been used* against anyone who is critical...' [*my italics*]. Not an honest mistake, but a secret, common plan to try to de-legitimize criticism with an instrumental use of the charge of antisemitism. Crying wolf. The *Livingstone Formulation* is both a strawman argument and a charge of 'Zionist' conspiracy. It is itself an antisemitic claim. Its regular appearance is also, in itself, evidence that antisemitic ways of thinking are becoming unexceptional in contemporary mainstream discourse.

Antisemitism which is expressed as exaggerated criticism of Israel does not routinely manifest itself as violence against Jews or as a racist exclusion of Jews. Currently, it is a political form of antisemitism. It starts in particular streams of left and liberal thought and it is moving into the mainstream where it tends to meld with other antisemitic traditions. Political antisemitism which is not self-evident as antisemitism, may lead towards more recognizable forms of anti-Jewish racism, of anti-Jewish violence, and anti-Jewish exclusion.

Right now the fight against antisemitism is, therefore, a political fight, a fight over common-sense notions, a fight over public discourse. It cannot be won simply by legislating against certain ideas or forms of words; it cannot be defeated only bureaucratically. If people want to oppose antisemitism then they must win arguments about how we understand events in the Middle East. They must persuade people of the threat of rhetoric of Jewish or Zionist conspiracy. They must learn to recognize the tropes of older antisemitisms.

We cannot aspire to persuade or educate those anti-Zionists who are already certain of their own righteousness and who already believe that anybody who is concerned about antisemitism is a dishonest defender of all that is evil in the world.

Rather, we must focus our political energy and our educational effort on those who may be persuaded by such people. They must be inoculated against antisemitism. They must understand something of the history and the nature of antisemitism. They must understand something more about Israel and Palestine than the one-dimensional and half-true narratives of Israeli aggression and Palestinian victimhood which are offered, temptingly, to those who are looking for easy ways to understand what is wrong with the world and easy ways to feel that they are doing and thinking the right thing.

But the fight against antisemitism must be an antiracist fight. It must not seek to deflect demonization onto another target; it must be as horrified by anti-Arab racism or by anti-Muslim racism as it is by antisemitism. We can only oppose antisemitism effectively if we treat it as a form of racism and if we oppose all racism consistently.



### **3.2. Antisemitic Radicalism: Challenges and Policy Recommendations**

Lars Rensmann<sup>24</sup>

#### **Definitions and Concepts**

Antisemitism has become a highly contested and politically charged subject of public debate. Today, this also resonates in the academic discussion of the subject. At the same time, empirical evidence of the resilience and rise of antisemitic attitudes and extreme right political mobilizations across the European Union is abundant. Contrary to popular views, in rigid scholarly research on antisemitism there is little controversy about the ongoing relevance and increase of antisemitism as an attitudinal pattern in Germany and Europe over the last decade. However, there is much debate about a) the dependent variable of research, i.e. what counts for ‘antisemitism’ as the subject of scrutiny that is to be explained, b) the explanatory variables, i.e. about the nature and origins of antisemitism, c) the extent and relevance of antisemitism among Muslim immigrant communities, and d) the question if there is a “new” antisemitism or simply a revival of the old.

Especially these controversial dimensions will be addressed in this brief expertise about current challenges of antisemitic radicalism by the extreme right, by extremist “anti-Zionists”, and segments among ethnic minorities. The current political challenges will then be discussed. In so doing, some resilient but problematic claims about antisemitism raised in academic and public discourse are critically examined. They themselves may nourish antisemitic perceptions of social conflicts. Finally, those observations and the summary of empirical findings will lead to a distinct set of policy recommendations.

The working definition and criteria suggested by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) [now EU Agency for Fundamental Rights] offer a useful reference point. It runs counter to the polarized political debate on “inflationary” antisemitism charges, on one hand, and the denial of antisemitic phenomena altogether, on the other. According to the EUMC, “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” (EUMC 2005) In addition, the EUMC argues, such manifestations could also target Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently “charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong’.” Beyond Nazi racial theories, the EUMC suggests criteria that point to various forms of stereotypes and anti-Jewish violence which classify as antisemitism. They include:

- Justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective – such as the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions
- Denying the Holocaust
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor

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- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected by any other democratic nation
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis (EUMC 2005)

Criticism of Israel and Israeli policies similar to those leveled against any other country, to be sure, cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism, in turn, is a persistent “prototype of political and social resentments” which is “difficult to change” (Benz 2004).

To understand antisemitism it is necessary to a) recognize its general dimension, hence to see it as a form of collective discrimination against Jews and anti-Jewish racism, similar to other prejudices against minorities or ‘others’, b) to recognize its specific dimensions, traditions, and functions. Modern antisemitism serves as a world explanation and conspiracy theory, i.e. it “explains” and personifies the origins of social conflicts, views Jews as all-powerful but secret “string-pullers” behind the workings of modern society, as a closed community pursuing world conspiracy, suggests Jews are driving nations and the world into war, and views Jews as lazy, decadent, greedy agents of finance capitalism, globalism, and cosmopolitanism, among other things. New forms of antisemitism also suggest that “Jews exploit the Holocaust for their material purposes” (Rensmann 2005; Rensmann/Schoeps 2008).

In addition, we should differentiate between radical, manifest and latent forms of antisemitism. Liberal-democratic societies put restrictions on overt expressions of antisemitism, by legal means and/or by the discursive scope or “zone of acquiescence” (Norris 2005: 20) that defines the boundaries of democratic legitimacy of public statements and actors. In reaction to these boundaries, hate speech often adapts to democratic conditions, uses innuendo, and becomes more coded (for example, by employing the same stereotypes but replacing the term “the Jews” by “the Zionists”, “the East Coast” or, in a Stalinist tradition, the “cosmopolites”; Cohen 2007).

## Issues and Attitudes

Antisemitism, as a set of prejudices and a binary, simplified interpretation of the social world, often marches in step with other anti-democratic, anti-constitutional and anti-pluralistic attitudes, such as ethnic nationalism, racism, and authoritarianism (Ahlheim/Heger 2000; Niedermeyer/Stöss 2005; Rensmann 2004). It is part of an authoritarian, extreme right world-view which, by pointing to “the Jew”, “explains” the modern world, social and international conflicts, perceived threats to national identity, and globalization. Antisemitism is also an integral part of the world-view of radical Islamism, which includes authoritarianism, homophobia, misogyny, racism, and hatred for democratic pluralism and constitutionalism. In addition, antisemitism can resonate in certain variants of “anti-imperialism” and “anti-Zionism” (including those sharing a left-wing self-understanding). This includes extreme left groups that show solidarity with antisemitic, Islamist groups, based on the ethnic-nationalist conception that homogenous, “rooted” peoples (Völker) are invaded by “foreign global agents” and “Zionists”.

Beyond those world-views, we face a rise of ‘everyday antisemitism’, which finds expression in random violence and an increasingly common slanderous use of the word “Jew” in society and among German youth. According to a study by the BpB (Federal Agency for Political Education), teachers no longer manage to teach Germany’s younger generations of the horrors of the Holocaust. Instead, the word “Jew” has turned into one of the most common German curse words among students in both East and West Germany”, and history teachers addressing the Holocaust are frequently attacked as “friends of Israel” (“Jude beliebtes Schimpfwort unter Schülern,” Die Welt, 8 January 2008; Haaretz, 11 January 2008).

Empirical research also proves that the common claim that Jews were “replaced” by other minorities as a subject of societal prejudice is unfounded. From 1998 to 2003, there has been an increase from 20% to 23% of people with manifestly antisemitic attitudes in Germany. Other prejudices against Jews have also increased in recent years; in 2003, 28% of the populace believed that Jews have too much influence on world politics (1998: 21%) (Bergmann 2008).

Other issues and attitudinal patterns also need to be taken into account. They are not reflected in conventional questionnaires relating to ‘classical antisemitism’. In Germany, in particular, “secondary antisemitism” (antisemitism related to the rejection of Holocaust memory) is a relevant issue shaping negative views towards Jews. “Secondary antisemitism” refers to the stereotypical perception that Jews embody the unpleasant memory of the Holocaust and are made responsible for the remembrance of this part of German history. In 2004, 62% of Germans say that they do not want to be reminded of the crimes committed by Germans against Jews (GMF Survey 2004). This serves as a background of prejudices against Jews.

Furthermore, after controlling other factors, Kaplan/Small (2006) show in an empirical study of respondents in ten European countries (including Germany) that antisemitism consistently increases with the degree of anti-Israel attitudes. Respondents with a radical anti-Israel attitude are six times as likely to be antisemitic than respondents which do not support anti-Israel statements. „Based on this analysis, when an individual’s criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying antisemitism“ (Kaplan/Small 2006: 560). Radical anti-Zionism does not only highly correlate with antisemitism but also with racism (Geissler 2002). In Germany, 28,9 % somewhat agree to the statement: “If one considers Israel’s policies, I can understand if one is against Jews,” while 15,5% fully agree to the statement. 23,9% somewhat agree that “what Israel does today is, in principle, not different from what the Nazis have done to the Jews in the Third Reich”, and 27,3% fully agree to this statement (GMF Survey 2004). These statements document forms of “anti-Israel antisemitism” cutting across conventional left-right cleavages. This can be conceived as “new” antisemitism.

This set of prejudices relates with a widespread denial of antisemitism as a motivation when violence against Jews occurs. In some countries, like France, Denmark, and Belgium, strong sympathy for the Palestinians corresponds with the desire to see opposition to Israel as the causal factor of violence against Jews in Europe (in Denmark, only 10% believe that antisemitism causes violence against Jews, 65% believe that anti-Israel sentiments are the cause; Bergmann 2008).

Finally, a subject of much recent controversy has been antisemitism among immigrant communities, especially among Muslims. To be sure, there may have been empirically unfounded exaggerations of the phenomenon. However, there have been initial far-reaching claims by some publicists, suggesting that negative attitudes and even violence against Jews primarily reflect Muslim opposition against Israel’s policies, or that “a spreading Islamic antisemitism in Europe cannot be verified by studies while in the meantime antisemitic prejudices are transferred to ‘the Muslims’,” (Mark Terkessidis, taz, 3 February 2004). These claims have been challenged by empirical research. A French study shows that negative attitudes among French immigrants towards Jews are by an average of 11.6% higher than among non-immigrant French, and antisemitism also correlates with the immigrants’ attachment to Islam (Bergmann 2008). According to an empirical survey in Great Britain among Muslim immigrants, 40% say “Jews are a legitimate target in the struggle for a just order in the Middle East.” (Die Zeit, 24 April 2007) According to a recent survey, every third Muslim (on various levels of education) harbors antisemitic and anti-Christian prejudices, and antisemitism is more wide-spread among Muslim immigrants than among non-Muslim immigrants and among non-immigrant Germans (Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 December 2007; Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007).

## Extreme Right Antisemitism

A major challenge is the increasingly radical and open antisemitic agitation and mobilization by extreme right parties, organizations, networks, and publications. Today, the major political actor in this field is the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). As the oldest extreme right party in Germany (founded in 1964), the NPD has changed its course in the 1990s under its new leader, Udo Voigt. It intensified its grassroots work and has shifted much of its organizing to the East; the headquarters are now located in Leipzig. Since the 1990s, it operates according to a “three-fold struggle for the “the brains”, power “on the streets”, and for (seats in) “the parliaments”. Benefiting from a consolidated extreme right youth culture and political movement, in recent years their three-fold long-term strategy increasingly pays off (Funke/Rensmann 2005). This includes electoral politics and public office. In regional/state elections, the NPD has received 9.2% of the vote in Saxonia in 2004 and 7.3% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in 2006 and entered the regional parliaments in both cases. Although Holocaust denial is no longer its primary focus (as in the decade before Voigt), the NPD has become increasingly militant and further radicalized over the years. Its declared goal is the reestablishment of a German Volksgemeinschaft (folkish ethnic community), and it glorifies Nazism. Under Voigt, neo-Nazis with a criminal record have been recruited to the leadership, and the party got more movement-oriented and “national-revolutionary”. The NPD and its youth organization Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN) have affiliations with the militant “free comradeships” (“freie Kameradschaften”) and successfully mobilize youths in the East. The NPD cooperates with the “National Alliance” (US) and, under the umbrella European National Front, other antisemitic extreme right parties in the EU, like Forza Nuova (Italy), Renouveau Francais (France), La Falange (Spain), Hrisi Anghi (Greece), and Nuova Dreapta (Rumania).

Antisemitism is a core element of global right-wing extremism (Weitzman 2006), but particularly of its German variant (BMI 2007). The NPD’s radicalization also – and especially – applies to their open antisemitism (Scharenberg 2006:87; Rensmann 2008), which is a key element of their program and campaigns. Many commentators and scholars, however, take little notice of this so far. To be sure, agitation against immigrants (“repatriation instead of right to stay”), and overt racism and ethnic nationalism remain essential parts of NPD ideology (Scharenberg 2006: 86f). But with the NPD’s turn on the “social question” in the mid-1990s and the party’s ideological “modernization” in relation to new issues such as social welfare reform (“Hartz IV”), globalization (“globalism”), Israel, and Islamism, radical antisemitism is once again at the core of its political organizing, mobilization, and campaigning. Electoral campaigns, public statements, demonstrations and publications employ antisemitic conspiracy theories. Jews are perceived as the “string-pullers” behind the Federal Republic, liberal democracy, capitalism, multi-culturalism, globalization, and alleged “world conflicts” like the Middle East conflict. Jews are seen as the personified root cause to all of the above. In case of the NPD, these mobilizations are anchored in a world-view assuming a global Jewish conspiracy. In particular, new mobilizations in the last years have focused not only on anti-immigrant propaganda but also on nationalist anti-globalization, “anti-imperialism”, and agitation against Israel and the USA. However, like others who agitate against Jews, the NPD declares speciously that it is not antisemitic, claiming that those who “declare their solidarity with the Palestinian people...cannot be antisemitic because Arabs are semites, too” (NPD, 9 January 2008).

In the NPD, the aforementioned new issues and topics serve as a medium for anti-Jewish hatred. Along with neo-Nazis, the NPD insinuates a „Zionist“ world conspiracy. Events, demonstrations, and local neighborhood activities of the NPD attack „multi-national globalization“, often interpreted as Jewish “globalism”, „US imperialism“ und „Zionist terror“. Hereby the NPD employs a nationalistic and antisemitic social justice and anti-war rhetoric and demands

to „overcome the capitalist interest rate economy“ (Udo Voigt). Addressing opposition against the social welfare reforms of Schröder’s Agenda 2010, American “locusts”, and “Jewish” banks, the NPD re-phrases the “social question” in a nationalistic and antisemitic fashion.

Israel and the US are major targets of their campaigns. In solidarity with Islamists, the NPD claims to fight „For a world of free peoples – solidarity with Iraq and the Palestinians!“ (Puschnerat 2005, 69) Jürgen Schwab, NPD intellectual and member of its national leadership, proclaims that Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida and its „global partisan war“ is „obviously the adequate answer to the strategies of the One World.“ (Schwab 2002, 134) Israel is frequently portrayed as a special center of cosmopolitanism and globalization, of „multinational finance capitalism“, „war-mongering imperialism“ with the ambition of „world domination“ (quoted in Gessler 2004: 29); on the other hand, it is portrayed as an „artificial“ state of a “non-people” oppressing the Palestinian people. This hardly coded extreme right „anti-Zionism“ is apparently open for alliances with left-wing „anti-Zionists“ and „anti-imperialists.“ The NPD paper Deutsche Stimme, for example, even endorses the „remarkable tradition“ of left-wing „anti-imperialism“ and supports the „overcoming of right-left-antagonisms in the aftermath of the war in Iraq“ which allegedly allows for a focus on the „common enemy“, the “apartheid state Israel” and the “Judeo-American world domination apparatus with its well functioning genocide machine!“ (Deutsche Stimme 8/2004). Accordingly, according to the NPD the conspiracy of „international Jewry“ materializes especially in Palestine (quoted in Puschnerat 2005: 70).

Behind the “aggression of Usrael” the JN suspects a “strong Israel lobby of the US East Coast” ([www.wernigerode.nationaler-beobachter.de](http://www.wernigerode.nationaler-beobachter.de), August 2006). The militaristic party even declares that “War is war and never right! No to war and oppression! Stop the Israeli and American war-mongers in the Middle East!” The most radical German anti-Semite today, the former RAF member Horst Mahler, was also temporarily active in the party. Mahler, among other things, calls for a new “final solution of the Jewish question” (Mahler, “Endlösung der Judenfrage,” [www.deutsches-kolleg.org/erklaerungen/judenfrage](http://www.deutsches-kolleg.org/erklaerungen/judenfrage); cf. Rensmann 2004: 253; Weitzman 2006 58) The Iranian president Ahmadinejad’s antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and anti-Israel agitation also attracts the NPD, which had organized demonstrations in his support during the World Cup in Germany 2006. As Der Spiegel points out, it is a myth that the NPD agitates primarily against Muslims. While attacking both immigrants and Jews, the NPD seeks to “close the ranks with Muslims who hate Israel” (Der Spiegel, 1/2008, p.33). According to the NPD, Jewish or „Zionist“ string-pullers conspiracies persecute and kill critics of Israel. Jürgen Möllemann “practiced German-Arab friendship and criticized Israel. This was his death sentence.“ The „Zionist string-pullers“ have, the NPD argues “reached their goal“ by “disempowering” the pro-Arab and pro-Muslim academic Udo Steinbach (NPD Hamburg: „Zionisten machen Deutsches Orient Institut platt“, [www.npd-hamburg.de](http://www.npd-hamburg.de)) To be sure, there is also a rise of new racist anti-Islam parties, but the NPD and many other extreme right groups today declare “solidarity” with Muslims and Islamists (at least with those living in foreign countries) in their “fight” against “the Jews”.

Finally, downplaying of the Holocaust remains another major agenda topic. In Saxonia, the NPD portrayed the bombs on Dresden at the end of World War II as “Holocaust by bombs“. In addition, the NPD consistently celebrates “good Jews” who allegedly disclose the “Zionist character” and the “Holocaust industry”. For example, the „Jewish David Irving“ Norman Finkelstein has been celebrated by virtually all extreme right groups. He claims that a Jewish “Holocaust industry” exploits the Holocaust and Germans for the sake of “Zionism” and material purposes. Jews are used as a reference point if they share the NPD’s resentments.

To be sure, the problem of antisemitic radicalism on the extreme right is not limited to the NPD alone. There are various other groups, organizations, and actors, including the Deutsche Volks-Union (DVU) and its popular “German National Newspaper”, the “Society for Free

Publishing” (GfFP), neo-Nazi groups and publications like the radically antisemitic National Journal, or authors like Johannes Rothkranz, who distributes the antisemitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and claims that the “Protocols” “have fully come true hundred years later”. (Document 1) Among others, there are also the fascist, anti-gay, and antisemitic conspiracy theorists from the Lyndon LaRouche cult, represented in Germany by the “Bürgerbewegung Solidarität” (“citizen movement solidarity”).

### **New Right and Populist Antisemitism**

Again and again, there have also been more coded, right-wing populist mobilization attempts in post-unification Germany which utilized anti-Jewish stereotypes. In the early 1990s, a so-called “New Right” academic and publishing scene intermingled calls for a new, “self-confident” nationalism against Western/European integration with downplaying Nazism, and latent anti-Jewish prejudices. Two books, edited by Rainer Zitelmann (among others), namely “The Self-Confident Nation” and “Western Attachment”, served as an intellectual platform. In the latter, professors like Hans-Helmuth Knütter, who later on joined the ranks of the extreme right “Society for Free Publishing” (GfFP), published antisemitic fantasies about “German-hating British rabbies” blackmailing the German nation. “German-hating” in Western foreign countries, Knütter had argued beforehand, is instigated by “Jews and particularly blacks, especially in the New York area and New England, but also in Georgia.” However, the New Right faced strong public criticism by democrats, clearly lost momentum during the 1990s, and became more and more politically and academically isolated. The extreme right weekly Junge Freiheit (“Young Freedom”) is the only relevant surviving “New Right” forum. Another right-wing populist effort to mobilize resentments against Jews could be witnessed during the 2002 national electoral campaign by the FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann (cf. Rensmann 2004: 442ff). Möllemann accused the German-Jewish lawyer Michel Friedman and the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon of instigating antisemitism by their behavior, thus blaming Jews for antisemitism. After the 2002 election, however, Möllemann was discredited in the FDP and eventually had to resign (and later committed suicide in 2003). None the less, Möllemann provided a political opening for those utilizing the complex Middle East conflict for anti-Jewish agitation.

### **Radical “Anti-Zionism”**

According to the EUMC definition and criteria, many cases of anti-Zionism and radical anti-Israel agitation, which do not identify themselves as extreme right, can also be classified as antisemitic. While there have been “anti-Zionists” who are not antisemites, just as there have been foes of affirmative action who are not racists, more and more “the crucial question is prejudicial overlap” (Cohen 2007). While criticism of Israeli policies is not neither anti-Zionism nor antisemitism, antisemitism strongly correlates with anti-Zionism and anti-Israel sentiments, and the likelihood of antisemitism increases with the intensity of anti-Israel sentiment (Kaplan/Small 2006). “Anti-Zionism” and antisemitism had resonated in parts of the left since the late 1960s, but had been marginalized since the 1980s. However, they resurged since the “Al-Aqsa-Intifada” in 2000. To be sure, antisemitic anti-Zionism and hatred of Israel are at odds, if not in outright contradiction with other left-wing ideals, such as democratic humanism and social egalitarianism. (Cohen 2007) One of the reasons of anti-Israel sentiments among left-wing groups is a change in perception since 1967 (Kloke 2007). Since then, Arabs and Palestinians are seen as the weak and “the oppressed”, Israel, to the contrary, is seen as “the powerful” and “aggressive”. Israeli military actions, then, are often blown out of proportion and described as “genocide”, whereas suicide bombings in civil neighborhoods are downplayed as “acts of despair”.

The “anti-Zionist” antisemitism is based on a binary world-view (evil Zionists versus the “good people”, good “anti-imperialists”). It is sometimes indirect or coded. However, the

simple act of substituting the words “the Zionists” by “the Jews” reveals the antisemitic nature of several radical anti-Israel groups which do not see themselves as “extreme right”. Today, indeed, we find various examples of antisemitic stereotypes in allegedly “left-wing” groups, websites, and publications. These stereotypes are applied to Israel as a “collective Jew”, portraying Israel, “Zionism” and “the Zionists” as agents “without scruples”, “parasitic”, “fundamentally evil”, “materialistic”, “string-pullers” behind global conspiracies, “warmongering”, “greedy”, “artificial”, “inhuman”, a “foreign power” “exploitative” the “peoples of the world”. Some of these categories, allusions, symbols, and hate speech are all too familiar to students of antisemitism and racist discrimination, and the language and imagery is, in several cases, indistinguishable from the anti-Israel agitation on the extreme right. In Thessaloniki (Greece), communist groups recently desecrated a Holocaust memorial, attaching pictures of dead Lebanese civilians, while in Italy extreme right activists from the Forza Nuova threw tomatoes at the Israeli embassy, symbolizing the “blood of the Lebanese” and proclaiming “Hezbollah, until victory”. There is also, in some cases, a convergence in the goal that “‘Israel’ must die!” (Interim)

The demonization of Israel as an “apartheid state” or as “Nazisreal” has now a long tradition in “anti-Zionist” or allegedly “pro-Palestinian” publications (with or without links to “the left”). This includes cartoons portraying Israeli politicians as revenants of Nazis, as exemplified in the portrayal of the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, in Nazi-uniform on the website “Das Palästina Portal” (erhard-arendt.de; arendt-art.de; Document 2). While claiming no to be right-wing extremist (please “no radical right links”), the “anti-Zionist” website “Say no to Israel” (www.no2israel.de; found 18/12/2007), for example, publishes “a selection” of cartoons from the Iranian Holocaust cartoon competition. Displayed are cartoons which have, says the author of the site, “special appeal to me”. Apart from dozens of cartoons which ridicule the Holocaust and equate the Nazi genocide with Israel, some cartoons suggest that Jews rule the world, while others show Jews as ticks and vermin (Document 3).

In Germany, the daily newspaper Junge Welt, which has considerable influence on the extreme left, consistently shows support for a global “anti-imperialist” alliance with Iran and radical Islamist/antisemitic groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, or Muslim brotherhood (some of their historical traces leading to the collaboration of al-Husseini with Nazism; cf. Lewis 1999; Faber 2005), as well as generally for the “armed resistance” against “Zionism and imperialism”. Whoever recognizes Israel’s right to exist, editor Werner Pirker argues, also recognizes the “last colonial state” and “apartheid state” and stands “in fundamental opposition to the anti-imperialist struggle for liberation.” (Junge Welt, 25 April 2002). Along with the „geofascist USA“ (Junge Welt 2 August 2006) Israel is viewed as a “foreign body in the Arab world.” (Junge Welt, 22./23 July 2006)

The “Campo antiimperialista” (antiimperialista.org) also plays an important propagandistic role in this political milieu. In Germany, it also publishes “Intifada: Zeitschrift für den arabischen Widerstand”. The group fights against “the Zionists” and the “so-called state of Israel”, seeks a „world without Zionism“ and “solidarity with Hamas”, and views elections as “imperialist theater”. It glorifies terror, including lynching, against the “true terror” of “Zionist-imperialist politics”. For the group, the “destruction of Zionism and the so-called state of Israel is the only way to justice.” (quoted by DÖW, hagalil.com 2003) In addition, Campo’s “Antiimperialist Coordination” explicitly supports Holocaust deniers (Neugebauer 2003). Its sister organization, the “Revolutionary Communist League”, demands an “Arab Palestine from the river Jordan to the sea”. Many demonstrations against the “child-killer Israel” and “Israel’s war of annihilation” are also joined by the Hezbollah and neo-Nazi Holocaust deniers.

“Anti-Zionist” agitation among “left-wing” anti-imperialists often refers to selected Jews who use antisemitic stereotypes or to antisemites who pretend to be Jews. This is a method also

common in the extreme right. For example, Norman Finkelstein's book about a global Jewish "Holocaust industry" found considerable resonance among left-wing anti-imperialists. Another striking example of the blurred boundaries of anti-Zionism and antisemitic radicalism is "Israel Shamir", a neo-Nazi called Jöran Jermas using a Jewish name to gain attention. He published a fiercely antisemitic book full of anti-Jewish stereotypes and conspiracy theories. One of the chapters is called "ZOG", the neo-Nazi term for "Zionist-Occupied Government". Shamir's book, "Galilee Flowers", was published by a radical-left anti-imperialist press (ProMedia), other versions appeared at Horst Mahler's neo-Nazi Deutsches Kolleg (Many of the "anti-Zionist" publications and groups do no longer pay much attention to left-right distinctions). The blatantly antisemitic book also received favorable reviews by anti-Israel publications, including those which claim to be "leftist". The leftist weekly Freitag, known for its demonization of Israel, published a review praising Ermash/Shamir's "forthright portrayal of Israel and its policies which many do not want to see and many disavow." The article also claims that „Shamir's conversion" „will never be forgiven by Jewry" ("[die Konversion] wird ihm seitens des Judentums niemals verziehen.") (Ludwig Watzal, "Die echten und die falschen Juden," Freitag, 3 June 2005).

### Religious Antisemitism

Christian antisemitism remains a societal problem. Traditional Christian stereotypes of Jews as "Christ-killers" remain relevant in rural religious communities and some radical Christian groups. Christians with antisemitic dispositions may feel encouraged by the comments by German Catholic bishops in Israel who hinted to analogies between the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the situation of Palestinians today.

However, while Christian antisemitism has not disappeared, it is clearly less politically articulate and radical than many manifestations of religiously motivated antisemitism in Muslim immigrant communities (although there are exceptions to the rule). Islamic or Muslim antisemitism is documented in music and culture, especially rap songs, in political agitation, and in forms of everyday antisemitism among Muslim youths („Antisemitische Welle an Schulen: Jüdische Schüler fliehen vor Nazis und aggressiven Muslimen," Der Spiegel, 7 December 2006). There is also a stark increase in antisemitic hate crimes by Muslims against Jews, although the number of violent hate crimes remains low. In addition, widely shared criticism of Israel among Muslim immigrants is often merging with antisemitism (Gessler 2004; Claudia Dantschke; cf. Die Zeit, 7 June 2007), so that Israel is perceived as an expression of the evil nature of "the Jews".

The origins of that trend are multi-faceted. On one hand, Muslims – like other immigrants – suffer from various forms of exclusion. Comprehensive integration programs are still lacking, which is a reflection of the decades-long refusal to accept that Germany has turned into a multicultural immigrant society. In addition, a study conducted at the University of Michigan (Miller/Rensmann 2008) shows that immigrants, although for a long time a considerable segment of the citizenry and the electorate, utterly lack political representation, especially across continental Europe (including Germany). Furthermore, Muslims in Germany and Europe are often subject to racist discrimination and exclusion, like any other ethnic minority. Unemployment and social exclusion are particularly drastic for young Muslims and other ethnic minorities. Radical religious centers and mosques offer a sense of community and support which many uneducated and unemployed Muslims feel lacking in society. These are societal factors that help to breed radicalism.

On the other hand, the relevance of antisemitic ideology, propaganda, and agency in Muslim communities have been ignored or underestimated for too long. The "import" of antisemitic radicalism through international media and the media (for example Ahmed Rami's antisemitic "radioislam.org", etc.; cf Weitzman 2006: 65, or Hezbollah's satellite TV station al-Manar),



provides an underestimated challenge. Al-Manar, which televises the antisemitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and justifies arbitrary killing of Jews, can still be received via satellite in Germany. Such media prove to have a considerable impact on the framing of issues and antisemitic world-views among immigrants. Moreover, many radical Koran schools preach antisemitism, misogyny, and hatred against liberal democracy and “non-believers”. Examples of antisemitism in established Muslim organizations (e.g. in the Islam Council/Islamrat, the Islamic Center Aachen, which belongs to the Central Committee of Muslims in Germany) have their share in nurturing and legitimizing forms of everyday antisemitism among marginalized Muslim youth. So, too, have radical Islamist organizations and publications that have spread over the last decade.

### **Academic & Media Responses and Political Opportunity Structures**

Political opportunity structures for radical antisemitic mobilizations have improved over the last decade. There is also a verifiable increase in legitimacy of antisemitic stereotypes. This is, I argue, partly due to a problematic set of recurring claims about contemporary or “new” antisemitism. These claims resonate in some media and even in some academic discourse positions. Most prominently, they include:

a) The vivid claim that criticism of Israel is somewhat prohibited or “taboo” in Germany and Europe, and that there is an “almost totalitarian ideology on the topic antisemitism” (Sophia Deeg, *Freitag*, 5 August 2005). This persistent claim cannot be substantiated by empirical research. Media and discourse analyses suggest, to the contrary, that Israel is one of the most criticized countries in the German and European public sphere. Criticism of Israel cuts across progressive and conservative media, let alone radical right and left media (Behrens 2003; Jäger/Jäger/Clever 2003; Wistrich 2004; Jaecker 2004; Faber/Schoeps/Stawski 2006). Right or wrong, no established or relevant station or paper shies away from criticizing Israel. Criticism of Israel in the media, the academia, and in politics is as ‘normal’ in the free and democratic German Federal Republic, as it is a vivid part of public debate in other liberal democracies of the European Union or the USA. In fact, in Germany the book “The Israel Lobby” by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer is, to give one example, a best-selling book (it is also a best-selling book in the US, where it received few favorable scholarly reviews). In spite of its one-sidedness, invented self-victimization as being “silenced”, and dubious claims about Israel lobbyists being responsible for the war in Iraq, the book was published by major publishing houses and received wide-spread reviews in the media and among some academics. In Great Britain, the Association of University Teachers (AUT) even launched a boycott of Israeli academia and academics, singling out only the democratic, Jewish state of Israel.

b) The closely linked claim that criticism of Israel would be impossible because of a “Jewish lobby” which makes inflationary use of “the antisemitism charge” against anyone criticizing Israel. Hence, it is frequently claimed, Jews or the “Israel lobby” “exploit” the antisemitism charge and the history of Holocaust “for their own material interests”. Here Norman Finkelstein’s unsubstantiated claims about the Jewish “Holocaust industry” resonate: The *tageszeitung* argues that the Israeli government and its international lobby organizations employ this “antisemitism charge...successfully” (*taz*, 6 July 2006). This claim, too, is hardly empirically verifiable. Incidents of unjustified accusations - branding legitimate criticism as antisemitism - are isolated. In addition, such accusations are hardly ever raised by relevant political actors. The claim that critics of Israel are persecuted by “antisemitism charges”, however, does serve the function to create an image of self-victimization or “persecuted innocence”. It also helps to blur the distinctions between legitimate criticism and antisemitism and, hence, to a priori exonerate every form of anti-Israeli slander from the charge of being antisemitic (once this charge is portrayed as a mere instrument of the “Jewish lobby”). In reality, criticism of Israel is not a priori antisemitic and usually not seen as such in the public; in turn, criticism of Israel

is not a priori free from antisemitic prejudice only because the target is Israel or “the Zionists”, not “the Jews”. In addition, to claim that Jews control the media & politics is itself an antisemitic myth. Antisemitic conspiracy theories resonate in the resilient myth of a powerful “Jewish Lobby”, “Zionist lobby” or “Israel lobby” working as secret “string-pullers” and dictating national policies, initiating wars, and controlling public opinion.

c) Some publicists and academic authors attribute the “new” antisemitism primarily to Israeli or Jewish behavior or the Jewish state and see contemporary antisemitism, both in Europe and the Middle East, as a consequence of Israel’s existence and subsequent policies. Hence, Jews and Israel are seen as responsible for antisemitism and antisemitic violence directed against them. However, the claim that the Middle East conflict in general and Israel’s policies in particular are responsible for evoking antisemitism and antisemitic violence (in the Middle East, Europe, and Germany) has never been substantiated. Although antisemites exploit the Israel-Palestine conflict, antisemitism, like colonial racism, is an ideological matrix. It is a worldview which operates *independent* from group conflicts and the actual behavior of the subjects of prejudice, here Jewish or Israeli behavior. Rightly so, no serious scholar has so far claimed that an African dictator evokes racism, or makes racism understandable. Still, it is common to maintain that Israel’s policies cause antisemitism. The claim that current forms of antisemitism, like the radical antisemitism put forward by the Hamas Charta, are rooted in the “reality of Israel as an occupation army”, and that arbitrary violence against Israel and Israelis, like organized suicide bombing, is predominantly or exclusively a “reaction” to Israel’s “state terrorism”, is sometimes resonating in academic discourse (for a critique cf. Brumlik 2006; Brumlik 2007). An indicator of antisemitism in such arguing, then, is if “there is nothing Hamas can do that you won’t blame ‘in the final analysis’ on Israelis.” (Cohen 2007)<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, due to the nature of antisemitism, which is a collective prejudice and worldview, it is highly unlikely that antisemitism in Germany, Europe, and the Muslim world will dissipate with a peace settlement of the regional conflict in the Middle East (as much as such a settlement is desirable).

d) Linked to the claim above, antisemitism is more often than in previous decades denied to be a motivation for anti-Jewish statements or anti-Jewish violence at home and abroad; and the existence of manifestations of radical antisemitism is more often than in previous decades denied altogether. Simultaneously, such denial frequently corresponds with comparisons or equations of Israel and Nazism (according to the EUMC definition, such claims qualify as antisemitism). Such ideologems have a substantial, negative political-discursive impact.

For example, the radical antisemitism, hatred of Israel, and Holocaust denial expressed by the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the “state antisemitism” expressed by many Iranian government institutions and think tanks is often disregarded, not taken seriously, or even denied (just as their violation of human rights, gay rights etc.). This is also the case with manifestations of radical antisemitic propaganda distributed by anti-Israel terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, which broadcast the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and demand that small children become martyrs and kill the “monkeys and pigs” (here Jews are frequently portrayed as filth and cockroaches that need to be eliminated; the Hamas charter orders Muslim to kill “the Jews”; its former leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi said that “the question is not what the Germans did to the Jews, but what the Jews did to the Germans”; cf. Goldberg 2008; Küntzel 2007) If the antisemitism of these organizations is noticed, it is often declared politically irrelevant or seen as subordinate to their (legitimate) “resistance” to occupation. The complex

<sup>25</sup> Israel and “the Jews” are often seen as the cause of violence leading to the destruction of humanity, as documented in a widely published statement: “We have created a culture of violence (Israel and the Jews are the biggest players) and that Culture of Violence is eventually going to destroy humanity.” (Arun Gandhi, “Jewish Identity Can’t Depend on Violence,” washingtonpost.com, January 2008)

origins of antisemitism and terrorism, then, are reduced to “despair”. By the same token, hate crimes by Muslim immigrants against Jews and Jewish institutions/synagogues in Germany are still often misperceived simply as “protests against Israeli occupation”.

The demonization of Israel as an outcast “apartheid state” or even heir to Nazi rule is still a widely shared public opinion. It is all the more important to avoid such demonization, which is not legitimate criticism but antisemitic in nature, in public or academic discourse. However, references to Nazi rule when Israeli policies are discussed by academics, and to Jewish resistance against Nazism when Palestinian suicide bombings in civilian neighborhoods are confronted, are still common. For example, Udo Steinbach, the former director of the German Orient Institute claimed: “If we see how Israeli tanks drive through Palestinian villages and how the desperate people resist with stones, shouldn’t we be allowed to ask with regard to Warsaw and the uprising of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto whether this then also constituted terror?” (quoted in *hagalil.com*). There is a crucial difference between – even one-sided – criticism of a government’s policies and human rights violations, on the one hand, and demonizing and delegitimizing the very existence of a country by applying Nazi imagery, on the other. *Die Zeit* points out: “Those who speak of Israel as an ‘apartheid state’ or even draw parallels to the Holocaust, apparently want to make clear: Israel and the Jews, who suffered from the Holocaust, have lost any legitimate moral claim. They do not have a legitimate claim for support.” (J. Krönig, “Judaphobie,” *Die Zeit*, 24 April 2007)

## Conclusion

The “zone of acquiescence” and the boundaries of socially acceptable speech about “the Jews” have changed and expanded since 2000. Political mobilizations of antisemitism and “new” antisemitism as well as respective manifestations of propaganda have also considerably increased since then. Today, antisemitism is less often subject to public sanctions and legal prosecutions than a decade ago. There is also a greater readiness displayed by antisemites to openly communicate their prejudices. This may also indicate a rise in the legitimacy of various forms of antisemitism, while it is less clear if there is also a general rise in antisemitic attitudes or if such attitudes are only displayed more openly.

Be that as it may, we witness a new depth and public presence of antisemitic radicalism and hate crimes since the turn of the century in Germany and Europe. This is exemplified by new extreme right mobilizations, radical anti-Zionism or “new” antisemitism cutting through conventional left-right cleavages, and Islamic/minority antisemitism. However, extreme right hate crimes against Jews still exceed other hate crimes. But the new relevance and proliferation of antisemitic stereotypes does not only originate in political mobilizations. It also benefits from largely unrestricted antisemitism on the Internet and prejudiced perceptions of the Middle East conflict in media and the academia (for example, that antisemitism is caused by Israel). To the contrary, it needs to become clear that there cannot be any justification for antisemitism, as there cannot be any justification for racism, child molestation, slavery, or genocide.

The widening of the “zone of acquiescence”, more open and radical antisemitism, and improved political opportunity structures are a challenge to liberal-democratic society as a whole. Antisemitism is at odds, and endangers, the principle values of pluralistic constitutional democracy. The “new” relevance of the problem should neither lead to alarmism, nor to ignorance toward the problem. Instead, it should guide sober and solid new policies.

## Policy Recommendations

### 1. Annual Report on Antisemitism, commissioned by the Federal Government/Executive Branch

The *Verfassungsschutzberichte*, the reports by the intelligence services of Germany's Constitutional Protection Agency, are necessary but insufficient sources to grasp the nature, extent, and dynamics of antisemitism in politics and society, and the political measures required to combat antisemitism. Most of the time, these phenomena are not fully reflected in forms of political membership or at the ballot box (although this is increasingly the case with the NPD's electoral successes in East Germany). Limiting its attention to extremist groups and criminal activities, the Constitutional Protection Agency does not and cannot provide an understanding of the extent, problems, and measures relating to societal antisemitism.

In addition, the problem and political challenge is, unfortunately, not restricted to extreme right mobilizations and anti-Jewish fringe groups. However, extreme right successes and positive responses to their antisemitic campaigns among voters and potential voters do signify that the government branches are not only confronted with an isolated but with a societal problem and challenge. The Federal Government is asked to intervene in issues of this importance.

The annual report should be based on both political/governmental analyses and scholarly research that should be subject to public scrutiny. The annual report on antisemitism by the Federal Government could function as a) an assessment and alert system, b) as a means of public education and awareness-raising about antisemitism, and c) as a decisive tool to discuss, evaluate, measure, suggest, justify, and adjust governmental and public programs to combat antisemitism. In the annual report, the Executive could inform about measures which have been realized and which are intended, both in Germany and in relation to foreign policy, including the EU context (for example, on the broadcasting and financing of the radically antisemitic Al-Manar station; or the impact of the highly circulated antisemitic paper *Vakit*, prohibited in Germany by the former Minister of the Interior but published in Turkey with effects on Germany). In addition, the annual report may serve as a model for the EU and OSCE.

### 2. Prohibition of the NPD and other Extreme Right/Antisemitic Organizations and Groups

The NPD is neo-Nazi and militant in its core; it can be classified as a "neo-Nazi movement party" (Funke/Rensmann 2005). The party is not only against the constitution but a declared enemy of the constitution, which the party intends to abolish and replace by a *völkisch* German-ethnic order. Especially its political symbols and demonstrations point to a glorification and re-enactment of Nazism. NPD propaganda, which has included Holocaust denial in the past and is increasingly antisemitic, is repeatedly under suspicion of *Volksverhetzung* ("incitement of the people"). It is prohibited according to § 130 of Germany's criminal law (StGB), for spreading "hatred against part of the populace" and by attacking "the human dignity of others"; by denying or downplaying the Holocaust, NPD activists were also subject to § 189 StGB, *Verunglimpfung des Andenkens Verstorbener* ("denigration of the remembrance of the deceased").

The party has proven again and again to be the central agent of overt racism and political antisemitism in Germany today. Its prohibition will not be the key to solve the problem and dissipate antisemitism altogether. None the less, a prohibition of a party that has become increasingly aggressive and continuously radicalized its antisemitic ideology, and its admiration for international antisemitic terrorist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hezbollah (which is still not yet prohibited in the EU due to coordination problems), Hamas, and even Al Qaeda, will be a major step to delegitimize extreme right and antisemitic ideology. It will also inhibit future grassroots organizing by the extreme right among German youth, especially in East

Germany, where the NPD has been an important factor in the political consolidation of extreme right youth cultures and antisemitic and racist views. Over the years, the NPD has increased its legitimacy, especially in the East, by not being prohibited and thus being misconceived as a democratic party. A common view, especially in the East, is that “if the NPD is legal, it is a democratic party just like any other.”

The NPD is a key *political* factor in the proliferation of antisemitism in Germany today, but it is not the only one. Other extreme right groups and publications have their share, as well as radical Islamist organizations. By prohibiting the pan-Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir and other extreme right organizations, the German executive took a first major step against militantly antisemitic groups and the distribution of their propaganda in the German public.

### **3. New Policing Initiatives against Hate Crimes, Prosecution of Antisemitic Propaganda**

Extreme right newspapers, websites, cartoons, to distribute propaganda that portrays Jews as cockroaches or vermin is beyond the legal limits of freedom of speech; the same applies to new variants of Holocaust denial. However, too little has been done to prosecute those crimes over the last years. In response, those publications have rapidly increased over the last five years and apparently feel encouraged by the limited political and legal opposition they meet today.

Attached you find three examples of antisemitic propaganda distributed by German websites (documents 1-3) which should be subject to legal scrutiny according to the German criminal code. Publications which downplay or ridicule the Holocaust and the memory of the deceased, or which instigate racist hatred and civil unrest, should meet the full force of the law. While taking into account the high value of freedom of speech granted by Article 5 of the Basic Law, radically anti-Jewish publications and websites, which portray Jews as ticks or vermin and praise such forms of antisemitic hatred, should be prohibited under the existing rule of law.

This also applies to non-German publications and media in Germany (e.g. al-Manar, Iqraa), which deserve equal prosecution before the law. Antisemitism is nothing inherent to “Muslim culture”, but rather a contested ideology among Muslims, just like political Islamism. The Federal Government and the National Parliament are challenged to make sure that moderate Muslims and secular Muslims feel safe to raise their opposition to Islamism and Islamic antisemitism, without, in turn, discriminating against Muslims or violating religious freedom.

There is an urgent need to make renewed efforts to de-legitimize antisemitism in the German public(s), including those public spheres and media which are not part of mainstream media and German-language mass communications. Political means, legal prosecution, and renewed efforts by the police should be employed in response to the proliferation of hate speech, possibly also on the international level. It is recommended that those measures may be addressed in a suggested annual report.

### **4. Government Programs and Support of Local Grassroots groups and Networks in Civil Society**

Grassroots initiatives, civil society organizations and networks, and educational initiatives combating antisemitism need ongoing public and political support on various levels. Existing government programs against right-wing extremism should expand their focus on the multifaceted phenomena and challenges of antisemitism, including “intellectual” or academic antisemitism. A good example is a project in cooperation with the Federal Agency for Civic Education and the Ministry of the Interior. “Mobile action and advisory teams” try to tackle antisemitism among Muslim youths and develop guidelines and material for education.

There is also the need for more non-Jewish supporters and groups fighting antisemitism. As Walter Mead points out (Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2007): “When antisemitic writers and politicians make vicious attacks, Jews are in a double bind: refrain from responding with outrage and the charge becomes accepted as a fact, express utter loathing at the charge and give anti-Semites the opportunity to pose as the victims of a slander campaign by venomous Jews.” Positive support measures for, and the development of, civil society initiatives should be addressed in the annual report.

### **5. New Initiatives of Political Education on the Federal, State and Local Levels**

A major task of a broader national political education initiative should include a deconstructing of wide-spread (potentially antisemitic) myths about Jews and antisemitism. These myths are mentioned above. They include the claims that a) criticism of Israel is “taboo” in the German public and in German politics because b) Jews and their “lobby” control the media, politics, and “exploit the Holocaust for their own (material) purposes”, and that c) Israel’s policies and Jewish citizens generate, instigate, or are responsible for, the new antisemitism. Criticism of Israel is perfectly legitimate and is, by no means, as such antisemitic. However, in turn, attacks against Israel are not per se free from antisemitism. Criticism of Israel is not taboo or sanctioned in the German public or German politics but, instead, empirical evidence suggests that Israel is one of the countries most criticized by the German media. By the same token, Jews are subject to public criticism like other Germans. The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional liberal democracy and it is not ruled by a „totalitarian“ pro-Israel or “Jewish lobby”. There is no link between Jewish behavior or Israel’s policies and antisemitism, a stereotypical world-view detached from social reality.

New research on education on the Holocaust in German schools suggests that new Holocaust education initiatives are necessary. Knowledge of the Holocaust among high school students is more limited than expected. New education initiatives may have to explore new ways to teach the history of the Holocaust and its impact in an immigrant society. But they will have to make sure that the German school system does not shy away from this important task.

Agencies of political/civic education (both government- and party-related) need to serve as a model with high standards when dealing with radical, manifest, and latent forms of antisemitism, and when dealing with the complex Arab-Israel conflict. Agencies need to enlarge their efforts in educating about antisemitism. While supporting independent academic research, they need to make sure that sympathy for the political causes or suffering of the Israelis or the Palestinians do not lead to binary, unrealistic, one-sided guilt reproaches against “the Zionists” or to outright anti-Israel bias. Disregarding the complexities of the Middle East conflict and portraying one side as fundamentally “evil” can feed and strengthen antisemitic dispositions, or racism against Palestinians, for that matter. Open collaboration with antisemitic groups and organizations that deny Israel’s right to exist should be prevented at any rate by government educational agencies, no matter how well intended. It also should be made clear that suicide bombings against civilian populations are human rights violations that may constitute “crimes against humanity”.

### **6. School Projects and Education**

Education on democratic values, liberal constitutionalism, group prejudices, the Holocaust, and antisemitism in particular should become more wide-spread and effective at the school level in order to combat everyday antisemitism among peers. This is particularly important since antisemitic myths about Jews are accessible and widely perpetuated in the Internet, and since the propaganda by political agents like the NPD or radical Islamists is distributed at schools, youth centers, or religious centers. Effective programs need further support. It is important to reach out to youths in the early stages of political socialization. To increase and monitor efficiency, in this context, too, it is recommended to provide an annual report.

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### 3.3. *Antisemitic Tendencies in the Academic Context – the case of “new antisemitism”*

Yves Pallade<sup>26</sup>

#### Introduction

Antisemitism in academia is by no means a new phenomenon; nor is it an usual one, for academics, while striving to approach an objective view of the world are always part of society. This fact is to be borne in mind when setting out to inquire about the present manifestations of Jew-hatred in the field of higher education and scientific research. What makes antisemitism in academia extraordinary is the fact that it is in the intellectual and scholarly sphere that many of the discourses that shape our social reality and that are often taken as a given are produced. Indeed the notion of antisemitism, the very term itself, has been the product of discourses that aspired or at least purported to be scientific in nature. Karl Marr, its father, attempted to put the traditional religiously-based hatred of Jews onto a firm scientific footing and provide it with a new pretext more suited to the epistemological criteria of modernity. Others followed in his footsteps and expanded the concept to universal dimensions, providing it with a world-explanatory character. Antisemitism, gaining purportedly objective consciousness of itself, constituted the negation of the Enlightenment and its aspirations of human freedom through reason and science, yet it bore the very marks of the age d’illumination, whose illegitimate but unmistakable offspring it was.

The racial theories and teachings of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries that climaxed in the Shoah left their mark not only on particular faculties and universities, but left imprints on numerous academic disciplines that can be felt to the present day. The *Gleichschaltung* of academia under National Socialism left virtually no field of science untouched by the negative normativity of its ideology, of which antisemitism constituted a if not *the* central element. A new and true German or Aryan science was contrasted to and substituted for a purportedly corrupted Jewish variant. Academia played an important role in justifying Nazi ideology and helping to implement it, perverting the products of science, initially conceived for the liberation and furtherance of the human being into instruments for his enslavement and ultimately his annihilation. Some institutions of higher learning have undertaken critical accounting of their own history while it remains very much a desideratum among others. Disciplines such as ethnology and in particular oriental studies have hardly – if at all – begun to reflect upon themselves. This has ramifications for the present, epitomized in particular in the way that a great many arabists and orientologists, particularly in Germany, construe the conflict in the Middle East or the problem of Islamic antisemitism.<sup>27</sup>

#### The “old” antisemitism in academia

While nowadays all-encompassing primary antisemitism does not feature in state ideologies in Europe, there exist various institutional anchor points in academia throughout the Continent and other parts of the OSCE region. Among these the Academy for Interpersonal Management (MAUP) in Kiev stands out. Through its publications and conferences it has repeatedly launched hefty attacks against Jews and “Zionists”, mixing classical Christian anti-Jewish motives such as the blood libel with more modern ones and engaging positively with

<sup>26</sup> Director, Foreign Affairs Network / B’nai B’rith Europe

<sup>27</sup> See Matthias Küntzel: *Djihad und Judenhaß. Über den neuen antijüdischen Krieg.* (ça ira, 2003, Freiburg), pp. 151-160

far-right activists such as the Ku-Klux-Clan leader David Duke. MAUP allegedly also received “significant funding from Arab and Muslims states”.<sup>28</sup>

The broader range of freedom of expression that characterizes the sphere of academia, renders institutions of higher learning also as spaces where controversial and otherwise socially little accepted personal views can be more openly articulated. Hence, it was no coincidence that the leading German neo-Nazis Horst Mahler and Udo Voigt were able to attend a meeting of the Islamist group Hisb-ut-Tahrir at the premises of the Technical University of Berlin. Voigt found that there their positions regarding their common enemies were “almost congruent”.<sup>29</sup> While the meeting had no openly academic pretension, the organizers used the university as an institution with a greater degree of tolerance for dissenting views.

Other organizations with a consciously antisemitic agenda give themselves names that are meant to bestow upon them a degree of academic credibility such as the revisionist Institute for Historical Review in Torrance, California, the leading organization of Holocaust deniers, that publishes *Journal of Historic Review*<sup>30</sup>, or the Adelaide Institute in Australia.<sup>31</sup>

The “International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust” that took place under the auspices of the Institute for Political and International Studies, a think tank of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Teheran in 2006, while arrogating to itself an academic character<sup>32</sup>, also featured a number of participants who can look back to an academic career. One example is Robert Faurisson, one of the best-known Holocaust deniers, who had taught literature at the University of Lyon until 1979, before being transferred to the central French institution for distance learning in the wake of the controversy that erupted due to his revisionist writings.

Outside the OSCE region there are quite a number of examples of institutions that promote antisemitism in an openly and systematic fashion. One does not need to venture as far as Teheran where the worldwide international of Holocaust negationism has shaken hands under the benevolent auspices of the Iranian regime that has espoused and promoted antisemitism since its own coming into being in 1979.<sup>33</sup> They can be found even among partner countries such as Egypt where the Al-Azhar University of Cairo has functioned as a hotbed for theologically inspired Jew-hatred. Its head Grand Sheikh Muhammed Sayyid Tantawi, the highest religious authority of Sunni Islam, who was called a “reasonable man, a tolerant man“ by Gunther Mulack, then Commissioner for the Dialogue with the Islamic World in the German Foreign Office<sup>34</sup>, had written in his PhD dissertation with the title “The People of Israel in the Koran and the Sunna” that the consumption of non-Jewish blood was a religious rite of the Jews and quoted passages from both “Mein Kampf” and “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” affirmatively. His book was published in fourth edition in 1997 and continues to be a standard work of reference in the field.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup> “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2004” and Designations of Countries of Particular Concern. Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Second Session, October 6, 2004, [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa96357.000/hfa96357\\_0.HTM](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa96357.000/hfa96357_0.HTM)

<sup>29</sup> *Jungle World*, Nr. 48/2002, 20. November 2002, Deniz Yücel: Jihad im Überbau

<sup>30</sup> Institute for Historical Review, <http://www.ihr.org/>

<sup>31</sup> Adelaide Institute, [www.adelaideinstitute.org](http://www.adelaideinstitute.org)

<sup>32</sup> IPIS – Institute for Political and International Studies, [http://www.ipis.ir/English/conference\\_persian-gulf.htm](http://www.ipis.ir/English/conference_persian-gulf.htm)

<sup>33</sup> Matthias Küntzel: Ahmadinejads Antisemitismus und der gegenwärtige Krieg, <http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/ahmadinejads-antisemitismus-und-der-gegenwaertige-krieg>

<sup>34</sup> Daniela Siebert: Gunther Mulack: Politische Differenzen zur Sprache bringen, 04 April 2005, [http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show\\_article.php/ c-469/ nr-306/i.html](http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/ c-469/ nr-306/i.html)

<sup>35</sup> Matthias Küntzel: Antisemitismus als Kampfauftrag. Mahathiers Ansprache an die islamische Welt, November 2003, <http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/antisemitismus-als-kampfauftrag>

By contrast, Western European universities have been subject to a wide-reaching ostracism of the more classical kinds of religiously and racially motivated antisemitism. Proponents of these manifestations of Jew-hatred certainly persist, yet they have become increasingly marginalized. One example is the sociologist Bernd Rabehl at the Free University of Berlin, who in an interview with the newspaper *Deutsche Stimme*, which is affiliated to the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), openly stated not only his sympathies for this political party and right-wing extremist views, but specifically compared the motivations of the party founder Adolf von Thadden with those of the Jews who founded Israel “after 1945 as a response to the discriminations”.<sup>36</sup> While the decision of his department at the university not to grant him lectureships any more was eventually suspended, his lectures were excluded from the exam curriculum. Another example is that of Konrad Löw, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Bayreuth, who has tried to portray historical antisemitism in Germany as a result of strong Jewish participation in left-wing revolutions. In 2004 he wrote a revisionist article for the *Deutschland Archiv*<sup>37</sup> in which he claimed that the majority of Germans had been “much more victims than perpetrators”<sup>38</sup>, emphasizing an alleged Jewish contribution to implementation of the “Final Solution”<sup>39</sup> and evoking an alleged “German-Jewish symbiosis under the swastika”<sup>40</sup>. The respective issue of the “Deutschland Archiv”, a publication of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, was subsequently pulped and the agency distanced itself in a letter to the subscribers from Löw’s essay.<sup>41</sup> When in 2007 Claudio Moffa, professor of politics and history of Africa and head of a Masters Program on the Middle East at the University of Teramo, who had been noted for his anti-Zionist views, invited the French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson to present his theses in a lecture, this was met with a storm of protest from within academia all over Italy. Faurisson was eventually prohibited by the university to appear at the university and demonstrators succeeded in precluding him from speaking at a nearby venue.<sup>42</sup>

### The Working Definition of Antisemitism

The near absence of European institutions of higher learning with a systematic and open antisemitic agenda must not belie the fact that antisemitic attitudes are not only held among academics (as among the rest of the population), but that they diffuse into and articulate themselves through their work. Moreover, as in other sections of society the wide condemnation or proscription of religious and racial antisemitism has not done away with the wishes that antisemitism fulfils, while having been unable to prevent the rise of new forms of articulation of Jew-hatred that manifest themselves in a socially more opportune and acceptable manner. Indeed, both the relevant expert institutions of the EU and the OSCE have taken account of this fact when drafting their Working Definition of Antisemitism. A considerable part of this

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<sup>36</sup> Deutsche Stimme, März 2005, Das Ende der Dämonisierung. Bernd Rabehl im Gespräch über die alte und neue «Außerparlamentarische Opposition»

<sup>37</sup> The text of the article was later published in Junge Freiheit, 16 April 2004, „Eingedenk seiner mehr als tausendjährigen Geschichte“. Dokumentation: Deutsche Identität in Verfassung und Geschichte / Ein Aufsatz des Politikwissenschaftlers Konrad Löw in der Zeitschrift „Deutschland Archiv“ fällt aus Gründen der politisch-historischen Korrektheit der Zensur zum Opfer / Restauflage soll vernichtet werden, Konrad Löw

<sup>38</sup> „Würde man ganz konkret auf die Schicksale der Einzelnen eingehen, würde man wohl zu der Einsicht gelangen, daß sie weit mehr Opfer als Täter waren, Opfer freilich in nicht so schrecklichem Ausmaße wie das Gros der Juden.“

<sup>39</sup> „Aber Goldhagen hat doch bewiesen, daß Hitler schier zahllose Helfer bei der Umsetzung seiner Endlösungspläne fand: Deutsche, Ukrainer, Letten usw. Was nicht in sein Bild paßt, sind Juden. Doch auch von ihnen leisteten einige einen beachtlichen Beitrag als Judenräte, als Häscher, als Polizisten, in den Gaskammern.“

<sup>40</sup> „Gibt es einen zuverlässigeren Chronisten der deutsch-jüdischen Symbiose unter dem Hakenkreuz als den Juden und Literaten Victor Klemperer ...?“

<sup>41</sup> Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 April 2004, Joachim Güntner: Schleusenwärter. Die Restauflage des «Deutschland Archivs» wegen revisionistischer Töne eingestampft

<sup>42</sup> Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 August 2007, Wolfgang Schieder: Studienziel Tabubruch

document deals with forms of antisemitism that target the state of Israel as an indirect route in order to get at the Jews.

In order to determine when exactly criticism of Israel crosses the line towards antisemitism, Nathan Sharansky, the former Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs, proposed three criteria, called 3-D-test: „D“ for demonisation, delegitimation and double standards<sup>43</sup> – the three facets of what is nowadays known as anti-Zionism. Such criticism which demonises the Jewish State, which denies its right to exist or to defend itself as such, or which gauges its actions differently than those of other states, is antisemitic. These criteria have entered the Working Definition of Antisemitism that was developed and is used by the EUMC (nowadays FRA) and ODIHR.<sup>44</sup> They correspond to a fairly broad consensus among leading researchers of antisemitism and practitioners in the educational field of dealing with the problem. As Gert Weisskirchen, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism, has pointed out: “We already have the tools in order to [implement the measures set out in the 2004 Berlin Declaration]. It is therefore time to make use of them more effectively.”<sup>45</sup>

This notwithstanding, antisemitism remains a controversially debated subject in public and it remains questionable whether the Working Definition will – apart from policing and law enforcement – at all be applied in political practice. What qualifies as antisemitic, indeed who is an antisemite, often continues to form the subject of hefty – and sometimes even legal – disputes, particularly when relating to allegedly modernized manifestations of the phenomenon. Infringements against Jews or slander against the Jewish State are often treated as mere (over-)reactions to Israeli policies or legitimate criticism of Israel. The debate generally hinges on the issue of anti-Zionism and the question of when (or whether at all) it equals antisemitism. In a number of legal cases courts have ruled against those who characterized others as “antisemites”. One such case in Germany involved Ludwig Watzal, an employee of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, who is co-editor of the academic supplement of the newspaper *Das Parlament* of the German Bundestag, who sued the editor of the Jewish news website *juedische.at*, inter alia for having called him an “anti-Zionist antisemite”.<sup>46</sup> Another similar case involved the publicist Henryk Broder who had been indicted and subsequently sentenced for – amongst other things – calling the publisher Abraham Melzer and the author Hajo Meyer “capacities for applied Judeophobia”<sup>47</sup> for having compared Israeli occupation policy with that of the Nazis, for having blamed Jewish behaviour for the rise of antisemitism, and for having accused Jews of exploiting the Holocaust.<sup>48</sup> While losing on most counts in a court of first instance, Broder eventually won his appeal on most counts the second instance. The court found that “Jewish antisemitism” indeed existed and allowed Broder to call his opponents “capacities for applied Judeophobia”.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Natan Sharansky: Antisemitism in 3-D. Differentiating legitimate criticism of Israel from the so-called new anti-Semitism, <http://www.hagalil.com/antisemitismus/europa/sharansky-1.htm>

<sup>44</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism, <http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-draft.pdf>

<sup>45</sup> Gert Weisskirchen: Combating Antisemitism ‘Best practices’ already exist – it is time to make use of them. In: Equal Voices, Issue 17, 2006

<sup>46</sup> Matthias Küntzel: Tag Watzal! Darf ich Sie Antisemit nennen? Die „juedische.at“ vor der Pressekommission des Hamburger Landgerichts, November 2005, <http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/tag-watzal-darf-ich-sie-antisemit-nennen> ; Watzal’s journalistic activities will be examined below.

<sup>47</sup> „Kapazitäten für angewandte Judäophobie“, Henryk M. Broder: Holo mit Hajo: Wie zwei Juden für die Leipziger den Adolf machen, [http://www.achgut.de/dadgd/view\\_article.php?aid=852](http://www.achgut.de/dadgd/view_article.php?aid=852) (censored version)

<sup>48</sup> Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 2006, Hans Riebsamen: Melzer obsiegt über Broder

<sup>49</sup> Der Tagesspiegel, 09 November 2007, „Den Adolf geamcht“

## The “new” antisemitism in academia

While the old forms of antisemitism in academia persist and must continuously be confronted, they have in many respects been marginalized. Yet it is in fact the modernized and socially acceptable articulations of this old hatred that – largely unchecked – have been on the rise in recent years. Most notably among the discourses promoted by some academics has been the ‘nazification’ of the Jewish State, namely the comparison between Israel and its actions to the Third Reich and Nazi policies. However critical one’s perspective on the actions of Israel might be: such criticism does not have much to do with the realities of the Middle East. It rather reveals something about the state of mind of the critic, who clearly uses the Jewish State as a psychological projection screen for his or her own sensitivities.

Such analogies can in fact take different forms. They might range from direct equations between Israel or its actions and the Third Reich and its methods to indirect variations of this theme such as the appearance of topos of the “Palestinians as the victims of the victims“ or the characterization of Palestinian “refugee camps” as “concentration camps”. A particularly interesting version is the one presented by Udo Steinbach, the then director of the Germany’s Orient Institute in Hamburg and current director of the Institute of Middle East Studies, who said:

“If we see how Israeli tanks drive through Palestinian villages and the desperate people defend themselves with stones, then we have to be allowed to ask with respect to Warsaw and the uprising of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto whether this was not also terrorism?”<sup>50</sup>

Steinbach leaves it open whether the uprising in the ghetto was in fact resistance – in this case the Israelis would be the same for the Palestinians what the Nazis were for the Jews – or whether it was rather a form of terrorism – in this case the Nazis were not really the Nazis and the uprising of the Jews not really justified. What this example shows is that the projection of guilt and the relativization of guilt are in fact two sides of the same coin: The Holocaust does not have to be denied and the self-proclaimed critic does not have to become a sympathiser of the Nazis in order to castigate the Jews. Quite the contrary: the victims are simply put into the role of the new perpetrators.

That this kind of antisemitism is hardly sanctioned by society is corroborated by the fact that Steinbach did not have to face any serious consequences on the part of his superiors. Neither did the Orient Institute’s board of trustees, which comprised well-known decision-makers from various sectors of society including politics, business, labour, and the academia, react at all to an open letter of protest that demanded Steinbach’s resignation; nor did the Institute’s co-sponsors, namely the German Foreign Office and the City of Hamburg, intervene. The Green member of the Bundestag and then Federal Commissioner for Human Rights Claudia Roth, who in her speech on antisemitism that she had given to the Bundestag previously had cautioned explicitly against such analogies by pointing at their relativising function concerning “the historical guilt of the German to the Jews”<sup>51</sup>, told him in a letter that she found his remarks “not unproblematic” and ultimately contented herself with a written explanation by the professor, in which he de facto insisted on his comparison. So did her the CDU parliamentarian and co-trustee Ruprecht Polenz who had told Steinbach’s critics that he found such

<sup>50</sup> „Wenn wir sehen, wie israelische Panzer durch palästinensische Dörfer fahren und sich die verzweifelten Menschen mit Steinen wehren, dann müssen wir im Blick auf Warschau und im Blick auf den Aufstand der Juden im Warschauer Ghetto auch fragen dürfen, war das nicht auch Terror?“, Stellungnahme von Prof. Udo Steinbach: Kritik am Hamburger Orient-Institut und seinem Leiter, 06 August 2004, <http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/2004/08/steinbach.htm>

<sup>51</sup> Deutscher Bundestag, 82. Sitzung, 11 December 2003, Claudia Roth, Antisemitismus bekämpfen

comparisons “improper and mistaken”, not mentioning what kind of consequences he would practically take. While not denying the charge of antisemitism against the academic, both failed to position themselves clearly on this matter, employing instead euphemistic language in their criticism.<sup>52</sup>

In order to legitimize his analogy Steinbach referred to Holocaust survivors and “numerous direct mails from Jewish scientists”, who had purportedly “agreed with him – in part with qualifications”. He eventually tried to conclude the affair by portraying the argument as “an inner-Jewish discourse” on which he “would not comment”.<sup>53</sup> This recourse to alleged or real Jewish “chief witnesses” in order to underpin one’s position reveals itself a pattern of antisemitic thinking, for it reproduces exclusion by implicitly assuming that

- a) the antisemitic nature of a remark depends on who the person is who makes it;
- b) people of Jewish origin cannot be subject to the kind of prejudice that others can;
- c) Jews have a particular inborn authority to speak on Israel and the Middle East conflict.

The only logical inference of such thinking is that Jews must either have been morally refined through suffering, in which case the injustice committed on them receives a sort of a posteriori purpose if not justification, or that must be a priori different from all others people in that they are incapable of holding the same kind of resentments that everyone else can. In either case Jews are not perceived first and foremost as individuals but always as representatives of their group. The Working Definition of Antisemitism holds that one contemporary example of antisemitism could be “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.”<sup>54</sup> An implicit corollary of this is also a preclusion of remarks and acts by Jewish individuals or groups that are seen in a positive light from being representative of any Jewish collectivity. Indeed, imputing a meaning to what a Jewish individual says that has relevancy above and beyond this person because of his or her belonging to a particular collectivity reveals a certain bias.

It seems that exactly such flawed and implicitly biased reasoning was behind the invitation of Alfred Grosser to a hearing on antisemitism in the German Bundestag in 2004 where he made the following statements: “As I was already allowed to say in the Frauenkirche in Dresden: it’s about understanding the suffering of others. This understanding generally does not exist on the part of Jews.”<sup>55</sup> And: “But it is furthering antisemitism if one does not at the same time fight other forms of racism. And that is a task of Jews and Jewish organizations.”<sup>56</sup> Moreover: “And if the question is asked why I argue so harshly against the policies of the Israeli government while Rwanda is so much worse, I say exactly because ... My Jewish origin is the reason that I have to be stricter on Israel than elsewhere.”<sup>57</sup> Grosser, a noted sociologist and political scientist, who had taught at Science Po in Paris Research and served as Studies Di-

<sup>52</sup> For a more comprehensive overview of the Steinbach affair see: Yves Pallade: Medialer Sekundäranisemitismus, öffentliche Meinung und das Versagen gesellschaftlicher Eliten als bundesdeutscher Normalfall. In: Julius H. Schoeps, Klaus Faber & Sacha Stawski: Neu-alter Judenhass. Antisemitismus, arabisch-israelischer Konflikt und europäische Politik. (Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2006, Berlin)

<sup>53</sup> Stellungnahme von Prof. Udo Steinbach: Kritik am Hamburger Orient-Institut und seinem Leiter, 06. August 2004, <http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/2004/08/steinbach.htm>

<sup>54</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

<sup>55</sup> „Wie ich schon einmal in der Dresdner Frauenkirche sagen durfte, es geht darum, das Leiden anderer zu verstehen. Dieses Verstehen ist auf jüdischer Seite im Allgemeinen nicht vorhanden.“

<sup>56</sup> „Es ist aber Antisemitismus fördernd, wenn man nicht zugleich andere Rassismen bekämpft. Und das ist eine Aufgabe von Juden und jüdischen Organisationen.“

<sup>57</sup> „Und wenn die Frage gestellt wird, warum ich harsch gegen die Politik der israelischen Regierung argumentiere, wo Ruanda doch viel schlimmer ist, sage ich eben gerade. ... Mein jüdischer Ursprung macht, dass ich für Israel strenger zu sein habe als woanders.“

rector at the French National Foundation of Political Science, is neither known for his strong Jewish identity nor for any particular expertise on antisemitism or even on the Middle East conflict for that matter. Yet it is the combination of his general – though in terms of the topic under discussion largely irrelevant – academic credentials and his Jewish family that are cited whenever he is interviewed about antisemitism and Israel; roots – as if he possessed something inherently genetic that enables him to speak with a particular authority on these matters. In his view the latter causes the former, as becomes evidently clear from an interview he gave to the *Berliner Zeitung*<sup>58</sup> in which he said: “Criticism of Israel and antisemitism have nothing to do with each other. It is rather Israel’s policies that promotes antisemitism globally.”<sup>59</sup> Thereby Grosser provides antisemitism, an utterly irrational delusion or – as Adorno put it – “the rumour about the Jews”, with a seemingly rational pretext. The strategy of blaming the victim for what happens to it is by no means new. Antisemitism has always – and even more so after Auschwitz – portrayed the actions that flowed from it as acts of self-defence against alleged Jewish machinations and wrongdoings on the part of all or at least some Jews. “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews” is therefore cited as one example of antisemitism by the aforementioned Working Definition, as is “Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel”. Grosser’s pronouncements have been appearing in numerous German and French media, most notably in a 10-page article in the February issue of Germany’s most renowned foreign policy journal *Internationale Politik*, in which he expressed his non-understanding “that Jews nowadays despise others and claim the right to pursue policies mercilessly in the name of self-defence. Understanding for the suffering of others – does this basic value of Europe not hold all the more for Israel?”<sup>60</sup> This in turn imputes a cathartic if not reformatory character to the Shoah, providing the unspeakable ex post with a degree of purpose and reproducing the exclusion of Jews once more. Jews are now hated neither in spite nor because of Auschwitz, to build on a well-known bon mot, but because of not having learned the alleged lessons of the mass murder to which they had been subjected.

These modern antisemitic patterns of arguing that have been outlined all have in common that they seek to put antisemitism on a rational footing, which in essence is the first step towards justification. This highlights the crucial role played by scholars and intellectuals, for it is the aim of academia to advance the pervasion of the world through reason. Yet the failure to endow rationality with the necessary momentum of self-reflection by and on the subject himself abets irrationality and delusion. Variants of these antisemitic ideologema can be found in otherwise respected academic discourse. Be it in German political scientist Eckart Jesse’s defence of FDP Vice-Chairman Jürgen Möllemann against the “killer argument antisemitism”<sup>61</sup> for having remarked that “hardly anyone has increased the throng of antisemites, who unfortunately exist in Germany and who we have to fight, more than Mr. Sharon and in Germany a Mr. Friedman through his intolerant and invidious manner”<sup>62</sup>; or in the following question posed to the German-Jewish professor Micha Brumlik in an open letter by Norman Paech, then professor for Public Law at the University for Science and Politics in Hamburg and cur-

<sup>58</sup> *Berliner Zeitung*, 15 August 2006, “Israel Politik fördert den Antisemitismus”. Der Publizist Alfred Grosser plädiert für eine Strategie der Versöhnung gegenüber den Arabern

<sup>59</sup> „Kritik an Israel und Antisemitismus haben nichts miteinander zu tun. Es ist vielmehr Israels Politik, die den Antisemitismus in der Welt fördert.“

<sup>60</sup> „Ich verstehe nicht, dass Juden heute andere verachten und sich das Recht nehmen, im Namen der Selbstverteidigung unbarmherzig Politik zu betreiben. Verständnis für die Leiden der anderen – gilt dieser Grundwert Europas nicht erst recht für Israel?“

<sup>61</sup> “Schlage-tot-Argument Antisemitismus”, *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 29 May 2002, Günther Hörbst, „Totschlagargument Antisemitismus“

<sup>62</sup> *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18./19. Mai 2002, Machtkampf in der FDP

rently Foreign Policy Spokesman of PDS parliamentary party in the Bundestag, for having criticized the Canadian philosopher Ted Honderich because of his legitimisation of terrorism: “Has it occurred to you that such an executivistic censure of thought could give a fresh boost to antisemitism, which, after all, clearly exists in our society?”<sup>63</sup> On another occasion Paech has claimed that Israel was waging a “war of extermination”<sup>64</sup> in Lebanon, thereby using a specific term in characterizing the actions of the Jewish State that is clearly associated with the kind of battle conducted by the Nazis in Eastern Europe.<sup>65</sup> The usage of the ideologeme of the (co-)responsibility of Jews for antisemitism as well as the double standards in treating Israel by no means epitomize a slip of the pen, but constitute positions that Paech had already been promoting decades ago as a legal professor for public and international law wrote in the *Hamburger Lehrerzeitung*: “Israel has, however, to ask itself indeed whether its Palestine policy does not fuel a latent antisemitism in Germany, which we cannot counter by remaining silent.”<sup>66</sup>

The topos of the ‘nazification’ of Israel can also manifest itself in the topos of the Palestinians as “the victims of the victims”, which is for instance advanced by the Jewish-born philosopher Ernst Tugendhat, who in his acceptance speech on the occasion of his receiving of the Meister Eckhart Award by the Identity Foundation in 2005 said:<sup>67</sup>

“As a Jew I am ashamed in the face of the oppression to which the remaining Palestinians in the Westbank are subjected to at the hands of their Jewish occupiers. Non-Jews in this country too are not indifferent to the fate of the Palestinians because one can see in the antisemitic past of Central- and Eastern Europe an indirect co-responsibility. ... Since one has to fear that the Israeli settlement policy will be tantamount to the annexation of remaining Palestine ..., one has to ask anxiously: should it have been only possible for us Jews to escape annihilation by shuffling our fate of expulsion off to another people?”<sup>68</sup>

His espousal of the “victims of the victims” topos became once again evident in an interview in 2006 in which he remarked: “Who was persecuted does not earn thereby the right to persecute others. If one has been kicked out of a house, this does not give one the right to break into another house.”<sup>69</sup> Given the implicit but obvious parallel drawn between the actions of Israel and those of the Nazis, attempts at rationalizing anti-Jewish sentiments would appear as a corollary of the underlying logic. Indeed, as early as 1991 – while teaching at the Free University of Berlin – Tugendhat had already posed the rhetoric question: “Mustn’t we Jews not

<sup>63</sup> Open letter by Norman Paech to Micha Brumlik, 29 October 2003, <http://www.steinbergrecherche.com/frpaech.htm#Doppelmoral>

<sup>64</sup> „Vernichtungskrieg“

<sup>65</sup> taz, 26.07.2006, „Deutsche Soldaten in Israel nicht denkbar“. Der Völkerrechtler Norman Paech, für die Linkspartei im Bundestag: Vorgehen Israels im Libanon unverhältnismäßig, Interview mit Norman Paech

<sup>66</sup> Cited in Eike Geisel: Der hilflose Antisemitismus. Anmerkungen zu seiner Hamburger Verübung. In: Ders.: Die Banalität der Guten. Deutsche Seelenwanderungen. (Edition Tiamat, 1992, Berlin), p.100

<sup>67</sup> Ernst Tugendhat: Vortrag anlässlich der Verleihung des Meister-Eckhart-Preises, 05 December 2005, <http://www.identityfoundation.de/pressemitteilungen.0.html>

<sup>68</sup> „Als Jude stehe ich beschämt angesichts der Unterdrückung, der die noch im Westjordanland verbliebenen Palästinenser von Seiten ihrer jüdischen Besatzer ausgesetzt sind. Auch auf nichtjüdischer Seite steht man ja hierzulande dem Schicksal der Palästinenser nicht gleichgültig gegenüber, da man in der antisemitischen Vergangenheit Mittel- und Osteuropas eine indirekte Mitverantwortung sehen kann. ... Da man befürchten muss, dass die israelische Siedlungspolitik auf die Annexion von Restpalästina hinausläuft ..., muss man sich beklommen fragen: soll es denn uns Juden nur möglich gewesen sein, der Vernichtung zu entgehen, indem wir das Schicksal der Vertreibung auf ein anderes Volk abwälzen?“

<sup>69</sup> „Wer verfolgt wurde, erwirbt dadurch nicht das Recht, andere zu verfolgen. Wenn man aus einem Haus herausgeworfen wurde, gibt es einem nicht das Recht, in ein anderes Haus einzubrechen.“, Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 25 March 2006, Die Politik der Unversöhnlichen



say that our arrogance and your antisemitism belong together?”<sup>70</sup> These positions would clearly qualify as antisemitic under the Working Definition of Antisemitism.

Similarly, in May 2007 the *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, one of Germany’s leading academic periodicals on domestic and foreign policy, published an article by Rolf Verleger, professor for neurophysiology at the University of Lübeck, in the wake of a debate about Jewish identity and the relationship to Israel.<sup>71</sup> Having become publicly known as a member of the board of directors of the Central Council of Jews in Germany for his criticism of Israel during the war in Lebanon in 2006, which had led to him being relieved from office as delegate by his hometown community,<sup>72</sup> he had subsequently launched a signature campaign in favour of greater international pressure on Israel to end the occupation.<sup>73</sup> It appears that Verleger’s rather one-sided criticism of Israel draws from sources such as the writings of the aforementioned Hajo Meyer, a Holocaust survivor, who has been trying to establish himself as one of the most vocal critics of Israel in recent years. Pleading for a universalist ethic deriving from Judaism, Verleger’s article refers to the book “The end of Judaism” by “the great Hajo Meyer”.<sup>74</sup> What can be clearly be understood as nothing short of a full endorsement of Meyer’s positions – for there is not a word of distancing or criticism in Verleger’s text – gains a new dimension when taking into consideration that in this very book Meyer speaks among other things of the “Israeli Wehrmacht” and the “Jewish SS” and the myth that “the Jews are aiming at ruling the world” which is about to become fact.<sup>75</sup>

Interestingly, the same issue of *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* also features an open letter by Michal Bodemann, a German-Jewish professor of sociology at the University of Toronto, to Micha Brumlik, defending Alfred Grosser against the charge of antisemitism without dealing with what Grosser had in fact said and written, defending also Verleger’s signature campaign.<sup>76</sup> Once again – as in the cases of Grosser, Meyer as well as for instance those of the American academics Chomsky or Finkelstein, both noted for their recent solidarity visits to the openly antisemitic terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon<sup>77</sup> – the question of whether Jews can be antisemitic blends into the debate about academic antisemitism. That this could even lead to pseudo-scientific etymological strains and quasi-biologicistic patterns of arguing is demonstrated by the case of Kinan Jäger, a lecturer in political science at the University of Bonn, who is also frequently recommended by the Federal Agency for Civic Education as an expert on Middle Eastern issues. After having presented a lecture at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in which he had advanced – in the manner of rhetorical questions – topoi such as that Israel was engaged in “state terrorism” or that Germany had responsibility to the Palestinians (as the victims of the victims), he was asked whether he considered it possible that he was making in part antisemitic arguments. Jäger replied to the question by arguing that he could not be an antisemite because he had Syrian ancestors and thereby was himself a Semite, and that moreover he had recently also found out that he had also a Jewish an-

<sup>70</sup> „Müßten wir Juden nicht sagen, dass unsere Arroganz und euer Antisemitismus zusammengehören?“ Cited in Oliver Tolmein: Deutsche Ethik. Wie der Philosoph Ernst Tugendhat für Frieden und für «Euthanasie» eintritt und damit auf begeisterte Zustimmung in der linken und alternativen Szene stößt. In: Konkret 05/91

<sup>71</sup> Rolf Verleger: Ethnizität als Religionsersatz. In: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 5/2007

<sup>72</sup> taz, 08 August 2006, Philipp Gessler: Vertreter des Zentralrats kritisiert Israel; taz, 14 August 2006, Philipp Gessler: Der Provokateur

<sup>73</sup> This campaign has been also signed by a number of well-known academics. See: Schalom 5767, <http://www.schalom5767.de>

<sup>74</sup> „Vgl. das Buch des großartigen Hajo Meyer, Das Ende des Judentums, Neu Isenburg 2005.“

<sup>75</sup> Hajo Meyer: Das Ende des Judentums. Der Verfall der israelischen Gesellschaft. (Melzer Verlag, 2005, Neu Isenburg)

<sup>76</sup> Michal Bodemann: Offener Brief an Micha Brumlik. In: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 5/2007

<sup>77</sup> MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series – No. 1165, U.S. linguist Noam Chomsky meets with Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon, 16 May 2006; Haaretz, 07 January 2008, U.S. academic Finkelstein meets top Hezbollah official in Lebanon

cestor.<sup>78</sup> Not only does this reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of antisemitism on the part of this particular academic; it also betrays the aforementioned bias that whether a remark has indeed an antisemitic quality depends on who the speaker is or what family origins he has.

The same holds true for researchers of antisemitism itself. To deal with a social phenomenon does not lift a scholar out of a society that also shaped his attitudes in one way or another. An approach to social research that aspires towards enlightenment requires first and foremost a permanent process of self-reflection on one's own biases. As Rensmann has noted: "Research cannot limit itself a priori to an analysis of the extreme right or of neo-Nazism, as much as time has come for such examination. It also has to have an eye on social phenomena such as political, legal and socio-cultural processes and to develop reflexive ways and methods of dealing therewith, mindful of the fact that researchers on antisemitism themselves are not a priori free from activating stereotypes, if they write about antisemitism and about (images of) the Jews, and they therefore have to expose themselves to respective critical assessments."<sup>79</sup> The sociologist and head of the Lutheran Foundation for Advanced Studies in Villigst Klaus Holz constitutes a point in case. He has been noted for his work on "national antisemitism"<sup>80</sup> and also gave the main lecture at an academic symposium on antisemitism that had been organized by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.<sup>81</sup> Yet in a lengthy dossier under the title "Guilt and Remembrance" that was published jointly with Elfriede Müller, a historian, and Enzo Traverso, a professor of political science at the University of Picardie in Amiens and the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales* in Paris, in the undogmatic left-wing weekly *Jungle World* in 2002<sup>82</sup>, Holz reiterates various ideologemes of left-wing anti-Zionism such as the reproach that Israel's Prime Minister Sharon is aiming at the "destruction of Palestinian civil society"<sup>83</sup> and that Palestinian "violence" is a reaction to Israeli "state terrorism"<sup>84</sup>. While stopping short of drawing a direct analogy between Israel and Nazi Germany, Holz and his co-authors compare Israel's policies to those of South Africa under the apartheid regime<sup>85</sup>, while leaving it to others to infuse the 'nazification' topos with a degree of legitimacy: The Israeli filmmaker Eyal Sivan is adduced, who had argued that the comparison between Sharon and the Nazis was customary among Israeli pacifists. Moreover, while calling the remark of the author José Saramago that the Israeli blockade of Ramallah is "in the spirit of Auschwitz" and "this place is being turned into a concentration camp" absurd, Holz, Müller and Traverso belittle his comparison by suggesting that the Nobel Prize laureate only wanted to express his horror at the Israeli occupation policy and had done so by using a

<sup>78</sup> [www.juedische.at](http://www.juedische.at), 04 July 2005, Ralf Schröder: Jäger gegen Israel. Auf den »Israelkritiker« Ludwig Watzal folgt endlich ein sympathischer Nahost-Experte.

<sup>79</sup> „Die Forschung kann sich nicht a priori auf die Analyse der extremen Rechten oder des Neonazismus zurückziehen, so sehr diese Untersuchung an der Zeit ist. Sie hat den Blick auch differenziert auf *gesellschaftliche* Phänomene sowie politische, rechtliche und soziokulturelle Prozesse zu richten und dabei reflexive Auseinandersetzungsformen und –methoden zu entwickeln; eingedenk dessen, dass Antisemitismusforscher selbst nicht a priori frei davon sind, Vorurteile zu bedienen, wenn sie über Antisemitismus und Juden(bilder) schreiben und sich deshalb entsprechender kritischer Bewertungen aussetzen *müssen*.“, Lars Rensmann: Parameter einer selbstreflexiven Antisemitismusforschung. In: Sozialwissenschaftliche Literaturrundschau, Heft 52/2006, p. 63f

<sup>80</sup> Klaus Holz: Nationaler Antisemitismus. Wissenssoziologie einer Weltanschauung. (Hamburger Edition, 2001, Hamburg)

<sup>81</sup> Klaus Holz: Neuer Antisemitismus? – Wandel und Kontinuität der Judenfeindschaft. In: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: Neuer Antisemitismus? Judenfeindschaft im politischen und öffentlichen Diskurs. Ein Symposium des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz, 05 December 2005, [www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/symp\\_2005.pdf](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/symp_2005.pdf)

<sup>82</sup> *Jungle World*, 13 November 2002, Klaus Holz, Elfriede Müller & Enzo Traverso: Schuld und Erinnerung. Die Shoah, der Nahostkonflikt und die Linke

<sup>83</sup> „Die Militarisierung der israelischen Gesellschaft und die Zerschlagung der palästinensischen Zivilgesellschaft sind langfristige Ziele des Premierministers Ariel Sharon ...“

<sup>84</sup> „Die israelische Besatzung ist der Ausdruck eines Staatsterrorismus, die palästinensische Gewalt ist eine Reaktion darauf.“

<sup>85</sup> „Die VertreterInnen eines »Groß-Israel« wollen eher die Ausweisung, um einen rein jüdischen Staat zu errichten. Der Vergleich mit einem Apartheidssystem ist weit zutreffender.“

wrong historical image, while failing to mention a further statement that Saramago also made in this respect: “The Israeli people and its army are profiting from the Holocaust.”<sup>86</sup> The authors go on to argue that looked at through the “Auschwitz screen”<sup>87</sup> that is distorting the perception of left-wing defenders of Israel “Jews are only a metonymical figure, in which the murdered of yesterday are superimposed on the oppressors of today”<sup>88</sup> and that “the banalisation of the events in the occupied territories in the name of the remembrance of Auschwitz deserves our outrage”.<sup>89</sup> While conceding that the Israeli state never intended “to exterminate” the Palestinians, they claim that the continuation of the occupation over decades could also “threaten the existence of the Palestinian population”.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, any existential threat to Israel by the Arab world is denied<sup>91</sup>, while the historical nexus between Nazi Germany and current Palestinian antisemitism – which they euphemistically call “anti-Zionism” – is downplayed.<sup>92</sup>

Klaus Holz not only comes repeatedly close to actuating the ‘nazification topos’ by defending those who draw such analogies and in using Israeli chief witnesses as proof of the legitimacy of such a comparison, but he also rationalises Palestinian terrorism as an exclusive reaction to Israeli behaviour. A similar line is taken by him in arguing that “antisemitism among Muslim migrant groups” rather manifests itself “often only on the basis of their experience in the country of immigration. Its preconditions comprise their social, racist and religiously justified exclusion”.<sup>93</sup> This is relevant in terms of the Working Definition of Antisemitism, which does not differentiate between an antisemitism with or without rational justification, but mentions the following as a contemporary example of an anti-Jewish expression: “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, *or even for acts committed by non-Jews.*”<sup>94</sup> Moreover, recent empirical research also refutes the veracity of Holz’ claim that antisemitism among Muslim migrants is a reaction to the Middle East conflict or Israel’s policies.<sup>95</sup>

The singling out of Israel is clearly epitomized by the boycott movement among the academic teachers unions in Great Britain. It is an example of what the Working Definition of Antisemitism mentions as “Applying double standards by requiring of it [*Israel*] a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”<sup>96</sup> While several boycott resolutions against particular Israeli universities or academia in general were passed in recent years within these bodies that represent teachers in higher education, these could not be implemented for various reasons, but can nonetheless be assumed to have an impact on the general

<sup>86</sup> Simon Wiesenthal Center: Press Information, 2 April 2002, SWC condemns further statements on Israel by nobel laureate Jose Saramago

<sup>87</sup> „Sichtblende Auschwitz“

<sup>88</sup> “In diesem verworrenen Rollenspiel sind die Juden nur noch eine metonymische Figur, in der die Ermordeten von gestern die Unterdrücker von heute überlagern.”

<sup>89</sup> „Wenn Saramagos Worte Kritik verdienen, so verdient die Banalisierung der Geschehnisse in den besetzten Gebieten im Namen der Erinnerung an Auschwitz unsere Entrüstung.“

<sup>90</sup> „Wenn die Besatzungspolitik des Westjordanlandes und des Gazastreifens sich über Jahrzehnte fortsetzt, wäre nicht nur die Existenz der palästinensischen Bevölkerung bedroht, sondern auch die Demokratie in Israel und die internationale Akzeptanz des Staates.“

<sup>91</sup> „Eine existentielle militärische Bedrohung des Staates Israel steht aber im Moment gar nicht zur Debatte.“

<sup>92</sup> „Der Antizionismus in der arabischen Welt und der vieler PalästinenserInnen wird mit dem traditionellen Antisemitismus der westlichen Welt, der die Shoah hervorbrachte, in eins gesetzt.“

<sup>93</sup> „Vielmehr manifestiert sich der Antisemitismus in Einwanderergruppen häufig erst aufgrund ihrer Erfahrungen im Einwandererland. Zu den Voraussetzungen gehört ihre soziale, rassistisch und religiös begründete Ausgrenzung.“, Klaus Holz: „Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus. Islamistische, demokratische und antizionistische Judenfeindschaft. (Hamburger Edition, 2005, Hamburg), S. 9

<sup>94</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism (emphases added by the author)

<sup>95</sup> Draft Report. Task Force Project # 2006-13, Guenther Jikeli: Qualitative Study: Antisemitic Patterns of Argumentation Among Youth with Muslim/Arab Background in Europe, 2006 (unpublished)

<sup>96</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

discourse about Israel and antisemitism.<sup>97</sup> By contrast, the anti-Israel boycott movement has so far not been able to gain comparable momentum in other European countries. However, even outside of Great Britain one can observe increasing attempts among certain sections in academia to promote in a more coordinated fashion positions that come very close or overlap with the topoi covered by the Working Definition of Antisemitism. A case in point was the so-called lecture series “Germany-Israel-Palestine” in 2005, which had been organized by Georg Meggle, a professor for philosophy at the University of Leipzig. While attempting to appear even-handed in the selection of the guest lecturers who were invited to address the audience, Meggle in fact invited a number of speakers who are known to promote positions that would qualify as antisemitic under the Working Definition of Antisemitism, among them:

- the aforementioned Ted Honderich, who on his website had previously claimed that “the Palestinians are right to look back to Fascist Germany and say they are the Jews of the Jews.”<sup>98</sup>;
- the Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery, who in an article had previously remarked “The Sharon government is a giant laboratory for the growing of the anti-Semitism virus. It exports it to the whole world. Anti-Semitic organizations, which for many years vegetated on the margins of society, rejected and despised, are suddenly growing and flowering.”<sup>99</sup>;
- the aforementioned Noam Chomsky, who in addressing the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign in December 2002 had claimed that “[b]y now *Jews in the US are the most privileged and influential part of the population. ... Anti-Semitism is no longer a problem, fortunately. It’s raised, but it’s raised because privileged people want to make sure they have total control, not just 98% control. That’s why anti-Semitism is becoming an issue. Not because of the threat of anti-Semitism; they want to make sure there’s no critical look at the policies the US (and they themselves) support in the Middle East.*”<sup>100</sup>
- Uwe Steinhoff, philosopher and research associate at the University of Oxford, who in his lecture compared the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with the Nazi organizer of the “Final Solution” Adolf Eichmann because of Sharon’s “indirect responsibility” for the 1982 massacres in Sabra and Shatila by saying: “Eichmann has by the way also never personally killed a Jew but has only helped in their murder.”<sup>101</sup>;
- and the aforementioned Hajo Meyer, who in his lecture said that “what is happening to the Palestinians daily under occupation” was “almost identical” with “what was done to the German Jews even before the ‘Final Solution’”<sup>102</sup> and also claimed that

<sup>97</sup> For an overview of the history of attempts at boycotting Israel by British university teachers’ unions in recent years see: Anti-Israel Academic Boycott Resource Center, [http://www.zionismontheweb.org/academic\\_boycott/](http://www.zionismontheweb.org/academic_boycott/)

<sup>98</sup> Ted Honderich: After Terror: A book and further thoughts, 09 December 2002, <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ATT&furtherthoughts.html>

<sup>99</sup> CounterPunch, 02 October 2002, Uri Avnery: Manufacturing Anti-Semites

<sup>100</sup> Cited in: Oliver Kamm, Chomsky, antisemitism and intellectual standards, 15 February 2005, [http://oliverkamm.typepad.com/blog/2005/02/chomsky\\_antisem.html](http://oliverkamm.typepad.com/blog/2005/02/chomsky_antisem.html) (emphases added by the author)

<sup>101</sup> „Eichmann hat übrigens auch nie einen Juden persönlich umgebracht, sondern nur bei deren Ermordung geholfen.“, Hagalil.com, 24 February 2006, Tobias Jaeger: Antizionistisches Einerlei. Unter dem Deckmantel der Wissenschaftsfreiheit: Antisemitismus im akademischen Milieu

<sup>102</sup> „Das „was den Palästinensern unter der Besatzung alles tagtäglich angetan wird“, sei „beinahe identisch“ mit dem, „was man schon vor der ‚Endlösung‘ mit den deutschen Juden machte.“, cited in: Hagalil.com, 24 February 2006, Tobias Jaeger: Antizionistisches Einerlei. Unter dem Deckmantel der Wissenschaftsfreiheit: Antisemitismus im akademischen Milieu

“If there is something such a rise in antisemitism at all, then its main cause lies in the demeanour of Israel itself”.<sup>103</sup>

Stopping short of openly supporting Meyer’s views, Meggle clearly endorses the moral lessons that Meyer claims to have drawn from the past and concludes by indirectly casting the Israelis as real or potential perpetrators: “He, who himself becomes perpetrator, ultimately loses his own soul. (This is the lesson, which [Steven] Spielberg’s ‘Prayer for Peace’ – his new film ‘Munich’ – rightly suggests to us and to the Israelis.)”<sup>104</sup>

The hitherto most notable coordinated attempt on the part of German and Austrian academics in infusing antisemitic ideologema into public discourse was the so-called “Manifesto of the 25”<sup>105</sup>. Although the signatories – most of them more or less well-known professors of political science at German universities and peace researchers – allegedly aim at a rebalancing of German-Israeli relations by stressing the continuation of friendship between the two countries but insisting on Germany’s right to voice criticism of its Israeli partner, their reasoning is not only a flawed one but reveals elements relevant to the Working Definition. Their main argument is that the creation of Israel, which also led to the plight of the Palestinians, was the direct result of the Holocaust, for which Germany and Europe bear responsibility. Hence, while they recognize the “global historic uniqueness of the Holocaust”<sup>106</sup>, they believe that Germany and Europe also have a particular responsibility towards “the Palestinian population”<sup>107</sup>, which “has not the least share in the outsourcing of a portion of the European problems into the Middle East”<sup>108</sup>. “It is the Holocaust, which has brought suffering on (Muslim, Christian and Druse) Palestinians, which has been ongoing for six decades and is currently enhanced up to intolerability. This is not the same as if the Third Reich had committed genocide against the Palestinians. But innumerable deaths resulted here too, the tearing apart of families, the expulsion or the dwelling in makeshift accommodation until today. Without the Holocaust against the Jews Israeli policy would not see itself justified or / and constrained to flout so adamantly the human rights of the Palestinians and of the citizens of Lebanon in order to secure its existence.”<sup>109</sup> Not only does this account of the Middle East conflict distort history in denying the role played by the Palestinian and Arab national movement under the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in Nazi Germany’s war against the Jews<sup>110</sup>; it clearly negates any idea of agency on the part of Arabs, portraying them in a rather paternalizing manner as the hapless objects of German action. “Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters *and accomplices* during World War II (the Holocaust)” is cited as one contem-

<sup>103</sup> „Wenn es überhaupt so etwas wie eine Zunahme des Antisemitismus gibt, dann liegt die Hauptursache dafür im politischen Verhalten von Israel selbst.“, cited in: Hagalil.com, 24 February 2006, Tobias Jaeger: Antizionistisches Einerlei. Unter dem Deckmantel der Wissenschaftsfreiheit: Antisemitismus im akademischen Milieu

<sup>104</sup> Telepolis, 23 April 2006, Georg Meggle: Deutschland/Israel/Palästina. <http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/22/22512/1.html>

<sup>105</sup> Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 November 2006, Freundschaft und Kritik. Warum die „besonderen Beziehungen“ zwischen Deutschland und Israel überdacht werden müssen / Das „Manifest der 25“

<sup>106</sup> „...weltweit historischen Einzigartigkeit des Holocaust ...“

<sup>107</sup> „Als Deutsche, Österreicher und Europäer haben wir nicht nur Mitverantwortung für die Existenz Israels ..., sondern auch eine Mitverantwortung für die Lebensbedingungen und eine selbstbestimmte Zukunft des palästinensischen Volkes.“

<sup>108</sup> „Und die palästinensische Bevölkerung hat an der Auslagerung eines Teils der europäischen Probleme in den Nahen Osten nicht den geringsten Anteil.“

<sup>109</sup> „Es ist der Holocaust, der das seit sechs Jahrzehnten anhaltende und gegenwärtig bis zur Unerträglichkeit gesteigerte Leid über die (muslimischen wie christlichen und drusischen) Palästinenser gebracht hat. Das ist nicht dasselbe, als hätte das Dritte Reich einen Völkermord an den Palästinensern verübt. Aber zahllose Tote waren auch hier die Folge, das Auseinanderreißen der Familien, die Vertreibung oder das Hausen in Notquartieren bis auf den heutigen Tag. Ohne den Holocaust an den Juden würde die israelische Politik sich nicht berechtigt oder/und gezwungen sehen, sich so hartnäckig über die Menschenrechte der Palästinenser und der Bewohner Libanons hinwegzusetzen, um seine Existenz zu sichern.“

<sup>110</sup> For accounts of the role of the Mufti and the Arab national movement in Nazi Germany’s war against the Jews see: Matthias Küntzel: Djihaad und Judentum. Über den neuen antijüdischen Krieg. (ça ira, 2003, Freiburg); Klaus Gensicke: Der Mufti von Jerusalem und die Nationalsozialisten. Eine politische Biographie Amin el-Husseinis. (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, Darmstadt)

porary example of antisemitism by the Working Definition of Antisemitism.<sup>111</sup> The signatories of the “Manifesto of the 25” moreover claim that “[t]ogether with the initially mentioned implicit prohibition to voice open criticism of Israeli decisions philosemitism in Germany bolsters antisemitism rather than weakening it”.<sup>112</sup> The notion that antisemitism is nowadays somewhat of a function of the degree to which Israel is criticized or not, is flawed in the sense that it provides hatred of Jews with a rational basis. It is also relevant under the Working Definition which holds “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews” as a contemporary example of antisemitism.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, the very fact that the authors disclaim to be comparing the Holocaust to Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians remains not only dubitable given the stressed alleged causal link they make between the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis and the plight of the Palestinians, but is clearly contradicted by the fact that the aforementioned Udo Steinbach and Georg Meggle feature among the signatories.

That an obsession with Israel informs modern antisemitism to a considerable degree is confirmed by the fact that the Working Definition contains a section with five (not necessarily exhaustive) examples of possible antisemitic manifestations with regard to the Jewish State. However, while constituting an important tool in identifying antisemitism, the Working Definition has arguably so far not even filtered down to relevant state institutions such as the Federal Agency for Civic Education that amongst other things deal precisely with educating and informing about antisemitism. Its aforementioned employee Ludwig Watzal, who maintains a lectureship at the University of Bonn and whose articles have also appeared in magazines such as *Intifada* on *anti-imperialista.com* / *antiimperialista.org*<sup>114</sup>, a transnational left-wing anti-imperialist website calling for solidarity with Hamas,<sup>115</sup> support of Hesbollah<sup>116</sup> and collecting funding for the “Iraqi resistance”<sup>117</sup>, published a piece entitled: “An Israelization of the world?”<sup>118</sup> in the periodical *International*, which contains statements such as the following: “Does the rest of the world also face imminent israelization now that the US has been israelized?”<sup>119</sup> This clearly relates to the following example of antisemitism with regard to Israel presented by the Working Definition of Antisemitism: “Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.”<sup>120</sup> Moreover, in a (positive) review of “Galilee Flowers” by Israel Shamir, a book which abounds with classical stereotypes about Jewish renegefulness, materialism, control of the world stock market and domination of the media, that appeared in the weekly *Freitag*, Watzal wrote:<sup>121</sup> “To this was added the fact that he [*Israel Shamir*] converted to Christianity as Mordechai Vanunu did too; he will never be pardoned by Judaism for

<sup>111</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism (emphases added by author)

<sup>112</sup> „Zusammen mit dem eingangs erwähnten unausgesprochenen Verbot offener Kritik an israelischen Entscheidungen stärkt der Philosemitismus in Deutschland den Antisemitismus eher als dass er ihn schwächt.“

<sup>113</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

<sup>114</sup> <http://www.antiimperialista.com/de/view.shtml?category=31&id=1042360761&keyword=+>, Intifada 11, 12 January 2003, Ludwig Watzal: Steht den Palästinensern eine neue Vertreibung bevor?;

[www.antiimperialista.org/de/view.shtml?category=31&id=1071150184&keyword](http://www.antiimperialista.org/de/view.shtml?category=31&id=1071150184&keyword), Intifada 14, 11 December 2003, Ludwig Watzal: Zur Nahost- und Israelpolitik der USA und der Macht der Neokonservativen (Neocons) auf die Außenpolitik. Vom ehrlichen Makler zur Partei Israels

<sup>115</sup> <http://www.antiimperialista.org/view.shtml?category=2&id=1063447151&keyword=+>, 13 September 2003, Campo Antiimperialista: Solidarität mit der Hamas!

<sup>116</sup> [http://www.antiimperialista.org/index2.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=4612&Itemid=184](http://www.antiimperialista.org/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4612&Itemid=184), Erklärung des Antiimperialistischen Lagers zum Krieg im Libanon. Stoppt den israelischen Terrorkrieg!

<sup>117</sup> <http://www.antiimperialista.com/view.shtml?category=44&id=1067790557&keyword=+>, 02 November 2003, Campo Antiimperialista: Spendet 10 Euro für den irakischen Widerstand!

<sup>118</sup> Ludwig Watzal: Eine Israelisierung der Welt? In: *International*, 3/2004

<sup>119</sup> „Steht nach der Israelisierung der USA nun auch dem Rest der Welt die Israelisierung bevor?“

<sup>120</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

<sup>121</sup> Freitag, 03 June 2005, Ludwig Watzal: Die echten und die falschen Juden

this. Therewith his problems began.”<sup>122</sup> The Working Definition cites the following example of contemporary antisemitism in this respect: “Making mendacious, dehumanising, demonising, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective ...”<sup>123</sup> The same example holds true for an earlier piece about an Israeli media entrepreneur entitled “Haim Saban, the media and Israel” that was broadcast by *DeutschlandRadio Berlin*.<sup>124</sup> Here Watzal sounded the following:

“The escapades of the so-called Holocaust industry are at any rate rather bizarre and an insult to the victims of National Socialist extermination policy. The actions of Saban have, however, nothing to do with conspiracy thinking, but they are evidence of how symbiotic the relationship between power and money is. Saban’s political desire is to obtain as much control over the media as possible. Peter Chernin, the President and head of the News Corporation has pointed out that the Hollywood mogul has not become involved in Germany for purely financial considerations, but that he regards the the country as the basis for something bigger.”<sup>125</sup>

Juliane Wetzel from the Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Technical University Berlin commented on this radio piece at the time that “he [Watzal] activates the typical clichés of Jewish capital and Jewish power”.<sup>126</sup> Yet until today Thomas Krüger, the President of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, does not seem to have drawn externally visible consequences with respect to Watzal.<sup>127</sup>

<sup>122</sup> „Hinzu kam, dass er zum Christentum konvertierte, wie dies auch Mordechai Vanunu tat; dies wird ihm seitens des Judentums niemals verziehen. Damit begannen seine Schwierigkeiten.“

<sup>123</sup> EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

<sup>124</sup> DeutschlandRadio Berlin, 16 September 2004, Ludwig Watzal: Haim Saban, die Medien und Israel

<sup>125</sup> „Die Eskapaden der so genannten Holocaust-Industrie sind jedenfalls ziemlich bizarr und eine Beleidigung für die Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Vernichtungspolitik. Die Aktionen Sabans haben aber nichts mit Verschwörungsdenken zu tun, sondern sie sind ein Beleg dafür, wie symbiotisch das Verhältnis von Macht und Geld ist. Sabans politisches Anliegen ist, eine möglichst große Kontrolle über die Medien zu erlangen. Dass sich der Hollywood-Mogul nicht nur aus finanziellen Erwägungen in Deutschland engagiert hat, sondern das Land als Basis für etwas größeres ansieht, hat Peter Chernin, Präsident und Leiter der News Corporation, deutlich gemacht.“

<sup>126</sup> „Er bedient die typischen Klischees vom jüdischen Kapital und jüdischer Macht“, Die Welt, 30 September 2004, Benedict Maria Mülder: Rassismus-Vorwurf gegen DeutschlandRadio Berlin

<sup>127</sup> For a more detailed though by no means exhaustive overview of the various publishing activities of Ludwig Watzal see Patrick Neu: Pädagogisch wertvoll? In: Tribüne. Zeitschrift zum Verständnis des Judentums, 4/2005, Heft 176; Patrick Neu: Bundeszentrale hält an ihrem Kurs fest. In: Tribüne. Zeitschrift zum Verständnis des Judentums, 2/2006, Heft 178; Alexandra Makarova: Neutrales Haus in Erklärungsnot. Bei der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung häufen sich Israelkritische Peinlichkeiten. In: Jüdische Zeitung, Nr. 6 (10), Juni 2006; Martin Kloke: Israel – Alptraum der deutschen Linken? In: Matthias Brosch, Michael Elm, Norman Geißler, Brigitta Elisa Simbürger & Oliver von Wrochem (Hrsg.): Exklusive Solidarität. Linker Antisemitismus in Deutschland.“ (Metropol, 2007, Berlin)

## Conclusion

While most of the above mentioned statements by academics that qualify as “antisemitic” under the Working Definition of Antisemitism would probably hardly have relevance under penal law, this does not absolve society in general and its elites in particular from sanctioning such hateful language and those who inject respective narratives into public mainstream discourses. Indeed, as Lars Rensmann from the University of Michigan had remarked, „only the critical public pervasion of one’s proper cultural shares and political-psychological motives that are bound up with antisemitic images, together with a consistent public discrediting of antisemitic prejudice could contribute to a reduction of anti-Jewish stereotypy, and that hence the importance of political discourses and processes of self-understanding should not be underestimated.”<sup>128</sup> Yet it must be concluded that societal decision-makers in most cases fall short of exploiting their respective possibilities, often failing to understand the nature of the problem as such even when pointed to it or shying away from controversial arguments that would inevitably ensue within their own ranks. The absence of firm and consistent political leadership on the issue of confronting the new forms of antisemitism highlights once again the important role belonging to education. It would have to take into account that anti-Zionism – while historically a distinct phenomenon with an only partial overlap to antisemitism – has become nowadays the most modern and socially opportune form of the old anti-Jewish resentment. A separation between the two categories – as is for instance done by the various Offices for the Protection of the Constitution on a federal and state level in Germany<sup>129</sup> – is not only an artificial one, in that it overlooks the core of the problem, but would potentially also abet the social acceptance of modernized manifestations of antisemitism.

<sup>128</sup> „... dass nur die kritische öffentliche Durchdringung der mit antisemitischen Bildern verbundenen kulturellen Selbst-Anteile und politisch-psychologischen Motive in Koppelung mit einer konsequenten öffentlichen Diskreditierung antisemitischer Vorurteile kurz- wie langfristig zu einem Abbau judenfeindlicher Stereotypie beitragen können, insofern also die Bedeutung politischer Diskurse und Selbstverständigungsprozesse nicht unterschätzt werden sollte.“, Lars Rensmann: Demokratie und Judenbild. Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004, Wiesbaden), p. 39

<sup>129</sup> Senatsverwaltung für Inneres. Abteilung Verfassungsschutz: Antisemitismus im extremistischen Spektrum Berlins. (September 2004, Berlin), pp. 7-8; Stefan Kestler: Antisemitismus und das linksextremistische Spektrum in Deutschland nach 1945. In: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: Neuer Antisemitismus? Judenfeindschaft im politischen und öffentlichen Diskurs. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, 05 December 2005, [www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/symp\\_2005.pdf](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/symp_2005.pdf); conversation with Thomas Sippel, President of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the federal state of Thuringia at the seminar “Bildungsinitiativen – Gegen Antisemitismus und Rechtsextremismus – für ein tolerantes und demokratisches Thüringen“, 27 November 2006



## 4. Panel discussion: The Role of Europe's Parliaments in Combating Antisemitism

### 4.1. *Der Kampf gegen die rechtsextreme NPD in Sachsen*

Cornelius Weiss, MdL<sup>130</sup>

Der spektakuläre Einzug der rechtsextremen NPD in den Sächsischen Landtag im Herbst 2004 (mit 9,2 % der Wählerstimmen!) traf die demokratischen Parteien ebenso wie die Medien weitgehend unvorbereitet. Noch wenige Jahre zuvor hatte der damalige Sächsische Ministerpräsident Kurt Biedenkopf erklärt, dass die Sachsen immun gegen rechtsextreme Ideologien seien. Dabei war bereits damals für jeden, der sehen wollte, klar erkennbar, dass die Strategie der Rechtsextremen – „Kampf um die Straßen, Kampf um die Köpfe, Kampf um die Parlamente“ - vor allem in den ländlichen Regionen und kleineren Gemeinden Sachsens auf durchaus bedenkliche Weise erfolgreich war. Immer wieder hörte man von der Ausrufung „national befreiter Zonen“, immer öfter wurden – zum Teil notorisch gewaltbereite – rechtsextreme „Kameradschaften“ oder „Wehrsportgemeinschaften“ gegründet, die Zahl der Gewalt- und Straftaten mit rechtsradikalem Hintergrund nahm stetig zu. Dieser unschöne Teil der gesellschaftlichen Realität wurde jedoch – entweder in der irrigen Hoffnung, dass der braune Spuk von allein verschwinden würde, oder aber aus kurzsichtigen Imagegründen – von der Regierungspartei und vielen lokalen Verantwortungsträgern jahrelang weitgehend verharmlost und verschwiegen. Nun, nach der Landtagswahl, war die breite Öffentlichkeit zwar alarmiert, aber die allgemeine demonstrative Empörung, gegenseitige Schuldzuweisungen, hektischer Aktionismus oder schweigendes Sich-Abwenden demonstrierten zunächst nur die anfängliche Hilflosigkeit der Politik und steigerten damit den Triumph der Rechtsradikalen.

Inzwischen hat sich leider gezeigt, dass die Präsenz rechtsextremer Parteien in Kommunal- und Landesparlamenten keineswegs ein allein sächsisches Problem ist, sondern auf absehbare Zeit zum politischen Alltag in Deutschland gehören wird. Dies ist, 62 Jahre nach Auschwitz, nicht nur eine Beleidigung der Millionen Opfer der Nazibarbarei und ein peinliches Ärgernis für jeden Demokraten, dies schadet nicht nur dem Ansehen des wiedervereinigten Deutschlands, sondern dies hat auch ganz erhebliche politische Konsequenzen. So beschert der Fraktionsstatus im Sächsischen Landtag der NPD, die sich selbst als Rückgrat des organisierten Rechtsextremismus versteht, beträchtliche finanzielle und logistische Ressourcen aus Steuermitteln, die ihren Handlungsspielraum deutlich erweitern. Noch schwerwiegender ist, dass sie nunmehr in den Plenarsitzungen und in der Landespressekonferenz über öffentlichkeitswirksame Podien verfügt, die sie durchaus clever und offensiv zu nutzen weiß. Das ist insofern nicht überraschend, als die NPD bereits Mitte der 90er Jahre den Freistaat Sachsen zum „strategischen Brückenkopf zur Eroberung weiterer Landesparlamente“ erkoren hatte und seither ihr intellektuelles und logistisches Zentrum praktisch vollständig nach Sachsen verlegt hat. Fast alle ihrer bundesweit führenden Köpfe kandidierten auf vorderen Listenplätzen für die Landtagswahl. In der NPD-Fraktion im Sächsischen Landtag sitzen folglich nicht nur die üblichen verbohrten Dummköpfe und Kleinkriminellen, sondern auch durchaus redegewandte, akademisch gebildete und innerhalb ihres rechtsradikalen Tunnelblicks konsequent denkende und handelnde Intellektuelle. Sie treten nach außen bewusst diszipliniert, professionell und fleißig auf und zeigen sich gern als aufgeschlossen für die Anliegen und Sorgen der Bürger. Ihre Anträge und Gesetzentwürfe bedienen (und schüren zugleich!) oft in sehr geschickter

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<sup>130</sup> SPD-Fraktion im Sächsischen Landtag

Weise bestimmte Stimmungslagen, dumpfe Ängste und Vorurteile von Teilen der Bevölkerung. Bei den Debatten im Plenum gibt es eine sorgfältig eingehaltene Arbeitsteilung zwischen den „gemäßigten“ Abgeordneten, die eher (klein-)bürgerliche Schichten gezielt ansprechen sollen, und den ideologischen Scharfmachern und Demagogen, die fast unverbrämt und gelegentlich sogar eindeutig provokativ die verfassungsfeindlichen Fernziele der NPD propagieren, möglichst ohne dabei strafrechtlich relevante Angriffsflächen zu bieten.

Dabei wird immer wieder deutlich, dass sich das Gesellschafts- und Staatsverständnis der NPD grundsätzlich vom Menschen- und Gesellschaftsbild des freiheitlich-demokratischen Grundgesetzes unterscheidet. Die Rechtsradikalen tarnen sich heute zwar gern als Biedermänner und nette Nachbarn, sind aber die alten Brandstifter geblieben. Sie verneinen die Gleichheit und Freiheit aller Menschen und setzen dem die auf der Grundlage der Abstammung organisierte „deutsche Volks- und Schicksalsgemeinschaft“ entgegen. Sie nehmen lediglich aus taktischen Gründen an freien Wahlen auf allen Ebenen teil, sie nutzen unverfroren die Freiheit der Meinungsäußerung, den Parlamentarismus, das Recht auf Opposition, den Schutz der Minderheitenrechte und die unabhängige Justiz, nur um alle diese demokratischen Rechte nach der angestrebten „Machtergreifung“ zugunsten eines „Führerstaates“ nach nationalsozialistischem Vorbild abzuschaffen. Es ist nur konsequent, dass die unbelehrbaren Neonazis auch im Sächsischen Landtag jede Gelegenheit nutzen, um die deutsche Kriegsschuld abzustreiten, die im deutschen Namen begangenen Völkermorde und Kriegsverbrechen der Nationalsozialisten auf penetrante Weise zu leugnen und zugleich antisemitische und fremdenfeindliche Hasspropaganda betreiben.

Für jeden Demokraten ist klar, dass es zwischen den Ansichten und Zielen der Rechtsextremen und den Grundprinzipien der Demokratie keine Kompromisse und keine Vermittlung geben kann und dass der Rechtsextremismus mit allen zur Verfügung stehenden rechtsstaatlichen und demokratischen Mitteln bekämpft werden muss. Die Präsenz der NPD im Sächsischen Landtag wird daher von allen fünf demokratischen Fraktionen - CDU, SPD, DIE LINKE, FDP, DIE GRÜNEN – als politische Herausforderung höchster Priorität gesehen. Es besteht ein breiter fraktionsübergreifender Konsens, dass in dieser Situation neben der legitimen Parteienkonkurrenz besonders auch die übergeordnete Parteilichkeit der Demokratie gefordert ist. Sehr bald nach der Konstituierung des Landtages wurden erste Ansätze einer gemeinsamen tragfähigen Strategie zum Umgang mit den Feinden der Demokratie entwickelt. Besonders wichtig war und ist die verbindliche Absprache, niemals mit Hilfe der NPD politische Ziele durchsetzen zu wollen und nicht zuzulassen, dass die NPD die demokratischen Fraktionen gegeneinander ausspielt. Das heißt in der parlamentarischen Praxis, dass es weder in den Ausschüssen noch in den Plenarsitzungen gemeinsame Antrags- oder Gesetzesinitiativen mit der NPD gibt und dass alle Anträge dieser Partei einmütig abgelehnt werden. Um nicht den Eindruck entstehen zu lassen, dass die NPD „eine Partei wie jede andere“ ist, und sie damit zu verharmlosen und aufzuwerten, wurde weiter verabredet, dass zu jedem von der NPD eingebrachten Tagesordnungspunkt in der Regel nur je ein Redner der regierungstragenden Parteien und der Oppositionsparteien spricht. Dabei werden rassistische, antisemitische, völkische und demokratiefeindliche Aussagen sofort und unmissverständlich zurückgewiesen. Auch das Präsidium des Landtages macht inzwischen bei rechtsradikalen Provokationen während der Plenarsitzungen von seinen in der Geschäftsordnung festgelegten Eingriffsmöglichkeiten schnell und unnachsichtig Gebrauch.

Wer sich im Parlament mit der NPD auseinandersetzen muss, braucht allerdings ein fundiertes historisches und gesellschaftspolitisches Wissen und manchmal auch starke Nerven. Emotionale Reaktionen sind angesichts der Unverschämtheiten der NPD-Redner oft nicht zu vermeiden und zu bestimmten Anlässen wohl auch notwendig. Die Artikulation von Abscheu, Zwischenrufe und Auszug aus dem Plenarsaal waren beispielsweise bei dem Eklat zum Jahrestag der Befreiung des KZ Auschwitz völlig angebracht. Solche spektakulären Schritte müs-

sen jedoch sparsam dosiert werden, sonst verlieren sie ihre aufrüttelnde Wirkung. Provokationen und Verbalinjurien regelmäßig mit gleicher Münze zurückzuzahlen ist auch deswegen wenig hilfreich, weil man den Rechtsextremen damit nur willkommene Gelegenheit gibt, sich als Märtyrer aufzuspielen. Ebenso sollte man unbedingt vermeiden, arrogant und oberlehrerhaft oder mit gut gemeinten Binsenweisheiten und schwammigen Allgemeinplätzen zu argumentieren, denn damit verletzt man das Selbstwertgefühl von Menschen, die sich von den populistischen Thesen der rechtsradikalen Parteien auf diffuse Weise und womöglich nur zeitweise angesprochen fühlen. Es gilt vielmehr, zu den Verfassungsfeinden stets sichtbar kühle Distanz zu halten und deren Parolen und Geschichtsfälschungen nüchtern zu analysieren und mit verständlichen aber wissenschaftlich präzisen und nachprüfbaren Argumenten zu widerlegen. Das gilt insbesondere für jene Politikfelder, die die NPD und die DVU außerhalb des üblichen rechtsextremen Repertoires populistisch zu besetzen versuchen - also für aktuelle Fragen der sozialen Gerechtigkeit, der Familienpolitik und der Umweltpolitik sowie für die europäische Integration und die Globalisierung (die von der NPD regelmäßig als teuflische Strategien des internationalen oder „jüdischen Kapitals“ zur Untergrabung der „deutschen Identität“ interpretiert werden).

Die politische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtsradikalismus darf sich jedoch nicht auf die Parlamente beschränken. Insbesondere in Ostdeutschland hat die NPD die jungen zivilgesellschaftlichen Strukturen wie zum Beispiel die verschiedensten Vereine oder Einrichtungen der Jugendkultur gezielt unterwandert und von innen heraus schleichend verändert oder neu aufgebaut. Nach neueren soziologischen Untersuchungen nehmen rassistische und versteckt oder offen antisemitische Positionen gerade bei jenen Personen stetig zu, die sich selbst der politischen Mitte zurechnen. So stimmen 60 % der Deutschen inzwischen dem Satz zu „es leben zu viele Ausländer in Deutschland“. Es ist daher eine wichtige Aufgabe aller demokratischen Kräfte, den sich in der Gesellschaft ausbreitenden Versatzstücken rassistischer und menschenverachtender Ideologien nachhaltig den Nährboden zu entziehen. Das ist mit kurzzeitigen Kampagnen allein gewiss nicht zu erreichen, sondern erfordert strategisches Denken, das nicht nur an den Symptomen ansetzt, Entschlossenheit und einen langen Atem. Dazu gehört, die glücklicherweise überall im Lande spontan entstandenen Initiativen, Projekte und Bündnisse für eine weltoffene, tolerante und freie Bürgergesellschaft langfristig materiell und ideell zu stärken. Die Sächsische CDU-SPD-Regierungskoalition ist hier mit der Auflage eines entsprechenden jährlich mit 3 Millionen Euro dotierten Landesprogramms auf einem guten Wege. Dazu gehört aber auch, und das wird inzwischen in allen demokratischen Parteien so gesehen, dass bei Manifestationen demokratischer Zivilcourage und bürgerschaftlichen Protestes gegen Aufmärsche, Konzerte oder andere Veranstaltungen der Neonazis – dem viel zitierten „Aufstand der Anständigen“ – neben Künstlern, Kirchen- und Gewerkschaftsvertretern regelmäßig auch Bundes-, Landes- und Kommunalpolitiker in Erscheinung treten und sichtbar Flagge zeigen.

Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zeigen übereinstimmend, dass verdeckter oder offener Rassismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Gewalt am besten auf dem Humus der Unwissenheit gedeihen, während eine möglichst breite historische, politische, soziale, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Allgemeinbildung als Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Wesens der Demokratie die Immunkräfte der Bürger gegen rechtsextreme Sirenenklänge signifikant stärkt. Aus diesem Grunde tragen auch unsere Bildungseinrichtungen – von den allgemein bildenden Schulen über die Berufsbildung bis hin zu den Hochschulen – ein großes Stück gesellschaftlicher Verantwortung für die Zukunft der Demokratie. Es ist daher außerordentlich wichtig, dass die demokratischen Parteien auch weiterhin der Bildungspolitik in Bund und Ländern ihre besondere Aufmerksamkeit leihen.

Die Bürgerinnen und Bürger werden unsere Verfassung aber letztendlich nur dann couragiert und nachhaltig verteidigen, wenn sie selbst die Demokratie als schützenswertes Gut erkennen.

Das bedeutet für die Politik, alle Anstrengungen darauf zu richten, die Vorzüge der freiheitlich-demokratischen Gesellschaftsordnung täglich aufs Neue möglichst für jeden Einzelnen sichtbar und erfahrbar zu machen. Dies ist angesichts des atemberaubend schnellen wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Wandels im Zuge von Globalisierung und technologischer Entwicklung und der daraus für die Menschen immer neu erwachsenden Orientierungsprobleme wahrhaftig keine triviale Aufgabe.

Die Präsidentin der Europa-Universität Viadrina zu Frankfurt an der Oder Gesine Schwan hat in ihrem Buch „Politik und Schuld – Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens“ bereits vor 10 Jahren auf die scheinbare Paradoxie hingewiesen, dass sich die Demokratie ausgerechnet nach dem Ende der politischen Bipolarität der Welt mit wachsenden Problemen konfrontiert sieht. Neben der überall grassierenden Massenarbeitslosigkeit (die zum Beispiel in Ostdeutschland ganze Regionen veröden lässt, für die bisher aber keine allgemeine Lösungsstrategie in Sicht ist) benennt sie als wesentliche Ursache dafür die mit der Globalisierung einhergehende stete Vergrößerung und Unübersichtlichkeit politischer Räume, die immer mehr soziale Gruppen, kulturelle Traditionen, divergierende Interessenkomplexe und ökonomische Verflechtungen umfasse. Die daraus resultierende bisher unbekannt Komplexität der aktuellen Entscheidungsgegenstände erfordert immer komplexere Beratungs- und Entscheidungsprozesse, die sich immer mehr in hoch spezialisierte Expertengremien verlagern und die inzwischen für die von den Entscheidungen Betroffenen weitgehend undurchschaubar geworden sind.

Dies wiederum führt zu einer allgemeinen psychischen Verunsicherung der Bürger, die sich vom Staat und den politischen Institutionen allein gelassen oder sogar hintergangen fühlen, und zur wachsenden Entfremdung zwischen den Bürgern und der Politik. Viele Bürger glauben, dass die politischen Parteien und ihre Repräsentanten zunehmend mit sich selbst beschäftigt sind und sich in kraft- und zeitraubenden zum Teil unwürdigen Rangordnungskämpfen erschöpfen, statt sich – dort, wo es notwendig ist, auch gemeinsam, also parteiübergreifend – den drängenden Problemen der Zeit zu stellen. Die Weigerung, sich politisch zu engagieren, Wahlabstinenz und Rückzug auf eng begrenzte private Areale – die so genannte Politikverdrossenheit – sind die logische Folge. Dies aber kann für die Zivilgesellschaft nicht erwünscht sein, denn sie bedarf zu ihrem Funktionieren und Gedeihen unabdingbar der Teilhabe und des Engagements möglichst vieler ihrer Bürger. Schlimmer noch: in dem so entstehenden ideellen Vakuum breiten sich irrationale Ängste, Resignation und Aggressionen aus, und die von der Geschichte längst widerlegten obskuren Heilslehren der rechtsradikalen Polit-Scharlatane finden zunehmend Anhänger.

In dieser Situation scheint es mir wichtig zu sein, kontinuierlich und hartnäckig daran zu arbeiten, die Demokratie weiter zu entwickeln, sie gegebenenfalls durch behutsame Modifikation der etablierten Strukturen und Prozesse den neuen gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen anzupassen und sie - zum Beispiel durch die Einführung von mehr plebiszitären Elementen - lebendiger und für die Menschen attraktiver zu machen. Der Bundespräsident Horst Köhler hat hierzu kürzlich sehr bedenkenswerte Vorschläge unterbreitet.

Entscheidend aber ist, so denke ich, dass die politischen Akteure der demokratischen Parteien selbst intensiver als bisher darüber nachdenken, wie sie ihre Arbeit transparenter gestalten und damit ihre Glaubwürdigkeit verbessern können. Mündige Bürger wollen nicht ständig mit den von einem Heer von Marketingstrategen, Medienberatern und Kommunikationstrainern produzierten wohlklingenden Worthülsen überschüttet werden, sie wollen nicht Zeugen taktischer Spielchen sein, sondern sie wollen den offenen und fairen Wettbewerb der Ideen und Zielvorstellungen. Und sie wollen die ungeschminkte Wahrheit wissen, auch wenn diese manchmal besorgniserregend ist. Die Menschen wollen sich ernst genommen wissen, sowohl mit ihren Sorgen und Nöten als auch mit ihren Anregungen und Vorschlägen. Sie wollen verstehen können, warum konkrete politische Entscheidungen schließlich so und nicht anders ge-

troffen wurden. Der Souverän -das Volk - will im Grundsatz auf die Integrität seiner gewählten Vertreter vertrauen können.

Die wichtigste Voraussetzung für Glaubwürdigkeit und Vertrauenswürdigkeit ist die Erkennbarkeit einer klaren, begründbaren politischen Linie und der Mut, diese Linie auch unter widrigen Umständen zu verteidigen. Worte und Taten, also Wahlversprechen und praktisches politisches Handeln nach der Wahl, müssen wahrnehmbar übereinstimmen, das „politisch Machbare“ darf nicht mit faulen Kompromissen, taktische Flexibilität nicht mit Beliebigkeit verwechselt werden. Meinungsumfragen, so wichtig sie als Werkzeug für den Politiker sind, dürfen nicht zu Stromlinienförmigkeit führen. Dies erfordert einen zuverlässigen inneren Kompass. Für viele von uns ist dieser Kompass der christliche oder jüdische Glaube, für andere mag es der Kant'sche kategorische Imperativ, eine gesellschaftspolitische Vision oder anderes sein. Auf diesen Kompass müssen wir Politiker wieder mehr als bisher achten. Dann, und nur dann, wird die demokratische Gesellschaftsordnung ihre unikalen Stärken optimal entfalten und die braunen Verfassungsfeinde endgültig in ihre Schranken verweisen.

## 4.2. *About the Parliamentary Committee against Antisemitism*

Jardena Lande<sup>131</sup>

### **The Mission**

The Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism is centred on the principle that Jews in the UK should not be left to fight antisemitism alone. It harnesses the goodwill of parliamentarians from all sides, and both Houses, in the struggle against prejudice and discrimination.

### **The Vision**

As a registered All-Party Parliamentary Group with committed members and an enviable reputation within Westminster and Whitehall for its impartiality, integrity and measured approach, the Committee enjoys unique access and standing.

The Committee's purposes are to monitor and survey antisemitism wherever it arises; to exchange information amongst national Parliaments, non-governmental organisations and the public; to consider and take whatever action may be necessary to prevent further antisemitism; to promote inter-faith contact, dialogue and co-operation; to organise conferences, seminars, visits and other activities as may be desirable to achieve the Committee's purposes.

Membership of the Committee is restricted to members of Parliaments, and associate membership to ex-members of Parliament and distinguished individuals involved in the life of Parliamentary and governmental institutions.

The Committee provides parliamentarians, academics, journalists and members of the public with up-to-date information on antisemitism, antisemitic incidents and the efforts being made to combat them in the United Kingdom and abroad. The Committee commissions research, holds events, arranges briefings, publishes bulletins and provides a forum for debate and discussion on the subject.

### **THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO ANTISEMITISM IN THE UK**

John Mann MP, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, commissioned the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2005 following increasing public debate about a rise in antisemitism in the UK

The inquiry panel, chaired by former Europe Minister Rt Hon Dr Denis MacShane MP, was joined by senior Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and UUP MPs and aimed to:

- Consider evidence on the nature of contemporary antisemitism;
- Evaluate current efforts to confront it;
- Consider further measures that might usefully be introduced.

The panel considered oral evidence and over one hundred written submissions from a wide range of organisations and individuals and published their report on 7 September 2006. [The Full Report](#) is available for download.

The panel's recommendations included improved reporting and recording of antisemitic attacks; a crackdown on anti-Jewish activity on university campuses; and improved international co-operation to prevent the spread of racist material online.

The Government published a formal response to the inquiry on 29 March 2007 and is also available for [download](#).

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## 5. Participants of the Conference

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